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This dissertation addresses the question of liability for oil spills emanating from offshore 
installations, beginning with an analysis of international law, specifically international customary 
law, global conventions and regional agreements. Following the analysis of the present 
international law, a number of proposals are considered in motivation of a global convention 
specifically addressing offshore platforms. Key areas addressed are the scope of the proposed 
convention, the standard of liability imposed, the quantum of liability suggested, financial 
security measures, dispute resolution proceedings and alternatives to a global convention. Legal 
instruments discussed in this portion include the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention, the 
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution and a number of global and regional 
legal instruments. This discussion will also draw analogies with the nuclear compensation 
regime in motivation for strict liability between States. 
 
The domestic legal framework of the United States of America and South Africa are discussed 
and contrasted. The primary federal marine pollution legislation of the USA, the Oil Pollution 
Act of 1990, is compared to South Africa’s Marine Pollution (Control and Civil Liability) Act 6 
of 1981 in order to determine which provisions are successful and which ought to be amended or 
supplemented. Other sources of South Africa law considered include the National Environmental 
Management Act 107 of 1998, the Maritime Zones Act 15 of 1994, the Admiralty Jurisdiction 
and Regulation Act 105 of 1983 as well principles of South African common law. 
 
The objectives of this research are to identify all the international and domestic legal instruments 
that are applicable to offshore platforms, critically evaluate their provisions and propose realistic 
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On 20 April 2010 the Deepwater Horizon, a semisubmersible oil platform operated by 
British Petroleum (‘BP’),1 exploded in the Gulf of Mexico off the coast of Louisiana, United 
States of America (‘USA’).2 Prior to the explosion, one of the leaders on the site (of which there 
were only two) left the installation to participate in a conference.3 The US Coast Guard, after an 
investigation, concluded that his replacement was inexperienced.4 BP had also been advised by 
Halliburton, the engineers hired to design the cement seal that prevents leaks from the well, that 
the mechanism used on the Deepwater Horizon was potentially defective.5 Halliburton suggested 
that BP utilise 21 centralisers to centre the drill – BP were using only 6.6 Reacting to the 
warnings from Halliburton, a BP engineer ordered the additional centralisers only to be overruled 
on 16 April by a BP manager who instructed the staff on the Deepwater Horizon to continue 
drilling operations.7 On 18 April, after conducting additional tests, Halliburton engineers 
repeated their warnings to BP that the Deepwater Horizon was not equipped with the requisite 
number of centralisers.8 BP once again ignored the warning, and on 20 April the well failed. 
 
The well failure resulted in an explosion that killed eleven men and leaked between an 
estimated 56 000 to 68 000 barrels of oil per day for three months until the well was sealed.9 It 
                                         
1 R Abeyratne ‘The Deepwater Horizon Disaster - Some Liability Issues’ (2010) 35 Tul. Mar. L. J. 125, 126. The 
Deepwater Horizon was valued at 350,000,000 US Dollars, carried 126 crewman and was 378 feet tall. 
2 M Fisk and L Calkins ‘BP Gulf of Mexico Spill, From Disaster to Trial: Timeline’ Bloomberg 25 February 2013. 
Available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-25/bp-gulf-of-mexico-spill-from-disaster-to-trial-







9 S Gupta ‘More than 4 million barrels of oil entered the Gulf’ NewScientist 24 September 2010, available at 
http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn19495-more-than-4-million-barrels-of-oil-entered-gulf.html#.Unnz0PlpnSo, 
accessed on 4 November 2013.   
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has been estimated that the oil spill covered 68 000 square miles of ocean.10 This is roughly 
equivalent in size to the state of Oklahoma,11 which is slightly larger than the Eastern Cape 
province of South Africa.12  
 
The scale of the environmental damage caused by the Deepwater Horizon has yet to be 
determined, as the quantity of oil spilled alone is not sufficient to determine the extent of 
environmental harm.13 A similar oil platform spill occurred in 1979 when an exploratory well 
drilled by the Ixtoc I suffered a blowout (this too occurred in the Gulf of Mexico, although the 
platform was within the jurisdiction of Mexico). The Ixtoc 1 spilled approximately 530 million 
litres of oil, nearly triple the quantity spilled by the Deepwater Horizon.14 Despite the alarming 
quantity, the environmental damage was minimal as the oil spilled by the Ixtoc 1 was of a light 
grade and did not reach environmentally sensitive areas.15 This is in stark contrast to the Exxon 
Valdez spill, which, whilst significantly smaller than the Ixtoc 1 at only 40 million litres, was 
environmentally disastrous due to the heavy grade oil and the sensitive environment where it 
spilled.16 
 
Whilst the environmental damage resulting from the Deepwater Horizon spill may be 
difficult to quantify, one can begin to calculate the economic damage that resulted. The 
commercial fishing industry is estimated to have suffered a 40% loss of sales revenue in 2010, 
amounting to approximately $4.36 billion.17 The tourism industry was also affected – albeit less 
than initially predicted – suffering an estimated loss of $3.8 billion.18 The real estate industry 
was similarly impacted, with the value of coastal properties exposed to the oil spill decreasing by 
                                         
10 C Robertson and C Krauss ‘Gulf Spill is the Largest of its Kind, Scientists Say’ N.Y. Times 2 August 2010, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/03/us/03spill.html?_r=1&fta=y, accessed on 3 March 2013. 
11 J Gillis ‘An Oil Slick to Rival Oklahoma’ New York Times 28 July 2010, available at 
http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/28/an-oil-slick-to-rival-oklahoma/, accessed on 19 May 2013. 
12 The size of the Eastern Cape Province is approximately 168 966 square kilometres. See 
http://www.southafrica.info/about/geography/eastern-cape.htm#.UmTIoJS6TGA, accessed on 21 October 2013. 
13 P Alhous, P McKenna and C Stier ‘Gulf leak: biggest spill may not be biggest disaster’ NewScientist 14 June 
2010, available at http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn19016-gulf-leak-biggest-spill-may-not-be-biggest-




17 L Smith, M Smith and P Ashcroft ‘Analysis of Environmental and Economic Damages from British Petroleum’s 
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill’ (2010) Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1653078, 11. 
18 Ibid, 12.  
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10%.19 BP itself has estimated that the Deepwater Horizon spill, excluding sanctions, will cost 
the company approximately $32.2 billion.20 
 
Oil spills from offshore platforms can also be transboundary in nature. The Ixtoc 1 spill 
travelled across state boundaries and polluted the coasts of the USA. Despite calls that followed 
the Ixtoc 1 incident to introduce legal instruments to allocate liability and regulate drilling from 
oil platforms, the situation remained largely unchanged until the Deepwater Horizon disaster. In 
2009 the Montara Wellhead Platform suffered a well blowout off the coast of Australia and the 
resulting oil slick damaged the coast of Indonesia.21 The Montara spill created an oil slick that 
covered approximately 90 thousand square kilometres, making it the largest oil spill in 
Australia’s history.22 In its wake there has been renewed scrutiny of international and domestic 
instruments governing liability for oil spills emanating from offshore oil platforms. The 
exploration and exploitation of offshore oil and gas is the largest marine industry.23 It is readily 
apparent that the current international regime governing liability for such spills is vague at best, 
absent at worst. This lacuna has not escaped criticism from the media,24 and there is an 
environmental and political need to effect a solution. Such a solution is urgently needed as 
offshore exploitation constitutes approximately 30% of the global oil production and 20% of oil 
reserves.25 It is therefore necessary to study various international law principles and instruments, 
as well as the domestic legislation of states, in order to determine their applicability to offshore 




                                         
19 Ibid, 12.  
20 Ibid, 14. 
21 M White ‘First Montara, then Deepwater Horizon - is Australia protected from catastrophic oil spills?’ The 
Conversation, available at https://theconversation.com/first-montara-then-deepwater-horizon-is-australia-protected- 
from-catastrophic-oil-spills-996, accessed on 25 August 2013. 
22 Ibid. 
23 L Wrathall ‘The Vulnerability of Subsea Infrastructure to Underwater Attack: Legal Shortcomings and the Way 
Forward’ (2010-2011) 12 San Diego Int’l L.J. 223, 225. 
24 K Galbraith ‘Gap in Rules on Oil Spills from Wells’ New York Times 16 May 2010, 
www.nytimes.com/2010/05/17/business/energy-environment/17green.html?_r=0, accessed on 15 February 2013. 
25 L Chabason ‘Offshore Oil Exploitation: A New Frontier for International Environmental Law’ (2011) Working 
Papers No 11/2011 IDDRI, available at http://www.iddri.org/Publications/Collections/Idees-pour-le-





Oil spills on the scale of the Deepwater Horizon may be infrequent, but they are 
economically and environmentally devastating. Liability in these instances needs to be clear, as 
in the absence of defined and enforceable liability, the likelihood that necessary precautions will 
be taken by the operators of offshore platforms is diminished. This dissertation is an endeavour 
1) to investigate the current legal regimes (international and domestic) imposing liability on 
parties for oil spills emanating from offshore oil platforms; and 2) to scrutinise the suggestions of 
leading authors to remedy the lacunae that presently exist in the law, in an attempt to identify the 
most appropriate legislative steps to remedy those gaps. Issues such as the standard of liability 
imposed, the quantum of liability imposed, the financial security measures required, and the 
dispute resolution process will be canvassed. Emerging from this analysis, the best practices at 
both the domestic and international level will be incorporated into a series of proposals to 




The starting point is an analysis of international law that is applicable to oil platform spills. 
This analysis of international law will commence with a consideration of the applicable 
customary international law principles arising from key decisions of the International Court of 
Justice and works of the International Law Commission. The Stockholm Declaration26 and the 
Rio Declaration27 will be discussed for the purposes of applying their principles in the specific 
context of offshore oil pollution. In addition, the Space Objects Convention,28 a global 
convention imposing strict liability on states for transboundary harm, will be considered in 
support of imposing strict liability on states of transboundary oil pollution. 
 
                                         
26 The Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 16 June 1972, U.N. 
Doc. A/Conf. 48/14 at 2-65 (1972) (‘Stockholm Declaration’). 
27 Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 14 June 1992, U.N. 
Doc. A/Conf. 151/26 (Vol. I). 
28 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 29 November 1971, 961 U.N.T.S. 
187, 1 September 1972. 
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Following the commentary on customary international law, a study of key global conventions 
addressing marine pollution will be undertaken. This will comprise of an examination of the 
United Nations Law of the Sea Convention, the London Dumping Convention,29 the Oil 
Pollution Preparedness and Response Convention,30 MARPOL,31 and the CLC 6932 and Fund33 
Conventions (including their updated protocols).34 This analysis will be conducted with the 
object of identifying whether these leading global conventions impose liability on states for 
pollution emanating from offshore installations, whether the flag or the coastal state bears the 
burden of regulating offshore activities, and what liability (if any) may be imposed by these 
conventions. This will be accompanied by a critique of these conventions and a commentary on 
their applicability to offshore installations. This will conclude with a study of CLEE,35 an 
instrument addressing pollution from offshore installations but which failed to obtain the support 
of the international community. 
 
The next aspect of international law addressed will be regional instruments. In the light of the 
identified failings of the global international regime, various regional frameworks will be 
identified and assessed to determine whether they are sufficient to address any lacunae that may 
exist. This consideration will begin with a study of OPOL,36 followed by OSPAR,37 the 
                                         
29 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 30 August 1975, 11 
ILM 1294 (‘London Convention’). 
30 International Convention on Oil Pollution, Preparedness, Response and Co-operation 1990, 30 November 1990, 
1891 UNTS 78. 
31 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, adopted 2 November 1973, 1340 
UNTS 184, (entered into force 2 October 1983), amended by Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Ships 1973, adopted 17 February 1978, 1340 UNTS 61 
(entered into force 2 October 1983). 
32 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution, 29 November 1969, 973 U.N.T.S 3. 
33 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution 
Damage, 18 December 1971, 1110 U.N.T.S. 57. 
34 1992 Protocol to amend the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 27 
November 1992, 1956 U.N.T.S. 255, 30 May 1996 (‘1992 CLC Protocol’). 1992 Protocol to amend the 1971 
International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 
27 November 1992, 1953 U.N.T.S. 330, 30 May 1996 (‘1992 Fund Protocol’). 
35 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from Exploration for and Exploitation of 
Seabed Mineral Resources, 1 May 1977, 16 ILM 1451 (‘CLEE’). 
36 Offshore Pollution Liability Agreement, (1974) 13 I.L.M. 1409 and (1975) 14 I.L.M. 147, available at 
http://www.opol.org.uk/downloads/opol-agreement-jul12.PDF, accessed on 1 June 2013 (‘OPOL’). 
37 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic 1992, 22 September 1992, 
2354 UNTS 67, 25 March 1998. (‘OSPAR’). 
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Barcelona Convention,38 the Kuwait Convention,39 as well as the Helsinki Convention.40 In 
addition to these select conventions, brief mention will be made of other regional instruments, 
notably the marine pollution directive of the European Union.41 These instruments will be 
critiqued in the context of their liability provisions and whether they create an effective 
regulatory regime. 
 
Chapter 3 will address the domestic legislation of the United States of America and South 
Africa. This will be done in an attempt to identify best practices that may be used to propose 
amendments to South Africa’s legal regime. This chapter will commence with an evaluation of 
American legislation and case law that is applicable to oil platforms spills, primarily focusing on 
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.42 This analysis will include commentary on the Ixtoc I spill, Exxon 
Valdez and Deepwater Horizon spills. As was done with international law, this commentary will 
be restricted to questions of civil liability. This evaluation will include a comparison between 
USA regime and the international law regime to determine whether America’s unilateral 
approach is laudable or concerning.  
 
South Africa’s legislative readiness to deal with the consequences of an oil spill will be 
examined in light of the prevailing international, regional and American regimes. This 
examination will entail a comprehensive consideration of existing legislation, primarily the 
Constitution,43 the MPCCLA (with its accompanying regulations),44 and the Maritime Zones 
Act.45 The MPCCLA specifically recognises discharges of harmful substances from ‘offshore 
installations’46 and contains detailed regulations for the inspection of such installations,47 thus 
                                         
38 Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution 1976, 16 February 1976, 1002 UNTS 
27, 12 February 1978 (‘Barcelona Convention’). 
39 Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution, 24 
April 1978, 17 I.L.M. 511, 1 July 1979 (‘Kuwait Convention’). 
40 1992 Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, 9 April 1992, 13 I.L.M. 
546, 17 January 2000 (‘Helsinki Convention’). 
41 Directive 2004/35/CE of the European Parliament and of the Council, 21 April 2004, L143/56 Official Journal of 
the European Union 30.4.2004. 
42 Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §2701 (ÓPA 90’). 
43 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (‘The Constitution’). 
44 Marine Pollution (Control and Civil Liability) Act 6 of 1981 (‘MPCCLA’).  
45 Act 15 of 1994. 
46 MPCCLA,s1. 
47 The Prevention and Combating of Pollution of the Sea by Oil Act Regulations in GN 1276 GG 9277 of 29 June 
1984, Reg. 24 and 26. 
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rendering it directly applicable to offshore oil platforms and any spills emanating from them. 
Furthermore, this section will address questions of jurisdiction, considering whether (in addition 
to the MPCCLA) offshore installations are subject to the provisions of NEMA,48 and the 
principles of admiralty law and customary law. This analysis will consider the scope of South 
Africa’s liability in the event of an oil spill and whether it is sufficient to address the reality of a 
modern-day offshore platform spill. This chapter will conclude with a comparison between 
South African and American law in order to determine whether South Africa’s law is truly 
sufficient to address a major oil spill off its coast. 
 
Chapter 4 will consider a variety of proposals on how to remedy the legal framework which 
exists at the international level. In this regard, the creation of a global convention specifically 
addressing pollution from offshore installations will be motivated. Particular attention will be 
given to certain key areas: the scope of such a global convention, liability under the convention, 
financial security measures mandated by the proposed convention, and the settlement of disputes 
under the convention. This section will include reference to CLEE, proposals made by the 
Comité Maritime International and analogies will be drawn between transboundary marine 
pollution and transboundary nuclear pollution. The purpose of this chapter is to consider whether 
there is an achievable solution that addresses the major concerns raised in the analysis of the 
global and regional instruments. 
 
Chapter 5 is the concluding chapter and will comprise of a précis of the conclusions drawn 
throughout the paper, and recommendations for future legislation in this area moving forward. 
 
                                         
48 National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 (‘NEMA’) 
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CHAPTER 2 - THE INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY REGIME 
 
Due to the international nature of modern resource exploration and exploitation,1 it is perhaps 
unsurprising that a number of international law authorities seek to regulate offshore platforms. 
These sources range from principles of customary international law, to global conventions, and 
to regional instruments. Whilst these sources are numerous, it is disconcerting to note that few 
are directly applicable to spills from oil platforms. Those that are applicable (directly or 
indirectly) are often incomplete in the context of liability as they fail to address large-scale oil 
pollution.  
 
2.1. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW 
 
Customary international law (‘CIL’) is a fairly difficult concept to define, as its precise 
nature is the subject of some debate amongst scholars. Resulting from this uncertainty, states 
differ in their interpretation of their obligations under CIL, which inevitably sows the seeds of 
dispute. CIL has traditionally been defined as arising ‘from widespread state practice and opinio 
juris - a sense of legal obligation.’2 This definition has been recognised as problematic due to 
differing opinions of what constitutes ‘widespread’ and what actions form ‘state practice’.3 
Certain scholars recognise the development of a new, flexible view of CIL. These scholars 
suggest that contemporary CIL is derived ‘in a loose way from treaties (ratified or not), U.N. 
General Assembly resolutions, international commissions, and academic commentary - but all 
[coloured] by a moralism reminiscent of the natural law view’.4 This contemporary definition 
suggests that CIL and multi-lateral conventions/agreements are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive.5  
                                         
1 It is quite plausible for a number of multinational corporations to have a financial interest in an offshore oil 
platform, operated in a country other those where they are registered. This results in a situation where a number of 
legal systems regulate different aspects of offshore drilling. Drilling may also occur in international waters, thus 
introducing international law instead of mere domestic regulation. 
2 A Guzman ‘A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law’ (2002) 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1823, 1874. 
3 Ibid. 
4 J Goldsmith and E Posner ‘Understanding the Resemblance Between Modern and Traditional Customary 
International Law’ (1999) 40 Va. J. Int’l L. 639, 640. 





For the sake of convenience, CIL will be discussed separately from the global and regional 
conventions. CIL will be considered in the marine pollution context and the applicability of 
certain general principles to the question of liability in the specific context of oil spills from 
offshore platforms will be discussed.  
 
2.1.1. The Duty of States to Prevent Transboundary Environmental Harm under CIL: 
 
The issues of transboundary pollution and the state liability were directly addressed in the 
Trail Smelter Arbitration.6 The dispute was caused by fumes travelling from a smelter in Canada 
into the state of Washington in the USA. The two countries created the Trail Smelter Convention 
in order to convene a tribunal to resolve the issue.7 The tribunal reached a decision that 
prohibited the smelter from causing further harm to Washington state’s environment, declaring 
that ‘no state has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause 
injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties of persons therein, when the 
case is of serious consequence.’8 Hancock and Stone note that commentators have accepted this 
principle as the basis of the duty of states to ensure that no acts within their jurisdiction cause 
harm to the water or air of other states.9 The exact ambit of this principle remains unclear, and 
the position is perhaps best encapsulated by Douglas who writes ‘the truth is that there is no 
accepted international law - which usually is based on custom, treaty or convention - stating the 
duty which one state owes its neighbour’ respecting pollution’.10 Hancock suggests that the result 
of the Trail Smelter Arbitration is a recognition of the CIL duty on states to prevent causing 
transboundary environmental harm to neighbouring states, with such a duty potentially including 
the payment of compensation on the part of the polluting state.11 This same duty was recognised 
in the first case heard by the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’), the Corfu Channel case,12 in 
                                         
6 3 R. Int’l Arb. Awards 1938 (1941). 
7 Convention for Settlement of Difficulties Arising from Operation of Smelter Trail, B.C., 15 April 1935, United 
States-Canada, 49 Stat. 3245, T.S. No. 893, 3 R. Int’l Arb. Awards 1907 (1935) (‘Trail Smelter Convention’). 
8 Trail Smelter Arbitration, 3 R. Int’l Arb. Awards at 1938, 1965. 
9 W Hancock and R Stone ‘Liability for Transactional Pollution Caused by Offshore Oil Rig Blowouts’ (1981) 5 
Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 377, 379-380. 
10 W Douglas ‘Environmental Problems of the Oceans: The Need for International Controls’ (1971) 1 Envtl. L. 149, 
155. At the time this article was written, Douglas was an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court. 
11 Hancock and Stone (note 9 above) 380. 
12 Corfu Channel case (U.K. v Alb.), Judgment of April 9th, 1949: I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 4. 
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which the ICJ held that in accordance with ‘certain general and well-recognised principles’ every 
state has the ‘obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the 
rights of other states.’13 Whilst this case dealt with Albania’s failure to disclose the presence of a 
minefield to the United Kingdom, the duty confirmed by the ICJ is general in nature and is 
therefore applicable to environmental matters. Commentators have also noted that the ICJ in its 
decision ‘clearly rejects the idea that state liability presupposes “culpa” on the part of the 
individual whose conduct is imputed to the state.’14 Sucharitkul states that as a result of the Trail 
Smelter Arbitration and the Corfu Channel case, amongst others, it is clear that ‘a state must not 
only refrain from harming or hurting neighbouring states, it must also prevent harm in the 
territories of neighbouring states.’15  
 
The obligation on states not to cause harm to a neighbouring state is echoed in the principle 
of bon voisinage (the good neighbour principle), which has been recognised as a ‘fundamental 
rule of international law’,16 even being expressly recognised by the Charter of the United 
Nations.17 Additionally, CIL requires states to consider the interests of other states in the exercise 
of their sovereignty in accordance with the sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use your 
property in a manner that does not harm others) rule.18 This principle was recognised by the ICJ 
in the Corfu Channel case.19 It would therefore seem that the principle that states ought to 
prevent harm caused by transboundary pollution to their neighbouring states has been recognised 
by certain international arbitral bodies. It follows that one must next canvas specific 
environmental decisions and legal instruments to determine how this obligation ought to be 
interpreted in the context of marine pollution. 
 
                                         
13 Ibid, 22. 
14 G Handl ‘International Liability of States for Marine Pollution’ (1983) 21 Can. Y.B. Int’l L. 85, 96. 
15 S Sucharitkul ‘State Responsibility and International Liability under International Law’ 18 Loy. L. A. Int’l & 
Comp. L. Rev. 821, 829. 
16 S Kirchner ‘State Responsibility for Transboundary Ecological Damage: The Case of the Chinese Benzole Spill’ 
(2005) SSRN 895847, 11, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID895847_code343201.pdf?abstractid=895847&mirid=1, accessed 
24 July 2013. 
17 Preamble of Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI. 
18 Kirchner (note 16 above) 12. This principle was also recognised as a fundamental principle of South African 
property law in Regal v African Superslate (Pty) Ltd 1963 (1) SA 102 (A) at 106. 
19 Corfu Channel case (note 12 above) 22. 
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The duty on states to ensure that their activities do not cause environmental harm to their 
neighbours was recognised in Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration.20 Principle 21 specifies 
that states have the ‘sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or 
control do not cause damage to the environment of other states.’21 Hancock and Stone state that 
Principle 21 is a clear endorsement of the Trail Smelter Arbitration decision.22 Principle 21 has 
subsequently been preserved in Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development (‘Rio Declaration'),23 given 20 years after the Stockholm Declaration. Principle 13 
of the Rio Declaration, in a similar vein to Principle 22 of the Stockholm Declaration, 
encourages states to develop international law in an ‘expeditious and more determined manner’ 
to address liability for polluting activities. It is submitted that it is clear from the Rio Declaration, 
that the rule arising from the Trail Smelter Arbitration award is still accepted by the international 
community as CIL. This is significant as oil spills have the potential to be transboundary in 
nature, and states would therefore be able to avail themselves of this principle in the event of a 
dispute. 
 
Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration has enjoyed support from a number of authoritative 
sources. The ICJ, in the Pulp Mills judgment,24 stated that it is ‘every state’s obligation not to 
allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other states’.25 The ICJ 
further stated that ‘a state is thus obliged to use all the means at its disposal in order to avoid 
activities which take place in its territory, or in any area under its jurisdiction, causing significant 
damage to the environment of another state’.26 The ICJ noted that this obligation ‘is now part of 
the corpus of international law relating to the environment.’27 Boyle notes that the ICJ’s decision 
                                         
20 The Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 16 June 1972, U.N. 
Doc. A/Conf. 48/14 at 2-65 (1972) (‘Stockholm Declaration’). 
21 Principle 22 adds to this by requiring states to cooperate in developing the international law concerning liability 
for transboundary environmental harm. 
22 Hancock and Stone (note 9 above) 381. 
23 Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 14 June 1992, U.N. 
Doc. A/Conf. 151/26 (Vol. I). 
24 International Court of Justice, Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay), 
Judgment of 20 April 2010. 
25 Ibid, para 101 the ICJ quoted its decision in the Corfu Channel case. 
26 Ibid. 
27 See the ICJ’s opinion in Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 
1996 (I), p. 242, para. 29. 
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was congruent with existing precedents and the work of leading authors.28 The ICJ’s affirmation 
of Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration has been mirrored in the 2011 ITLOS Advisory Opinion.29 
In this opinion, the tribunal noted that ‘while it is not considered reasonable to make a state liable 
for each and every violation committed by persons under its jurisdiction, it is equally not 
considered satisfactory to rely on mere application of the principle that the conduct of private 
persons or entities is not attributable to the state under international law’. 
 
Boyle posits that a combined reading of the Trail Smelter Arbitration, the Pulp Mills 
judgment and the ITLOS Advisory Opinion suggests that ‘states will thus be responsible under 
international law for damage caused by their own failure to act with due diligence, but they are 
not guarantors of last resort for the defaults of industry or business. They will not be responsible 
for damage if they have acted with due diligence: there is no consensus in favour of international 
liability of states without fault.’30 As noted above, this is a significant conclusion, as negligence 
may often not be present in the event of an oil spill from an offshore platform. When the Ixtoc 1 
spill occurred, the USA was unable to demonstrate that Mexico had been negligent. It is thus 
necessary to investigate the principles of CIL to determine whether a departure from the usual 
standard of fault (requiring negligence) is possible in the specific context of oil spills. It is also 
necessary to determine the maximum amount that may be claimed in the event of such a spill. 
 
2.1.2. The Extent of Liability for Transboundary Harm under CIL: 
 
As discussed previously, there are numerous treaties and other legal instruments that create 
liability regimes at the international level and these will be dealt with later. The present analysis 
will consider sources such as the reports of the ICL, amongst others, in an attempt to identify 
emerging trends in the context of liability and whether a case can be made for the imposition of 
strict liability (that is, liability without the requirement of negligence).  
 
                                         
28 A Boyle and G Handl ‘International law and the Liability for Catastrophic Environmental Damage’ (2011) 105 
Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 423, 424. 
29 Advisory Opinion on Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to 
Activities in the Area, ITLOS Seabed Disputes Chamber, 2011. 
30 Boyle and Handl (note 28 above) 424. 
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The International Law Commission (‘ILC’) published its ‘Draft Principles on the Allocation 
of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising out of Hazardous Activities’ in 2004 as part 
of an on-going effort by the international community to agree on principles of liability in the 
event of a damaging, but lawful act, with such damage being transboundary in nature.31 The last 
version of these draft principles (‘2006 Draft Principles’) was adopted by the ILC at its 58th 
session in 2006, and was submitted to the General Assembly as part of the ILC’s report.32 These 
principles are not yet binding on the international community, but they represent the likely 
direction in which CIL is likely to evolve and as such, they merit consideration. 
 
The 2006 Draft Principles define damage as meaning ‘significant damage caused to person, 
property or the environment’, including loss of life or personal injury, damage to property 
(including property that is considered part of the cultural heritage), loss or damage to the 
environment, costs incurred of rehabilitating the environment or reinstating property, and the 
cost of reasonable response measures.33 The 2006 Draft Principles require states to adopt 
measures to ensure that prompt and adequate compensation is available to victims,34 and that 
such measures shall include the imposition of liability on an operator or other person, without the 
requirement of proving fault.35 The 2006 Draft Principles additionally recognise that operators 
should establish and maintain financial security,36 and in appropriate cases this should include 
establishing ‘industry-wide funds at the national level.’37  
 
In its commentary attached to the draft principles, the ILC notes that the state itself is not 
required to pay compensation. The duty extends only to ensuring that such compensation is 
available.38 The ILC further elaborated on what was meant by the term ‘adequate compensation’ 
noting that that ‘adequacy is not intended to denote “sufficiency.”’39  This sets a fairly low 
                                         
31 2004 draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising out of Hazardous 
Activities (ILC, 2004) available in Report of the International Law Commission on its Fifty-Sixth Session (UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/L.661, 8 July 2004). 
32 ILC Report A/61/10 in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2006, vol. II, Part Two. 
33 2006 Draft Principles, principle 2(a)(i)-(v). 
34 Ibid. principle 4(1). 
35 Ibid, principle 4(2). 
36 Ibid, principle 4(3). 
37 Ibid principle 4(4). 
38 ILC Report (note 32 above) 152. 
39 Ibid, 154. 
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threshold, as the ILC seems to accept any compensation as adequate provided that the quantum 
of such compensation is not determined in an arbitrary fashion and is not ‘grossly 
disproportionate’ to the damage that has been suffered.40 The commentary states that in the event 
of significant damage, liability is ‘generally channelled to the operator of the installation.’41 The 
ILC motivates this approach by arguing that primary operator liability is common in both 
international and domestic regimes, adding ‘operator’s liability has gained ground for several 
reasons and principally on the belief that one who created high risks seeking economic benefit 
must bear the burden of any adverse consequences of controlling the activity.’42 Handl agrees 
with this approach by stating that it is ‘unobjectionable, indeed eminently sensible from a 
deterrence and compensation point of view, given that it is private parties that most often are the 
primary actors in creating and controlling significant transboundary risks’.43 However he remains 
critical overall due to his concern that the 2006 Draft Principles focus exclusively on these 
‘private actors’.44 
 
The ILC justifies the imposition of the strict liability standard by recognising that ultra-
hazardous activities (which would clearly include deep sea mineral exploration and exploitation) 
carry ‘inherent risks of causing significant harm.’ The ILC goes on to reason that ‘it would be 
unjust and inappropriate to make the claimant shoulder a heavy burden of proof of fault or 
negligence in respect of highly complex technical activities whose risks and operation the 
concerned industry closely guards as a secret.’45 This approach is commendable, as the highly 
technical nature of the evidence emerging from the Deepwater Horizon spill (as well as attempts 
by Halliburton to destroy such evidence) seems to corroborate the ILC’s reasoning.46 A 
significant difficulty - and one identified by the ILC - is the transposition of domestic concepts of 
strict liability to an international level. The ILC has thus created a simple definition, stating that 
strict liability means to ‘make the person liability without any proof of fault for having created a 
                                         
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid, 155. 
42 Ibid. 
43 G Handl ‘International Accountability for Transboundary Environmental Harm Revisited: What Role for “State 
Liability”?’ (2007) 37.2-3 Environmental Policy and Law 116 (‘Handl 2007’), 116. 
44 Handl 2007 (note 43 above) 116. 
45 ILC Report (note 32 above) 156. 
46 T Fowler ‘Halliburton to Plead Guilty to Destroying Deepwater Horizon Evidence’ The Wall Street Journal 26 
July 2013, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324564704578628472663785926.html, 
accessed on 12 August 2013. 
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risk by engaging in a dangerous or hazardous activity.’47 The ILC rightly identifies this as a 
definition that should be palatable to the international community and yet still serves as an 
effective remedy.48  
 
It is submitted that the 2006 Draft Principles demonstrate that there is a noticeable trend in 
the development of international law favouring the use of the strict liability standard in the case 
of transboundary pollution. However, it is necessary to note that the ILC was not attempting to 
‘proclaim or develop’ international customary law, as the ILC was not able to ‘reach consensus 
on what customary law is or should be in this area.’49 Furthermore, Boyle writes that the greatest 
flaw of the 2006 Draft Principles is that they fail ‘to require states as a matter of legal obligation 
to make provision for adequate redress in the event of transboundary damage’.50 This is surely a 
damning critique, as in the absence of a clear obligation, it is unlikely that one can rely on a state 
to voluntarily provide compensation for environmental harm. In addition to the uncertainty of 
their application, the substance of the 2006 Draft Principles is also of some concern. As noted by 
Foster, the principles favour a ‘privatised approach to risk’ as they impose strict liability upon 
operators, but stop short at definitively imposing similar liability upon state actors.51 Whilst the 
provisions do impose strict liability on another ‘person or entity’, it only does so ‘where 
appropriate’.52 This would seem to confirm the suspicion that the international community is 
reluctant to impose the standard of strict liability when claiming from states but the text of this 
provision does not necessarily exclude that possibility. Foster argues that the ILC has proposed a 
‘soft’ set of principles in the hope of reaching international consensus, as the imposition of strict 
liability on states is controversial.53 In fact, the topic is so controversial that it has taken the ILC 
more than three decades of work on the matter to produce the current draft principles. The sheer 
time it has taken the international community to reach this point makes it unlikely that a more 
                                         
47 ILC Report (note 32 above) 157. 
48 Ibid, 158. 
49 M Matheson ‘The Fifty-Eighth Session of the International Law Commission’ (2007) 101 Am. J. Int’l L. 407, 413 
50 A Boyle ‘Globalising Environmental Liability: The Interplay of National and International Law’ (2005) 17 
Journal of Environmental Law 3, 26. 
51 C Foster ‘The ILC Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising out of 
Hazardous Activities: Privatizing Risk?’ 14 Review of European Community & International Environmental Law 
265, 266. 
52 2006 Draft Principles, principle 4(2). 
53 Foster (note 51 above) 272. 
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definitive and binding instrument will be produced in the near future. It is therefore necessary to 
consider other international instruments that support the strict liability standard. 
 
The only international instrument that explicitly imposes strict liability on states for 
transnational harm is the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space 
Objects (‘Space Objects Convention’).54 The Space Objects Convention has been recognised by 
a number of authors as a possible model for a treaty imposing liability for transboundary 
pollution. This is because the Space Objects treaty recognises that launching objects into space is 
an inherently dangerous activity, and thus it is possible for serious harm to occur even if a state 
has acted with reasonable care (and thus, not negligently). Cates notes the existence of a number 
of similarities between the launch of space objects and the exploration of the seabed, as they both 
require the use of advanced technology with the potential for failure even where the operator acts 
with due diligence.55 She argues that in such cases ‘a negligence theory of liability [is rendered] 
impotent because determining the exact malfunction causing injury is difficult’.56 The quantum 
of compensation recoverable in terms of the Space Objects Convention is the amount required to 
‘restore the person, natural or juridical, state or international organisation on whose behalf the 
claim is presented to the condition which would have existed if the damage had not occurred.’57 
A submission can therefore be made that precedent exists in international law for imposing strict 
liability on states to restore the condition of property to the condition it was in prior to the 
occurrence of transnational harm (in this context, transboundary pollution).58 This precedent is 
arguably a reasonable continuation of the principle established in the Trail Smelter arbitration 
(and confirmed by the ICJ) that states have an obligation not to cause harm to another state and 
that they must take steps to prevent such a harm. This duty could now be expanded to include 
compensation for such harm without the requirement of proving negligence. Indeed, a growing 
                                         
54 Ibid, 273. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 29 November 1971, 961 
U.N.T.S. 187, 1 September 1972. 
55 M Cates ‘Offshore Oil Platforms Which Pollute the Marine Environment: A Proposal for an International Treaty 
Imposing Strict Liability’ (1983) 21 San Diego L. Rev. 691, 700. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Space Objects Convention, art. XII. The principle that the quantum of damages awarded must return the plaintiff 
to the position he would have been had the harm not occurred is a basic principle of South African law for pecuniary 
claims. See Union Government (Minister of Railways and Harbours) v Warneke 1911 AD 657 at 665. 
58 Foster (note 51 above) 273. Foster supports the notion that strict liability exists for transboundary pollution in 
general international law, and supports this argument by referencing a number of pollution conventions that impose 
17 
 
number of authors support the establishment of strict (or even absolute) liability in international 
law for harm caused to the environment.59 Such a principle would prevent a repeat of the 
uncertainty following the Ixtoc 1 spill in the event that the states concerned are not parties to a 




It is safe to conclude that CIL is applicable in the context of offshore oil platform spills but 
that it suffers from a lack of clarity and enforceability.60 The draft principles published by the 
ILC are promising, as they recognise the need for implementing the strict liability standard in the 
context of transboundary harm. Whilst this is a positive step, it needs to be developed so that 
states themselves are liable to that same standard, not just ‘operators’. The Space Objects Treaty 
is proof that such an approach is not unprecedented. Unfortunately the greatest problem with the 
reliance on CIL to regulate an industry stems from the nature of CIL itself. CIL, in the form of 
uncodified principles and ICJ judgments, is not sufficiently detailed to be of practical use in 
offshore drilling regulation. A rather cynical view of CIL is provided by Goldsmith and Posner, 
who wrote that ‘with [CIL]… nations mouth their agreement to popular ideals as long as there is 
no cost in doing so, but abandon their commitments as soon as there is a pressing military, 
economic or domestic reason to do so.’61 Whilst this view may be pessimistic, it is clear that one 
cannot hope to eliminate marine pollution by reliance on uncodified principles alone. The 2006 
Draft Principles demonstrate that whilst there is some movement amongst states to address 
incidents of transboundary harm, their failure to agree on key principles after nearly three 
decades is disheartening. A strong political will is required to address this problem and 
unfortunately it does not appear to be present.  
                                                                                                                                   
strict liability on operators. Whilst not explicitly imposing strict liability on states per se, these conventions do 
support the idea that strict liability is an established feature in the context of transboundary harm. 
59 G Doeker and T Gehring ‘Private or International Liability for Transnational Environmental Damage - The 
Precedent of Convention Liability Regimes’ (1990) 2 J. Envtl. L. 1, 3. 
60 Doeker and Gehring (note 59 above) 2. The authors write that it is unclear ‘in the absence of treaties, that states 
can be held absolutely or strictly liable for their damaging activities, even if they engage in ultra-hazardous 
enterprises, or those with a foreseeable risk of damage, such as operating nuclear or other power stations, using ships 
to transport oil and other hazardous or noxious cargoes, disposing of toxic wastes, exploiting seabed resources or 
outer spaces etc.’ The authors further state that in event a state does actually pay, such payment ‘is normally based 
not on customary international law but on regimes for certain specific areas of transnational pollution established by 




There is a need for clear and detailed agreements between states, at both the global and 
regional level, in order to begin to address the problem. Some such agreements do exist and their 
substance (as well as their applicability to offshore platforms spills) will be examined in order to 
determine whether they add sufficient clarity and enforceability to CIL principles.  
                                                                                                                                   
61 Goldsmith and Posner (note 4 above) 672. 
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2.2. THE APPLICABILITY OF LEADING GLOBAL MARINE OIL POLLUTION 
CONVENTIONS TO OFFSHORE PLATFORMS 
 
A significant number of global conventions govern oil pollution of the marine environment, 
yet their applicability to offshore oil platforms is erratic. The majority of global conventions 
focus on tanker-source pollution, addressing only incidental aspects of oil pollution from 
offshore installations. This will analyse the provisions of these instruments; their applicability to 
offshore platforms, the liability framework created by the instruments, and will conclude with a 
critical evaluation of the effectiveness of these instruments.  
 
2.2.1. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: 
 
A discussion on legal instruments relating to the ocean cannot commence without first 
considering the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (‘UNCLOS’).62 UNCLOS was 
adopted in 1982 and signed by over 120 states,63 quickly achieving the status of customary 
international law.64 UNCLOS defines pollution of the marine environment as ‘the introduction of 
substances into the marine environment which result or are likely to result in such deleterious 
effects as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine 
activities, including fishing and other legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of 
sea water and reduction of amenities.’65 UNCLOS created fives zones — (1) the territorial sea; 
(2) the contiguous zone; (3) the exclusive economic zone (‘EEZ’); (4) the continental shelf; and 
(5) the high seas,66 specifying the extent to which states can exercise their jurisdiction in each 
zone. UNCLOS bestows upon each state the sovereign right to explore and exploit resources 
within its EEZ,67 as well as limited rights to the establishment and use of artificial structures.68 
                                         
62 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3. 
63 As of 23 January 2013, 165 countries are signatories to UNCLOS. See the Chronological list of ratifications, 
accessions and succession available at 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm, accessed on 24 May 2013. 
64 Carroll B ‘Drilling in the Deep: Jurisdiction over Oil Rigs Operating Outside of the Territorial Zone in Light of 
the Deepwater Horizon Spill’ (2011) 18 Sw. J. Int’l L. 667, 673. Since UNCLOS’s provisions have achieved the 
status of customary international law, they are capable of being enforced against states who are not signatories to the 
convention - a notable example being the USA. 
65 UNCLOS, art. 1(4). 
66 Carroll (note 64 above) 674. 
67 UNCLOS, art. 56(1)(a). 
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UNCLOS grants states the jurisdiction to enact measures protecting and preserving the marine 
environment with the EEZ.69 These rights are significant in the context of offshore oil platforms, 
as the EEZ extends up to 200 nautical miles from the edge of a state’s territorial sea,70 which 
means that the various EEZs of states cover approximately thirty percent of the ocean.71 A state’s 
continental shelf extends up to 350 nautical miles from the baseline of its territorial seas,72 and 
UNCLOS similarly confers upon states the exclusive right to exploration and exploitation within 
this area.73 Coastal states have the additional exclusive right to authorise and regulate drilling on 
the continental shelf ‘for all purposes’.74  
 
UNCLOS places a number of obligations on states, specifying that they are responsible for 
protecting and preserving the marine environment and are ‘liable in accordance with 
international law’.75 States are required to ensure that their legal systems provide for ‘prompt and 
adequate compensation’ in respect of damage caused by pollution to the marine environment 
(whether it is done by natural or juridical persons).76 States are required to cooperate in the 
implementation of existing international law, as well as aid in the development of such laws in 
relation to responsibility and liability for environmental harm (the article mentions the 
introduction of measures such as compulsory insurance or compensation funds).77 However, 
where a state takes all ‘necessary and appropriate measures’ to ensure that persons comply with 
the environmental provisions of UNCLOS, they escape any liability for such persons’ failure to 
comply with those provisions.78 UNCLOS states that contractors will be liable for any actual 
damage arising out of wrongful acts in the conduct of their operations,79 although the exact 
                                                                                                                                   
68 Ibid, art. 56(1)(b)(i). 
69 Ibid, art. 56(1)(b)(iii). 
70 Ibid, art. 57. 
71 Carroll (note 64 above) 675. 
72 UNCLOS, art. 76(5). 
73 Ibid, art. 77(1). 
74 Ibid, art. 81. 
75 Ibid, art. 235(1). 
76 Ibid, art. 235(2). 
77 Ibid, art. 235(3). This article has been seen as an affirmation of the concept of state responsibility in instances 
where marine pollution causes harm to the environment. See also E Duruigbo ‘Reforming the International Law and 
Policy on Marine Oil Pollution’ (2000) 31 J. Mar. L. & Com. 65, 78. 
78 Ibid, art. 139(2). 
79 Ibid, Annex III, art. 22. 
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extent of liability is woefully undefined.80 A jaded spectator could hardly be blamed for 
assuming that the liability provisions are deliberately obtuse, as UNCLOS has been criticised for 
protecting maritime commercial interests.81 This pessimism may well be warranted, as article 
228(1) allows flag states to pre-empt litigation by coastal and port states against one of their 
vessels for pollution damage, provided the coastal state did not suffer major damage. This 
provision has been criticised, as it is clearly prone to abuse,82 with critics calling it ‘a mockery of 
port state and coastal state enforcement’.83 As one author notes,84 the ‘lukewarm manner’ with 
which UNCLOS addresses liability for pollution from offshore platforms has created ‘the perfect 
recipe for dispute and disagreement’. 
 
In addition to these ‘general’ rights and obligations conferred upon states by UNCLOS, there 
are articles that specifically pertain to offshore platforms within the zones created by the 
convention. Article 60 of UNCLOS confers upon coastal states the exclusive right to construct 
and operate installations and structures for the purposes of exploring and exploiting natural 
resources,85 as well as granting these states exclusive jurisdiction over these structures, with such 
jurisdiction including the ability to enact laws and regulations.86 This includes laws and 
regulations aimed at preventing, reducing or controlling pollution that is a result of seabed 
activities by structures within their jurisdiction,87 provided that such laws are no less effective 
than international standards,88 and congruent with any applicable regional policies.89 States are 
obliged to take any other necessary measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution from these 
platforms.90 It is clear from Article 60 that offshore platforms are ‘ipso facto subject to coastal 
                                         
80 K Agyebeng ‘Disappearing Acts - Toward a Global Civil Liability Regime for Pollution Damage Resulting from 
Offshore Oil and Gas Exploration’ (2006) Cornell Law School Graduate Student Papers, Paper 11. Available at 
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/lps_papers/11. 
81 M Stephenson ‘Vessel-Source Pollution under the Law of the Law of the Sea Convention - An Analysis of the 
Enforcement Standards’ (1992) 17 U. Queensl. L.J. 267, 282-283. 
82 Duruigbo (note 77 above) 78. 
83 J Bernhardt ‘A Schematic Analysis of Vessel-Source Pollution: Prescriptive and Enforcement Regimes in the Law 
of the Sea Conference’ (1980) 20 Va. J. Int’l L. 265, 307-08. 
84 Agyebeng (note 80 above) 11 
85 UNCLOS, art. 60(1)(b). 
86 Ibid, art. 60(2). 
87 Ibid, art. 208(1). 
88 Ibid, art. 208(5). 
89 Ibid, art. 208(4). 
90 Ibid, art. 208(2). 
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state control’.91 Article 80 explicitly states that the provisions of Article 60 also apply to offshore 
installations and structures on the continental shelf. Article 214 of UNCLOS requires that states 
enforce these laws and regulations, and that they endeavour to implement applicable 
international rules and standards established through international organisations to prevent, 
reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from installations and structures under 
their jurisdiction, pursuant to Articles 60 and 80. Finally, Article 194 requires states to take 
measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution originating from any source, ensuring that their 
policies prevent damage by pollution to the environment.92 Article 194 contains a list of potential 
sources of marine pollution and requires states to adopt measures to reduce pollution from these 
activities. This list of potential sources includes ‘installations and devices used in exploration or 
exploitation of the natural resources’ of the seabed,93 which comfortably brings offshore 
platforms drilling for oil (such as the Deepwater Horizon) within its ambit. Article 194(3) has 
been criticised because, whilst it lists ‘particular measures’ to be adopted by states,94 these 
measures do not actually result in reduced pollution.95 This is because Article 194 merely 
requires states to adopt ‘particular measures’ to either prevent accidents or deal with emergencies 
resulting from certain activities, but it does not elaborate on what is meant by this term. Nor does 
the article seek to provide any specific practices that states ought to adopt that would satisfy its 
provisions. Thus Article 194 merely requires states to combat pollution for a specific list of 
activities, which would already fall within the broader obligation on states to protect and 
preserve the marine environment. It would clearly be preferable for this article to specify the 
practices that states must adopt to satisfy this requirement, but the article fails to do so.  
 
Of further concern is the applicability of UNCLOS to offshore platforms as, despite their 
specific mention in the above provisions, ambiguity remains as to the extent to which many 
UNCLOS provisions apply to offshore platforms. Carroll notes that an obvious omission exists 
in Article 1 of UNCLOS, as it fails to define what is meant by ‘a ship’.96 Certain authors argue 
                                         
91 J Kindt ‘The Law of the Sea: Offshore Installations and Marine Pollution’ (1985) 12 Pepp. L. Rev. 381, 412 
92 UNCLOS, art. 194(1). 
93 Ibid, art. 194(3)(c). 
94 Ibid, art. 194(3)(c)(d). 
95 Kindt (note 91 above) 414. 
96 Carroll (note 64 above) 677. 
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that the term ‘ship’ ought to be read to include oil platforms,97 however Carroll notes that this 
would be difficult as UNCLOS specifically refers to ‘platform’ and ‘structure’ in its provisions,98 
decreasing the likelihood that the latter terms are interchangeable with the former. Even the term 
‘oil platform’ presents difficulties, as offshore installations designed to exploit minerals from the 
seabed are notoriously difficult to define.99 
 
It is apparent that UNCLOS directly recognises the need to prevent environmental harm due 
to offshore platforms and therefore gives states the legal basis to implement laws and regulations 
to minimise such environmental risk.100 UNCLOS provisions clearly designate the geographical 
areas in which states may exercise jurisdiction over such platforms, a measure which should 
remove any uncertainty as to who bears responsibility for the platform. Unfortunately, 
difficulties remain as the above measures require states to take additional steps to prevent 
environmental harm, but fail to allocate liability definitively in the event of a spill. It has been 
noted that ‘the regime of enforcement by the UNCLOS continues to recognise the flag state as 
the principle repository of jurisdiction over its vessels’.101 This is troublesome as the sovereignty 
of flag states remains ‘jealously guarded’,102 with flag states often enjoying their protected status 
at the expense of coastal states’ economic and environmental interests.103 This problem is 
illustrated by the provisions of UNCLOS, which places the duty of preventing pollution on flag 
states whilst only conferring the right to do so to coastal states and not the corresponding duty.104 
It is submitted that the reliance of UNCLOS on flag states to regulate ships in the latter’s ship 
registry is unwise, as flag states do not exercise sufficient control over such vessels in order for 
any regulation to be effective. It would perhaps be prudent to require the state that faces the 
                                         
97 G Walker and J Noyes ‘Definitions for the Law of the Sea Convention - Part II’ (2003) 33 Cal. W. Int’l L.J. 191, 
318. 
98 Carroll (note 64 above) 677. 
99 C Brown ‘International Environmental Law in the Regulation of Offshore Installations and Seabed Activities: The 
Case for a South Pacific Regional Protocol’ (1998) 17 Australian Mining & Petroleum L.J. 109, 113 
100 L Chabason ‘Offshore Oil Exploitation: A New Frontier for International Environmental Law’ (2011) Working 
Paper No 11/2011 IDDRI, pg. 6 available at http://www.iddri.org/Publications/Collections/Idees-pour-le-
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the Sea Convention, 1982: A Reassessment’ (1991) 10 U. Tasmania L. Rev. 269, 281. The difficulties created by the 
frequent use of flag states to avoid strict regulation will be addressed in detail later in this dissertation. 
102 E Ellis ‘International Law and Oil Waters: A Critical Analysis’ (1995) 6 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y 31, 42. 
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greatest risk of damage from pollution, the coastal state, to prevent pollution from platforms 
within its territory, as they have means (and the incentive) to do so. 
 
2.2.2. The 1972 London Dumping Convention and the 1996 Protocol: 
 
The Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other 
Matter (‘the London Convention’)105 is an undertaking by contracting parties to protect the 
marine environment against pollution caused by hydrocarbons, including oil,106 wastes generated 
in the course of operation of vessels, aircraft, platforms and other man-made structures at sea,107 
and wastes or other matter directly arising from the exploration, exploitation and associated off-
shore processing of sea-bed mineral resources.108 The London Convention is notable as it was 
the first international attempt to regulate deliberate dumping of wastes and material of any 
kind.109 There are currently 87 states that have ratified or acceded to the London Convention, 
with 20 contracting parties also accepting the 1978 amendments concerning settlements of 
disputes.110 The amendments are not yet in force.111 As concerns civil liability, the London 
Convention imposes liability in ‘accordance with the principles of international law regarding 
state responsibility’ for causing harm to any area of the environment or the environment of 
another state by the ‘dumping of wastes and other matter of all kinds’.112 Additionally, the 
London Convention requires contracting parties to develop methods for assessing liability and 
settling disputes concerning dumping.113  
 
                                         
105 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 30 August 1975, 11 
ILM 1294 (‘London Convention’). 
106 London Convention, art. 12(a). 
107 Ibid, art. 12(c). 
108 Ibid, art. 12(f). 
109 E Molenaar ‘London Convention’ (1997) 12 Int’l J. Marine & Coastal L. 396, 396. Molenaar notes that the 
London Convention was not the first convention to cover situations where waste was incidental to the functioning of 
a vessel or structure, but rather the deliberate dumping of such waste. 
110 See the report on the status of the London Convention and Protocol published on 19 July 2012 by the 
International Maritime Organisation, available at 
http://www.imo.org/blast/blastDataHelper.asp?data_id=31094&filename=2.pdf, accessed on 31 May 2013. 
111 In terms of Art. 15(1) the amendments will come into force once two-thirds of the contracting parties accept 
them. 




In 1996, states, many of which are party to the London Convention, sought to increase the 
effectiveness of the London Convention in order to better address modern disposal practices. To 
this end the 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by the 
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (‘1996 Protocol’)114 was drafted, entering into force on 24 
March 2006 (superseding the London Convention)115 with 42 states parties.116 The 1996 Protocol 
essentially created a separate convention as it has altered or supplanted almost every provision of 
the original London Convention.117 The 1996 Protocol has expanded on the London 
Convention’s definition of ‘dumping’ so that it not only includes wastes and other matters from 
platforms and other man-made structures, but also the deliberate disposal of the platform or man-
made structure itself.118 The 1996 Protocol has adopted a ‘reverse list’ approach, meaning that all 
dumping is prohibited unless the wastes or matter are on the approved list of substances.119 This 
novel approach gives the 1996 Protocol a significantly wider scope that its predecessor. 
Unfortunately, the 1996 Protocol fails to make any significant changes regarding the imposition 
of liability,120 except that it now features a clear procedure for the settlement of disputes.121  Thus 
the 1996 Protocol, as was the case with London Convention before it,122 still restricts liability to 
the existing principles of international law and ultimately goes no further than UNCLOS in 
establishing a clear liability regime for oil spills. The 1996 Protocol merely imposes standard 
liability upon states for deliberate disposal from offshore platforms, which is unfortunate 
considering progressive instruments (such as the CLC and Fund Conventions) have begun to 
adopt strict liability. Whilst such a rudimentary framework is necessary and a good point of 
departure, it does not truly address the massive potential for harm that may be caused by an 
unintentional oil spill. Carroll agrees with this conclusion, stating that the London Convention is 
                                         
114 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 
1972, 7 November 1996, 36 ILM 1. 
115 M Kashubsky ‘Marine Pollution from the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry: Review of Major Conventions and 
Russian Law (Part 1)’ (2006) 151 Maritime Studies 1, 3. Available at 
http://worldlii.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MarStudies/2006/31.html, accessed on 11 May 2013. 
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http://www.imo.org/blast/blastData.asp?doc_id=7541&type=body, accessed on 30 May 2013. 
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119 Ibid, art. 4(1). 
120 Ibid, art. 15. 
121 Ibid, art. 16. 
122 Molenaar (note 109 above) 402. 
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‘no more effective than [UNCLOS], MARPOL and CLC in preventing environmental disasters 
stemming from oil rigs’.123 
 
2.2.3. The Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response Convention: 
 
The International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation 
1990 (‘OPRC’)124 entered into force on 31 May 1995 with 104 states party to the convention.125 
Numerous authors have recognised the OPRC as one of the most important,126 and efficient,127 
global instruments relating to pollution from offshore platforms.128 This is because the OPRC 
makes specific reference to ‘offshore units’ in its provisions, a rarity in IMO conventions,129 
defining them as ‘any fixed or floating offshore installation or structure engaged in gas or oil 
exploration, exploitation or production activities, or loading or unloading of oil’.130 The OPRC 
requires offshore units under the jurisdiction of a party state to have ‘oil pollution emergency 
plans’ that are co-ordinated under a national system and approved by the party state.131 The 
operators of such offshore units are required to report, without delay, any event (whether relating 
to their own vessel or an observed vessel) involving a discharge, or possible discharge, of oil to 
the coastal state which exercises jurisdiction over the offshore unit.132   
 
Whilst the main objective of the ORPC is the establishment of emergency procedures and 
increased cooperation between states in preventing or minimising oil spills, the convention does 
                                         
123 Carroll (note 64 above) 682. 
124 International Convention on Oil Pollution, Preparedness, Response and Co-operation 1990, 30 November 1990, 
1891 UNTS 78. 
125 See ECOLEX list of State parties to the OPRC, available at 
www.ecolex.org/ecolex/ledge/view/RecordDetails?id=TRE-001109&index=treaties, accessed on 1 June 2013. 
126 Kashubsky (note 115 above) 151. 
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128 H Esmaeili The Legal Regime of Offshore Oil Rigs in International Law (2001) 158. 
129 As noted by R Shaw in his paper ‘Regulation of offshore activity - Pollution liability and other aspects”, 
delivered to the CMI Beijing International Conference 2012, available at 
http://www.cmi2012beijing.org/dct/attach/Y2xiOmNsYjpwZGY6Mjg5NDY=, in June 2011 the IMO refused to 
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General of the IMO, there is no UN body that has better authority for addressing these matters. 
130 OPRC, art. 2(4). 
131 Ibid, art. 3(2). 
132 Ibid, art. 4(1)(2). 
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have possible liability implications. In the preamble of the convention it states that the OPRC 
‘takes account of the ‘polluter-pays’ principle as a general principle of international law’.133 This 
is a curious feature of the convention, as none of the articles in the OPRC directly address the 
issue of civil liability. The only portion of the OPRC that has liability implications is an annex 
concerning reimbursement for costs of assistance.134 This annex provides that when, in the 
absence of any other agreement, a state requests the assistance of another state, the former should 
pay the costs of the latter.135 Where a state acts on its own, it shall bear the costs.136 It is therefore 
apparent that the primary consideration of the OPRC is not liability. Thus, whilst the convention 
may be an incredibly significant tool in the procedural regulation of offshore platforms and in 
promoting cooperation between states in the implementation of preventative and remedial 
measures,137 it is unfortunately of little assistance in the context of allocating liability in the event 




The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified 
by the Protocol of 1978 (‘MARPOL’)138 entered into force on 2 October 1983 and can be 
considered the primary international convention combatting oil pollution from ships, with over 
150 states party to the convention.139 The key objective of MARPOL is to eliminate intentional 
and accidental discharge of harmful substances into the marine environment.140  
                                         
133 Ibid, preamble. The preamble also notes the significant role played by regional conventions and agreements. The 
importance of these agreements will be discussed in detail below, coupled with an analysis of the polluter-pays 
principle. 
134 Ibid, Annex ‘Reimbursement of Costs of Assistance’. 
135 Ibid, Annex (1)(a)(i). 
136 Ibid, Annex (1)(a)(ii). 
137 Llewelyn Usher Offshore Drilling in Ocean Waters and its Adverse Effect on the Potential of Blue Carbon of 
Coastal State: A Belize Perspective (unpublished LLM dissertation, IMO, International Maritime Law Institute, 
2012) available at 
http://www.rempec.org/admin/store/wyswigImg/file/News/Forthcoming%20Meetings/Offshore%20Protocol%20WG
%20(Malta,%2013-14%20June%202013/WG%20384-%20INF.5%20-%20IMLI%20Doc%20-
%20Llewelyn%20Usher%20-%20E.pdf, accessed on 11 September 2013, 29. 
138 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, adopted 2 November 1973, 1340 
UNTS 184, (entered into force 2 October 1983), amended by Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Ships 1973, adopted 17 February 1978, 1340 UNTS 61 
(entered into force 2 October 1983). 
139 See the list of contracting states as of 27 September 2012, prepared by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority, 
available at https://imo.amsa.gov.au/public/parties/marpol78.html, accessed on 2 June 2013 
140 E Ellis ‘International Law and Oil Waters: A Critical Analysis’ (1995) 6 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y 31, 41. 
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 A preliminary concern arising from MARPOL is apparent from its title; the convention only 
addresses pollution from ‘ships’. As mentioned above, the applicability of most oil pollution 
conventions to offshore platforms is partial and indirect at best. Whilst MARPOL defines a 
‘ship’ as a vessel including ‘fixed or floating platforms’, it is only applicable when the platform 
is in a mobile configuration.141 This means that MARPOL will apply to a platform whilst it is in 
transit to a drilling site, but it will not apply once the platform has been configured for drilling. 
This has the result of excluding the actual operation of the platform from the ambit of MARPOL, 
thus preventing any claims for environmental damage resulting from a well leak or a blowout. 
This is due to the definition of ‘discharge’ which specifically excludes the release of harmful 
substances directly arising from the exploration, exploitation and associated offshore processing 
of seabed mineral resources.142 Annex 1 of MARPOL provides a list of ‘unified interpretations’ 
that must be adopted when considering MARPOL provisions. Regulation 21 sets out the 
application of MARPOL to offshore platforms engaged in the exploration and exploitation of oil, 
as addressed in Article 2(3)(b)(ii).143 Regulation 21 identifies four categories of potential 
discharges that may result from offshore exploitation of minerals: (1) machinery space drainage, 
(2) offshore processing drainage; (3) production water discharge, and (4) displacement 
discharge; stating that only machinery space drainage is subject to the provisions of 
MARPOL.144 Additionally, where a tanker is utilised as an offloading facility, it is to be treated 
as a platform for the purposes of regulation 21.145  Annex V, ‘Regulations for the Prevention of 
Pollution by Garbage from Ships’,146 is also applicable to offshore platforms147. Regulation 4 
even prohibits the disposal of garbage from offshore platforms whereas ships are subject to far 
less-stringent measures.148 Regrettably, the incorrect disposal of garbage, whilst clearly 
undesirable, pales in comparison to an oil spill, an area MARPOL expressly excludes from its 
ambit.  
 
                                         
141 Kashubsky (note 115 above) 4. 
142 MARPOL, art. 2(3)(b)(ii). 
143 Ibid, annex I, 10.1.1. 
144 Ibid, annex I, appendix 6 illustrates the various offshore platform discharges. 
145 Ibid, annex I, 10.1.2. 
146 Ibid, annex V. 
147 V Radovich ‘International Legal Regime of Offshore Structures - Environmental Concerns’ (2010) Paper 
submitted to 2010 CMI Buenos Aires Colloquium, available at 
www.cmi2010buenosaires.com.ar/papers/Paper_2_Violeta_Radovich.pdf, accessed 31 May 2013. 
148 MARPOL, annex V, Reg. 4(1). 
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A further concern is that MARPOL provisions must not conflict with UNCLOS 
provisions.149 The result of this is that any provisions regulating the design or manufacture of oil 
rigs (or ships in general) are not enforceable against offshore oil platforms, as Articles 60 and 94 
of UNCLOS directly prevent coastal states from mandating the design or construction standards 
of vessels within their EEZ.150 Without the right to implement design standards in their EEZ, 
coastal states are left perilously exposed and must rely on the flag state to regulate the design of 
an installation.151 As Richards writes, it is the coastal state that bears ‘both the brunt of the harm 
and the majority of the clean-up responsibility’.152 One could therefore suggest that as the coastal 
state bears the risk of pollution, it should have the right to mandate design standards for 
installations. However, as installations are often relocated to different states in the pursuit of oil, 
it would be incredibly difficult in practice for an installation to conform to the design 
specifications of different states.  
 
MARPOL has been criticised as states frequently fail to comply with its provisions. Critics 
have stated that MARPOL fails to provide a mechanism that ensures compliance with its 
provisions,153 with others noting that there are few economic or legal motivations to comply with 
the convention.154 A reluctance by states to enforce MARPOL’s provisions coupled with poor 
applicability to offshore platforms leads to the inevitable conclusion that MARPOL, in its 
present form, is of limited application to pollution emanating from oil platforms. Whilst it may 
cover incidental pollution resulting from, inter alia, incorrect garbage disposal, it will be of no 
use in the event of a catastrophic oil spill nor can it be utilised to force a design of offshore 
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2.2.5. The CLC and Fund Conventions: 
 
The 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (‘CLC 69’)155 
was an instrument drafted to specifically to address the issue of liability for pollution emanating 
from oil tankers.156 The CLC 69 was drafted in response to the Torrey Canyon oil spill, as the 
incident revealed the lacunae that existed in the liability regime.157 The CLC 69 defines the term 
‘ship’ as ‘any sea-going vessel and any seaborne craft of any type whatsoever, actually carrying 
oil in bulk as cargo’,158 and thus is not directly applicable to oil pollution from offshore 
platforms. This is because offshore platforms are designed for the exploration and exploitation of 
oil, and do not carry it in bulk as cargo.159 However, whilst the CLC may not be directly 
applicable to offshore platform oil pollution, it is a vital instrument as it encapsulates the 
international law on oil spills from ships. It is not unreasonable to assume that a similar approach 
ought to be adopted by an offshore platform regulatory regime, as there are numerous similarities 
between a spill from a tanker and a spill from an offshore platform. Both activities are 
economically valuable to the international community, both have the potential to draw massive 
liability in the event of a spill and it is impossible to completely remove any risk from both 
simply by exercising due care.160 It is for this reason that an understanding of the liability 
framework created by the CLC is vital. 
 
The CLC 69 imposed strict liability on the owner of an oil vessel for any oil spill,161 unless a 
specified exception applied.162 The reason for implementing strict (no fault) liability was due to 
                                         
155 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 29 November 1969, 9 ILM 45. 
156 Brown ‘The Conventional Law of the Environment’ (1973) 13 Nat. Resources J. 203, 224. 
157 See the IMO description of their work on liability and compensation, available at 
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the difficulty in recovering damages on the basis of negligence.163 In order to soften the blow of 
strict liability, the CLC 69 placed a ceiling on a potential liability in accordance with the tonnage 
of the vessel, with a maximum liability amount of 210 million ‘francs’.164 In order to avail 
themselves of this limitation, the CLC 69 required ship owners to contribute to a fund equal to 
the maximum applicable liability.165 The convention outlined the procedure for distributing the 
fund with the court of the state in which the fund was deposited having exclusive jurisdiction to 
resolve any issues that may arise in relation to the distribution procedure.166 The CLC 69 went 
even further and required a state to directly compensate another for any harm caused by the 
pollution from one of its own ships.167 
 
The CLC 69 was thus a very effective liability regime but the absolute cap on liability was 
perceived to be insufficient in the event of a major spill.168 To resolve this shortcoming, the 1971 
International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil 
Pollution (‘71 Fund Convention’)169 was drafted. The 71 Fund Convention was premised on the 
idea that the shipping industry alone should not bear the burden of supporting the liability regime 
created by the CLC 69, but rather that it ‘should in part be borne by the oil cargo interests’.170 
This objective would be achieved, as Hancock and Stone explain it, by the 71 Fund Convention 
implementing three main concepts: 1) increasing the possible compensation provided by the 
CLC 69; 2) relieving ship owners of any extra financial burden; and 3) spreading the expenses of 
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the liability regime amongst all the major players in the oil industry.171 The 71 Fund Convention 
exists as a complementary structure to the CLC 69, increasing the liability limit to 450 million 
francs,172 and providing compensation in certain circumstances where it would not be possible 
under the CLC 69.173  A major departure from the CLC 69 is the 71 Fund Convention’s 
requirement of contributing to the fund if a party transports more than 150 000 tonnes of crude 
oil by sea per annum.174 The reasoning behind this requirement is to shift the financial burden 
away from the ship-owner and towards the parties who benefit from the offshore oil trade (and 
ultimately the consumer).175 
 
Whilst the combination of the CLC 69 and the 71 Fund Convention created an effective 
liability regime, both underwent revisions in 1992 and were significantly altered by new 
protocols. The Protocol to the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage, 1992 (‘CLC 92’)176 has maintained the underlying structure of the CLC 69 albeit with 
revised upper limits and insurance requirements. Commentators have noted that the CLC 92 was 
drafted in the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez disaster, and contained relaxed ‘entry into force 
requirements’ in order to avoid the need for accession by the USA.177 As with the CLC 69, the 
CLC 92 does not apply to offshore oil platforms, instead catering specifically to ‘ships’ with a 
ship being defined as a vessel ‘actually carrying oil in bulk as cargo’.178 The CLC 92 retained the 
key feature of the CLC 69 by implementing strict liability for damage caused by pollution,179 the 
result being that a claimant need only identify the polluting ship without the requirement of 
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172 71 Fund Convention, art. 4(4). 
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177 M Mason ‘Transnational Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage: Examining Changing Spatialities of 
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178 CLC 92, art. 1. 
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certain circumstances, including situations where the incident was wholly caused by a third party. These limitations 
on liability do not however alter the strict liability standard maintained by art. 4 of CLC 92. 
33 
 
establishing negligence.180 The CLC 92 defines ‘pollution’ damage to include loss or damage 
caused by the discharge of oil from the ship,181 but this does not extend to a loss of profits. A 
claimant may also recover any costs of preventive measures that they implemented, or any loss 
or damage caused by those measures.182 As with the CLC 69, a limit on the amount that may be 
claimed from the ship-owner does exist but this limitation does not apply in certain instances, 
such as incidents where the ship owner deliberately caused the damage or acted recklessly with 
the knowledge that oil pollution would be likely.183 
 
The International Maritime Organisation Protocol of 1992 to amend the International 
Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution 
Damage (’92 Fund Convention’)184 retains its predecessor’s complementary role with the CLC 
conventions. The 92 Fund Convention allows a claimant to recover their losses in the event that 
the CLC 92 does not adequately cover the claim.185 This includes situations where the liable 
ship-owner is insolvent or cannot be identified.186 The 92 Fund Convention has subsequently 
been amended by the Protocol of 2003 to the International Convention on the Establishment of 
an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992 (‘2003 Protocol’)187. 
The 2003 Protocol created a supplementary fund to compensate for pollution damage where the 
claimant was unable to ‘obtain full and adequate compensation for an established claim for such 
damage under the terms of the 1992 Fund Convention’.188 The supplementary fund created by 
the 2003 Protocol will usually compensate a claimant only after they have first claimed from the 
1992 Fund189. The increased amount available to a claimant from the supplementary fund is 
significantly greater than the 1992 Fund, as the 2003 Protocol permits compensation up to 1155 
Special Drawing Rights (SDR) per ton, whereas the 1992 Fund Convention permits 312.6 SDR 
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per ton and the CLC 92 provides up to 137.9 per ton if the tanker’s gross tonnage exceeds 140 
000.190  
 
Whilst the CLC and Fund Conventions clearly seek to address large-scale oil pollution 
emanating from tankers, and they have has been extremely effective in doing so,191 there are two 
clear concerns for our purposes. First, as mentioned above, the two conventions are not 
applicable to spills from oil platforms. Second, the manner in which the conventions’ liability 
limits are increased is concerning.192 There is a noticeable trend of the international community 
setting a limit and only increasing it following a disaster (such as the Exxon Valdez) that exceeds 
that limit.  This approach is reactive and does not anticipate any future crises — an approach that 
is, with respect, short sighted. 
 
2.2.6. Critical analysis of the present global regime: 
 
It is evident from the above analysis that the global treaty regime in regard to pollution 
emanating from offshore installations is rather sparse and inadequate. Whilst a number of 
conventions, in addition to those listed above,193 may apply to certain aspects of the offshore oil 
industry there is nothing on the scale of the CLC and Fund Conventions. There are a number of 
possible reasons for the lack of any unified convention on the topic. The most likely explanation 
for the lack of motivation on the part of the international community is the infrequency of large 
oil spills from offshore platforms. Whilst tanker spills occur fairly frequently, large-scale 
platform related disasters are a rarity and this infrequency has resulted in the seeming 
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indifference of the international community. A further reason could be that many the major oil 
companies are registered in countries such as the USA or the United Kingdom whereas the oil 
fields are based elsewhere, thus creating competing interests between these two groups of states. 
However, as many commentators have noted,194 there is an increased danger of large-scale oil 
spills from platforms due to increased offshore exploration and exploitation. Furthermore, the 
scale of these disasters is set to increase as wells are drilled at significantly deeper depths every 
year. The Deepwater Horizon was drilling at a depth of 1500 m but platforms off the coast of 
Australia, such as the Maersk Discoverer, are drilling at a depth of 3000 m.195 One can only 
imagine the difficulty in capping a well twice as deep as that drilled by Deepwater Horizon, a 
well that took many months to permanently seal. 
 
Hancock and Stone also suggest that the international community is reluctant to introduce 
further regulation to the offshore oil industry,196 as it may be unwilling to place any additional 
obstacles in the path of petroleum exploration and development.197 Their hypothesis would 
appear to be correct when one considers the fate of the Convention on Civil Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage Resulting from Exploration for and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources 
(‘CLEE’).198 CLEE was a convention specifically designed to regulate the international offshore 
drilling industry. In its preamble CLEE stated, as an objective, the desire to ‘adopt uniform rules 
and procedures for determining questions of liability and providing adequate compensation in 
such cases.’199 CLEE was directly applicable to any ‘installation’ fixed or mobile, utilised for the 
purposes of exploring for, producing, treating, storing, transmitting or regaining control of crude 
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oil’.200 CLEE applied to wells drilled for the same purposes.201 CLEE therefore cast a very wide 
net when defining what activities fell within its ambit, essentially seeking to regulate any vessel 
or structure designed to drill for oil (or any vessel that was involved with such drilling). CLEE 
applied exclusively to pollution damage resulting from an incident occurring in waters under the 
jurisdiction of a controlling state, with such damage being suffered in the territory of a party state 
or an area of where it had sovereign rights in terms of international law.202 The operator would 
be liable for all damages recovered under CLEE unless it is able to demonstrate that the damage 
occurred due to certain events such as an exceptional natural disaster, civil war or other 
hostilities.203 CLEE was clearly modelled on the CLC and Fund Conventions, incorporating 
concepts such as strict liability with a limit on the amount that could be claimed from an 
operator, unless that operator could be shown to have intentionally caused the pollution or that he 
acted with gross negligence.204 The drafters of CLEE presumably observed the success of the 
tanker conventions and sought to extend similar coverage to offshore platforms. They failed, as 
CLEE was not enthusiastically received by states, with only six becoming signatories to the 
convention and no accessions.205 The result - CLEE remains unenforceable.206 An additional 
concern pertaining to enforcement is that even where a ‘global’ international instrument contains 
provisions stipulating liability, there is no international court a claimant may approach to 
adjudicate their claim,207 nor is it likely that a national court would have jurisdiction.208 This 
means that for any instrument to be effective, there must be a will on the part of states to enforce 
its provisions, something that seems unlikely considering CLEE’s stillbirth.  
 
In conclusion, it is clear that whilst a number of conventions exist to address issues of oil 
pollution in the marine environment, they were clearly not drafted with the intention of 
specifically addressing the problem of oil pollution caused by or emanating from offshore 
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platforms. As offshore oil production is increasing rapidly, the international community finds 
itself in a disconcerting situation because there is an increasing risk of oil pollution being caused 
by the activities of offshore platforms but there is not international regime to deal with that 
eventuality. All that is available is the existing system of regional agreements, the existence of 
which may provide some explanation for the failure to create an overall international solution to 
this problem. These agreements are, as the name suggests, strictly regional in their application 
with some agreements even being considered as private international law. Since they form the 
bulk of the effective oil platform regulation on the international level (albeit not global) they 
merit detailed consideration.  
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2.3. THE REGIONAL OFFSHORE PLATFORM LIABILITY REGIME 
 
The global regulatory framework of offshore oil platforms is a patchwork of incomplete 
instruments that fail to directly address the issue of liability in respect of oil spills. Fortunately a 
number of smaller regional initiatives have been developed and seem to be the approach 
currently preferred by the international community to this issue. Indeed, the IMO has recognised 
the success of regional agreements and has encouraged states to conclude multilateral 
agreements.209 In order to understand the merits of this approach, the texts of the various regional 
instruments will be considered as well as whether they have proven successful. After all the 
leading instruments have been considered, the current system will be critiqued and suggestions 
will be made to ‘fill in the gaps’.  
 
2.3.1. The Offshore Pollution Liability Agreement: 
 
To full the lacuna that exists in global international law, a number of offshore platform 
operators developed the Offshore Pollution Liability Agreement (‘OPOL’).210 This voluntary 
agreement applies to operators’ party to the agreement operating in ‘designated states’,211 
including operators drilling within the European Economic Community jurisdiction and 
Norway.212  Unlike the global conventions, and most regional instruments, the parties to OPOL 
are not states but rather all the offshore operators that are involved in mineral exploration and 
exploitation on the United Kingdom’s Continental Shelf (‘UKCS’).213 It is the operators 
themselves who are required to satisfy any claims, not a state.214 OPOL gives a very wide 
definition to ‘offshore platform’, which includes any fixed or mobile installation or pipeline or 
portion thereof of any kind that is used for ‘exploring, producing, treating, storing or transporting 
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oil from the seabed or its subsoil’, even where such an installation has temporarily been removed 
from its operational site.215 The definition extends to wells that are being drilled or worked upon 
(except for normal work-over operations).216 Remaining within the definitions clause, OPOL 
defines ‘pollution damage’ in quite a restrictive sense, stating that it ‘means direct loss or 
damage (other than loss of or damage to any offshore facility involved) by contamination which 
results from a discharge of oil’.217 A discharge of oil is simply defined as ‘any escape or 
discharge of oil into the sea’ from an offshore facility.218 
 
The parties to OPOL formed a company called the Offshore Pollution Liability Association 
Limited (‘OPOL Association’),219 which is governed by the laws of England.220 It is this 
company that administers any claims brought against operators, but the OPOL Association does 
not itself pay the claims.221 The operator ‘responsible’ is the only party liable to the claimant 
however, if the responsible operator should default, the remaining operators will cover the 
claim.222 Due to this structure it would be incorrect to refer to OPOL as a convention in the 
traditional sense. It is rather a contract, concluded in England, between the various operators to 
ensure the payment of any claim brought against an operator for damages resulting from an oil 
spill. For an operator to become a member of the OPOL Association, the Rules of the OPOL 
Association (‘OPOL Rules’) require that the operator provide evidence of financial 
responsibility.223 An operator will be deemed to be financially responsible where it can 
demonstrate that it is capable of fulfilling its obligations under clause 4 of OPOL.224 Evidence of 
financial responsibility may be provided by one (or a combination of) insurance, guarantee or 
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self-insurance.225 Evidence of financial responsibility may be required of operators throughout 
their membership in order to ensure their continued ability to meet future claims.226 Membership 
of OPOL is a condition for obtaining a licence to drill on the continental shelf in English Law, 
specifically in terms of the Petroleum (Production) (Seaward Areas) Regulations 1988,227 and it 
has become a standard clause in all Joint Operating Agreements.228  
 
OPOL was heavily influenced by the terms of the ill-fated CLEE229 and thus incorporated the 
concept of strict liability into its provisions.230 As with the CLC and Fund Conventions, a limit 
exists on the amount that may be claimed via the OPOL Association. OPOL sets the maximum 
reimbursement at US $250 million per incident, with $125 million comprising compensation for 
remedial measures,231 taken by a ‘public authority’,232 and $125 million maximum compensation 
for pollution damage.233 A party may escape liability in restricted circumstances such as the 
incident resulting from an act of war,234 or the damage being wholly caused by the conduct of a 
third party.235 For a claimant to recover any amount via the OPOL Association, they are required 
to proceed by arbitration in London.236 This approach has been praised, as certain authors fear 
that courts lack the required expertise to deal with the highly technical aspects of offshore oil 
exploitation.237 In addition to the expertise of the arbitrator, arbitration proceedings are private 
and the claim is likely to be resolved sooner than it would by means of traditional litigation.238  
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OPOL has thus far been effective, with some commentators suggesting that its success may 
be the cause of Europe’s reluctance to implement a comprehensive treaty pertaining to oil 
pollution from offshore platforms, preferring simply to require the operators of such platforms to 
become parties to OPOL.239 Whilst the inclusion of strict liability is in keeping with international 
practice, it is submitted that the maximum amount that can be claimed is still too low. The OPOL 
liability cap was raised from $125 million to the present $250 million in response to the 
Deepwater Horizon incident,240 however, since BP has set aside approximately $20 billion to 
compensate victims (with further claims against the company still pending) and finance clean-up 
operations, the amounts envisaged by OPOL are still inadequate.  Indeed, this same conclusion 
was reached by the UK House of Commons, Energy and Climate Committee (‘the committee’) 
assigned to investigate the Deepwater Horizon spill and advise whether the UK had a 
satisfactory regulatory regime in place.241 The committee concluded that the $250 million 
compensation provided by OPOL was too low,242 a conclusion supported by witnesses 
presenting to the committee.243 The committee raised further concerns over the definition of 
‘direct damage’ suggesting that this definition was vague and unclear, noting that polluters could 
argue that damage to ‘biodiversity and ecosystems’ is indirect and thus not eligible for 
compensation.244 The committee stressed that ‘any lack of clarity on liability will inhibit the 
payment of compensation to those affected by an offshore accident’,245 and it is submitted that 
this conclusion is accurate. A final concern of the committee was the voluntary nature of OPOL, 
as the MPs felt that its ‘voluntary nature’ weakened OPOL’s ‘legality and the control and 
deployment of its funds’.246 This particular concern is questionable, as membership of OPOL (as 
discussed above) is a requirement to obtain a licence to operate an offshore oil platform. A 
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legislative body may be preferable, it is certainly not the most pressing concern. Whilst claimants 
may bypass OPOL and claim directly through the courts,247 they would do so without the benefit 
of strict liability, resulting in complex and technical litigation that would be drawn out for 
years.248  
 
2.3.2. Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic: 
 
The Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, 
1992 (‘OSPAR’)249 was created with the explicit view that stringent measures at the regional 
level were the preferable means of addressing marine pollution.250 There are sixteen states party 
to OSPAR,251 whose jurisdiction allows the convention to effectively cover not only the Atlantic 
and the North Sea, but also the Rhine River.252 OSPAR comprehensively addresses pollution 
from a variety of sources, including offshore installations, which it addresses in detail. A notable 
aspect of OSPAR is that it addresses the practice of abandoning offshore platforms by 
implementing strict procedures that must be followed.253 These include obtaining a permit and 
keeping records of all disused offshore installations and pipelines.254 OSPAR specifically 
incorporates the precautionary principle.255 The precautionary principle, as enunciated in 
Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (‘Rio 
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Declaration’),256 requires that where there are ‘threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of 
full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to 
prevent environmental degradation.’257 The need for the principle is summarised well by Cho,258 
who states that ‘effective implementation of environmental law needs to proceed in spite of 
scientific uncertainties in order to prevent irreversible damage.’ The precautionary principle is 
not without limits - there must be an identifiable and clear threat to the environment, capable of 
causing serious or irreversible damage.259 Despite espousing preventative measures, OSPAR 
fails to provide for emergency planning procedures nor does it allocate clean-up 
responsibilities.260 OSPAR also lacks any provision for insurance or financial guarantees in the 
event of an accident, something present in OPOL. The failure of OSPAR to cover emergency 
response situations or to make provision for financial guarantees has been strongly criticised by 
environmental groups.261 
 
OSPAR has implemented the polluter-pays principle, requiring the polluter to cover the costs 
relating to ‘pollution prevention, control and reduction measures’.262 OSPAR additionally 
requires contracting parties to implement measures and programmes to ‘prevent and eliminate 
pollution fully’ with such initiatives adopting the best available techniques and the best 
environmental practices.263 In the context of offshore oil platforms, OSPAR states that the 
dumping of wastes or any other matter is prohibited,264 however, this prohibition does not extend 
to ‘discharges or emissions from offshore sources’.265 Such discharges or emissions capable of 
reaching and affecting the maritime area, whilst not entirely prohibited, are strictly subject to the 
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authorisation or regulation by competent authorities of the contracting parties.266 The 
significance of this provision is that it permits individual states to impose additional regulations 
and liability criteria upon operators who are located within their jurisdiction. The clear drawback 
to such an approach is that it is reliant on states to actually implement such measures.  OSPAR 
requires contracting parties to settle disputes relating to either its interpretation or application by 
means of arbitration.267 The parties to the dispute are free to elect their own procedure,268 but 
OSPAR does prescribe a procedure should parties fail to decide otherwise.269  
 
As mentioned earlier, OSPAR, for the purposes of liability, is based on the polluter-pays 
principle.  It is submitted that the reliance of OSPAR on the polluter-pays principle alone is 
insufficient to deter polluters or to provide adequate redress to bona fide claimants. The polluter-
pays principle was encapsulated in the Rio Declaration, which states that ‘… the polluter should, 
in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without 
distorting international trade and investment.’270 Ellis defines the principle as ‘an economic 
theory that “internalizes” environmental pollution and degradation costs caused by a company or 
a producer. The [costs of pollution] are included as a cost to the producer rather than being paid 
by the general community through reduced environmental quality or increased taxes…’271 Whilst 
this is clearly an aspirational principle, it is not legally binding on states and must be 
implemented in more precise terms in order to be effective,272 hence its incorporation into 
OSPAR. Note that only a handful of conventions have adopted the polluter-pays principle since 
the Rio Declaration.273 Offshore oil exploration and exploitation is both technically complex and 
dangerous. Whilst colossal spills may be infrequent, they have the potential to cause great harm. 
Due to these technical aspects of offshore drilling, there is an intimidating evidentiary burden on 
a claimant seeking damages for a spill. As a result of the unusually hazardous conditions 
surrounding offshore oil exploitation, it is quite probable that a spill could occur without a party 
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being negligent. Indeed, this was the case with the Ixtoc I spill in 1979. It is precisely for this 
reason that instruments such as OPOL have gone beyond merely incorporating the polluter-pays 
principle, instead specifically adopting an approach of strict liability, thus alleviating the burden 
on the claimant of proving fault and instead merely quantifying the damages. There has been a 
noted trend in international environmental instruments favouring strict liability over traditional 
fault-based liability, a trend even continued in the domestic legislation of states such as the USA 
and the UK.274 This decision to only utilise the polluter-pays principle in OSPAR without 
specifying a stringent liability standard would thus seem to be at odds with some of the 
convention’s other founding principles, specially its mandate to adopt the best environmental 
practices. The polluter-pays principle ought to be enacted in conjunction with the 
implementation of strict liability as the two concepts complement each other well.275 However, 
there is a presumption in international law that, unless stated otherwise, negligence is required in 
order to establish fault.276 Thus merely stating that the polluter-pays principle has been 
incorporated into a convention will result in a standard of fault requiring negligence. 
 
It is perhaps unwise to apply more modern environmental standards solely to precautionary 
techniques and not to the liability aspects of the convention, as despite all the measures adopted 
by offshore operators to be compliant with OSPAR, there were still 467 accidental oil spills 
totalling 137 tonnes of oil, from only 7 contracting parties, in 2010 alone.277 This is particularly 
alarming as OSPAR only specifically apportions liability for pollution control, reduction and 
prevention.278 OSPAR therefore fails to address liability in the event of an accident, remaining 
silent on liability for damages suffered as a result of economic loss or any other form of loss. 
Clearly, it is not ideal to have such a vague liability clause, as this will force claimants to resort 
to costly litigation and rely on customary international law (which is itself a difficult beast to 
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master). It is clearly not sufficient for a legal instrument to restrict itself to precautionary 
measures - it is fair to conclude that OSPAR lacks metaphorical teeth.  
 
2.3.3. Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution: 
 
The 1976 Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution 
(‘Barcelona Convention’)279 is a regional agreement established with the goal of preventing 
marine pollution in the Mediterranean. As of June 2012 there are 22 state parties,280 with 20 
having accepted the 1995 amendments.  The Barcelona Convention was drafted in response to 
United Nations Environmental Programme (‘UNEP’) Mediterranean Action Plan,281 which 
recognised the need for regional conventions that addressed pollution and selected the 
Mediterranean as its first priority.282 The Barcelona Convention directly addresses the issue of 
offshore pollution by requiring states to take ‘all appropriate measures to prevent, abate, combat 
and to the fullest possible extent eliminate pollution of the Mediterranean Sea Area resulting 
from exploration of the continental shelf and the seabed and its subsoil.’283 As with OSPAR, the 
Barcelona Convention recognises the precautionary principle,284 and requires that parties 
implement the ‘best available techniques and the best environmental practices.’285 The 
implementation of these principles has been considered to be consistent with internationally 
accepted standards.286 In the context of liability the Barcelona Convention merely contains a 
pactum de contrahendo provision obliging states to ‘cooperate in the formulation and adoption 
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of appropriate rules and procedures for the determination of liability and compensation for 
damage resulting from pollution.’287 The only other mention of compensation in the convention 
can be found in article 4, which mandates that states apply the polluter-pays principle, thereby 
requiring states to bear the ‘costs of pollution prevention, control and reduction measures’ with 
‘due regard to public interest’.288 The Barcelona Convention implores parties to engage in 
‘negotiation’ or any other ‘peaceful means’ to settle disputes that may arise in the interpretation 
or the application of the convention.289 Should the parties fail to resolve the dispute through such 
means, the parties will follow an arbitration procedure set out in annex A of the convention.290 
The approach adopted by the Barcelona Convention is similar to that adopted by the Space 
Objects Convention, as it encourages diplomacy over the use of legal arbitration.   
 
In addition to being addressed in the Barcelona Convention, the state parties agreed to a more 
specific protocol pertaining to offshore mineral exploitation, which was probably in response to 
the growing number of offshore platforms in the region (231 as of 2010).291 The 1994 Protocol 
for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution Resulting from the Exploration and 
Exploitation of the Continental Shelf and the Seabed and its Subsoil (‘Madrid Protocol’)292 has 
been signed by 12 states, and as of April 2013 has 6 state parties.293 The Madrid Protocol is a 
comprehensive instrument, specifying obligations for operators who may include private 
persons, be they natural or juristic in nature. Furthermore, the protocol extends the definition of 
operator beyond those who have authorisation to those who lack authorisation, but exercise de 
facto control over operations.294 As with the Barcelona Convention itself, the Madrid Protocol 
                                         
287 Barcelona Convention, art. 16. The Barcelona Convention is unfortunately not unique in this regard, see T 
Scovazzi ‘The Mediterranean Guidelines for the Determination of Environmental Liability and Compensation: The 
Negotiations for the Instrument and the Question of Damage that Can Be Compensated’ (2009) 13 Max Planck 
U.N.Y.B. 183, 184 (‘Scovazzi 2009’) for a comprehensive list of conventions with similar provisions. 
288 Barcelona Convention, art. 4(3)(b). 
289 Ibid, art. 28(1). 
290 Ibid, art. 28(2). 
291 Chabason (note 100 above) 8. 
292 1994 Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution Resulting from Exploration and 
Exploitation of the Continental Shelf and the Seabed and its Subsoil, 14 October 1994, 24 March 2011. This 
protocol is also referred to as the ‘Offshore Protocol’. 
293 Status of Protocol and list of state parties available at 
http://195.97.36.231/dbases/webdocs/BCP/StatusOfSignaturesAndRatifications.doc, accessed on 19 June 2013. The 
current states party to the protocol are Albania, Cyprus, Libya, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia. 
294 T Scovazzi ‘Maritime Accidents with Particular Emphasis on Liability and Compensation for Damage from the 
Exploitation of Mineral Resources of the Seabed’ in A de Guttry et al. (eds) International Disaster Response Law 
(2012) 287 (’Scovazzi 2012’), 298. 
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imposes a duty on states to ‘cooperate as soon as possible’ to formulate rules to determine 
liability and compensation for damage caused by pollution.295 Scovazzi notes that this obligation 
is not entirely devoid of legal meaning,296 as the International Court of Justice has interpreted 
such a provision to mean that the parties are under an obligation to reach an agreement, not 
merely to negotiate.297 Thus this provision requires parties to engage in meaningful negotiations, 
with the bona fide intention of reaching an agreement. Until such rules are determined, the 
Madrid Protocol states that operators are liable for any damage caused by their activities, and 
that such operators shall be required to pay ‘prompt and adequate compensation’.298 
Significantly, the Madrid Protocol requires states to ensure that operators have sufficient 
‘insurance cover or other financial security’ that the state deems appropriate to cover any damage 
that may occur as a result of the activities covered by the protocol.299 It is submitted that this 
approach is wise, as it anticipates the usual delay that occurs when states negotiate liability 
provisions and thus creates a temporary measure that goes beyond liability found in other 
conventions. The robust liability provisions imposed by the Madrid Protocol have been 
suggested as a reason for the long wait for the protocol to enter into force as well as the low 
number of state signatories to the protocol.300  
 
Despite the Barcelona Convention (and Madrid Protocol) requiring party states to pay 
compensation in the event of pollution, there are still numerous difficulties - the most apparent of 
which is uncertainty. Whilst the Madrid Protocol undoubtedly sought to place the actual cost of 
compensation on the operators of the platforms, the protocol ultimately fails to define what is 
meant by the term ‘damages’. If one is to apply the ‘polluter-pays’ principle, presumably the 
intended standard considering its incorporation by article 4 of the Barcelona Convention, the 
operators might well be able to limit compensation to clean up costs. It is submitted that loss of 
tourism, economic damages suffered by those in the fishing industry and costs to rehabilitate the 
environment post-spill would be difficult to include within the ambit of the polluter-pays 
                                         
295 Madrid Protocol, art. 27(1). 
296 Scovazzi 2012 (note 294 above) 299. 
297 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, ICJ Rep. 1969, para. 85. 
298 Madrid Protocol, art. 27(2)(a). 
299 Ibid, art. 27(2)(b). 
300 Scovazzi 2012 (note 294 above) 300. The author notes that the European Union and France have both entered 
reservations concerning Article 27(2) in particular, although this position has been changed in the wake of the 
Deepwater Horizon spill. 
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principle, as the principle itself is of minimal practical use in the absence of a detailed liability 
provision. Whilst the polluter-pays principle indicates an intention to hold the polluter 
accountable, it is not effective in isolation. The difficulty to quantify a damages claim has an 
adverse effect on another key feature of the Madrid Protocol - the provision of security. Whilst 
operators are required to furnish a guarantee or some other form of financial insurance to the 
amount required to cover a damages claim, operators could conceivably argue in favour of a 
narrow interpretation of the ‘polluter-pays’ principle. This would potentially allow an operator to 
furnish security that would be practically insufficient.  As was the case with OSPAR, it is 
unfortunate that a strict liability approach was not adopted, as this would have been congruent 
with agreements such as OPOL and conventions addressing tanker pollution (namely the CLC 
and Fund Conventions), which have proven to be effective. Indeed, these same concerns were 
addressed in a proposed 1997 amendment to the Barcelona Convention.301 The 1997 draft 
contemplated strict liability without any limitations, the establishment of a supplementary fund 
(to assist in the event that an operator was unable to meet the costs) and held the state with 
jurisdiction over the activity liable in the event that the operator and fund were unable to satisfy 
the claim.302 The 1997 draft also defined ‘damage’ to include damage to persons (as well as the 
state) and their property, the cost of ‘reasonable preventative measures’ and any additional loss 
caused by such measures, and damage resulting from any impairment created by harm to the 
marine and coastal Mediterranean environment.303 Despite the need for such amendments, the 
proposal was considered too extensive to be accepted by the majority of Mediterranean states,304 
and thus it is submitted that the Barcelona Convention and the Madrid Protocol have yet to reach 





                                         
301 United Nations Environment Programme ‘Appropriate Procedure for the Determination of Liability and 
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2.3.4. Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine 
Environment from Pollution 1989: 
 
The Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine 
Environment from Pollution 1989 (‘Kuwait Convention’),305 is, as the name suggests, a 
multilateral regional agreement among states based in the sea area adjacent to Kuwait.306 The 
party states are Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates – therefore all the Persian Gulf countries are party to the convention. As the Persian 
Gulf is a major producer of oil, the participation of all eight countries is certainly positive. The 
Kuwait Convention applies to the marine area shared by the party states and seeks to eliminate 
pollution in the area by the implementation of laws comparable to, and that conform to, 
international law.307  In addition to the general obligation to eliminate pollution, the Kuwait 
Convention also requires contracting states to take ‘all appropriate measures to prevent abate and 
combat pollution’ that results from the exploration and exploitation of the seabed, its subsoil and 
the continental shelf.308 The Kuwait Convention requires states to cooperate in the event of a 
pollution emergency,309 it mandates scientific and technological co-operation,310 and requires the 
use of environmental assessments to minimise the risk of pollution.311 As concerns liability, the 
Kuwait Convention merely envisages the future formulation and adoption of procedures to 
determine civil liability in the event of damage caused by marine pollution,312 as well as liability 
for violating obligations under the convention and its protocols.313 The only clarification 
provided by the liability provision can be found in its reference to ‘applicable international rules 
                                         
305 Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution, 24 
April 1978, 17 I.L.M. 511, 1 July 1979 (‘Kuwait Convention’). 
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and procedures relating to those matters’.314 This provision merely indicates the convention’s 
intention to conform to international law and is of no additional assistance.  
 
A number of protocols exist that supplement the Kuwait Convention, including the Protocol 
Concerning Marine Pollution Resulting From Exploration and Exploitation of the Continental 
Shelf (‘Kuwait Protocol’).315  The Kuwait Protocol is directly applicable to offshore oil 
platforms,316 and enjoys ratification from all eight states party to the Kuwait Convention.317 As 
with the convention itself, the Kuwait Protocol places an obligation on the contracting states to 
ensure that ‘all appropriate measures’ are taken to restrict and eliminate pollution ‘taking into 
account the best available and economically feasible technology’.318 In the context of offshore 
operations, the protocol goes further than the convention as it requires that such operations are 
conducted under a licence,319 and the protocol implements a number of requirements that states 
must satisfy prior to the granting of a licence.320 The Kuwait Protocol contains a number of 
safety measures in order to minimise the risk of an oil spill, but unfortunately, it does not contain 
a liability provision. In the absence of such a provision, liability under the protocol will be 
assigned under article 7 of the Kuwait Convention - an article that contains nothing more than a 
pactum de contrahendo. 
 
The Kuwait Convention and Protocol are vague at best when it comes to the issue of liability, 
perhaps even mute if one is particularly critical. Whilst these instruments contain a number of 
measures to prevent oil pollution from occurring, it is submitted that by sparing the rod, they are 
perhaps spoiling the child, as the absence of any clear liability provision allows a polluter 
operator (or state) to hide behind the uncertainty of customary international law. Without 
requiring any financial guarantees from operators in the region, there is no assurance that an 
operator would be able to cover the costs associated with an oil spill even if they felt obliged to 
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do so. When one considers that the Persian Gulf is a major producer of the world’s oil, it is 
frankly alarming that no liability provisions have been effected. Whilst this might not be 
particularly alarming if other legal instruments could cure this deficit, the existence of the 
Kuwait Convention and Protocols have been cited in the past as reasons mitigating against the 
creation of a global convention to address this issue.321 The inescapable conclusion is that the 
Kuwait Convention, in the context of liability at least, is completely insufficient yet its very 
existence prevents the formulation of an effective liability regime. Thus, as concerns liability, the 
Kuwait Convention can be considered to represent the very worst stereotypes of international 
law. 
 
2.3.5. Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area: 
 
The Baltic Sea also enjoys the environmental protection of a regional convention, 
specifically the 1992 Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea 
Area (‘Helsinki Convention’)322, which presently has ten state parties,323 replacing the 1974 
Convention of the same name.324 The Helsinki Convention differs from most conventions as it 
expands the definition of ‘ship’ to include ‘fixed or floating platforms’.325 This is significant as 
the definition of ship is not a settled matter in international law and, as mentioned above, most 
interpretations of UNCLOS would suggest that the offshore platforms are not included in the 
general definition of ship or vessel.326 The Helsinki Convention applies the precautionary 
principle, requiring states to take preventative measures when ‘substances or energy’ introduced 
to the marine environment may cause harm, even if there is no conclusive evidence of a causal 
connection between the introduction of such substances and environmental harm.327 The 
convention also requires parties to utilise the best environmental practices and best available 
                                         
321 Brown (note 99 above) 125 where the existence of instruments such as the Kuwait Convention have caused 
regulatory bodies to conclude that there ‘is no pressing need’ for a global convention on the issue of offshore 
platform spills. 
322 1992 Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, 9 April 1992, 13 I.L.M. 
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technologies,328 and fortunately includes an annex detailing what is meant by these principles.329 
This provision further mandates that parties shall adopt additional measures in the event that 
satisfactory results are not obtained.330  
 
The Helsinki Convention, continuing the trend of the Barcelona and Kuwait Conventions, 
contains a liability clause that merely requires parties jointly to develop rules and principles 
concerning the allocation of liability, limits on liability and available remedies.331 Guidance can 
be found in the founding principles of the convention, in which it states that the parties will apply 
the polluter-pays principle.332 Whilst there is an annex focusing on the regulation of offshore 
platforms,333 it is unfortunately silent on liability. The Helsinki Convention does however make 
explicit reference to assistance and the recovery of costs incurred in providing such assistance. 
Parties to the convention are entitled to call for assistance,334 with the requested party being 
required to ‘use their best endeavours’ to provide the necessary assistance.335 When such 
assistance is rendered, the requesting party is required by the convention to reimburse the 
assisting party.336 Where the assistance is taken at the initiative of the assisting party, it shall bear 
its own costs unless otherwise agreed.337 This same regulation recognises that contracting parties 
shall continue to enjoy the right to claim from third parties for pollution damage, unfettered by 
the terms of the Helsinki Convention.338 This would perhaps allow a party to bypass the 
limitation of the polluter-pays principle, provided they are not claiming from a party to a 
convention - as would be the case where the claim lies against an offshore operator. States are 
also entitled to utilise national or supra-national regulations in such an event.339  
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329 Ibid, annex 2. 
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The absence of clear liability provisions in the Helsinki Convention has been attributed to 
uncertainty amongst member states concerning the substance of and necessity for such liability 
regulations.340 The Helsinki Commission has made certain recommendations that are of 
interest.341 In response to the obligation on contracting states to agree to rules on liability, the 
commission has noted the success of IMO liability regimes in the context of vessel-based 
pollution.342 To cure the current liability deficit of the Helsinki Convention the commission 
recommended that contracting parties accede to IMO conventions, notably the CLC 69, Fund 71 
and their 1984 protocols,343 as well as recommending that contracting states cooperate with the 
IMO in creating further liability regimes for pollution damage.344 A second set of 
recommendations from the Helsinki Commission with liability considerations are those 
pertaining to a harmonised system of fines in the event of a ship violating anti-pollution 
regulations.345 The commission recommended that contracting states impose harmonised 
minimum penalties in the event that a ship (a term that is defined in the Helsinki Convention to 
include offshore platforms) commits an illegal discharge, including a discharge of oil in 
contravention of MARPOL.346 The recommendations also suggest imposing greater fines on 
legal persons than on natural persons, with the quantum of such fines being determined in 
accordance with Special Drawing Rights (‘SDR’). The minimum suggested administrative fine 
for the illegal discharge of oil, in terms of annex I of MARPOL, is 1500 SDR.347 It is worth 
noting that whilst this is truly a paltry amount, it represents the absolute minimum that could be 
charged and the recommended fine is to take into account the quantity of the discharge and the 
environmental damage caused by the discharge.348  
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In conclusion, the Helsinki Convention has implemented measures to improve the transfer of 
information between the parties and promotes state cooperation in the fight against marine 
pollution, emanating from a wide variety of sources. Whilst the imposition of a fine system and a 
mechanism for recovery of the costs incurred in assistance operations is a tangible step in the 
right direction, it is unfortunate that the drafters of the convention failed to decide upon clear 
liability provisions. It may not be particularly rare to include a pactum de contrahendo in a 
convention, but it would have been preferable if the Helsinki Convention had implemented 
interim measures pending final agreement between the parties. Such temporary measures have 
the desirable effect of granting recourse against polluters whilst negotiations on permanent 
provisions continue. The need for such measures is clear, as the Helsinki Convention has been in 
force for 13 years and the parties have failed to reach a clear agreement on a liability clause. The 
convention also fails to require insurance or financial guarantees from offshore operators, a 
much-needed feature when one considers the potentially catastrophic clean-up costs that can 
result from an offshore spill. The Helsinki Convention thus requires immediate amendment if it 
is to provide adequate financial protection against modern pollution threats. 
 
2.3.6. Other notable conventions and regional agreements: 
 
The Cartagena Protocol,349 to the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity,350 
tackles transboundary pollution caused by any living modified organism. It is therefore not 
applicable to oil pollution, but the manner in which it addresses liability for biological pollution 
is worth some study in the hope that these methods may be exported to address oil spills in future 
or existing conventions. As with the Helsinki and Barcelona Conventions, the Cartagena 
Protocol’s liability clause merely requires parties to agree to liability provisions at a future 
date.351 However, unlike the Barcelona and Helsinki Conventions, the parties to the Cartagena 
Protocol met and drafted the Kuala-Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress 
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(‘Supplementary Protocol’),352 which has yet to come into force.353 The Supplementary Protocol 
has a broad scope, as it is applicable to both unintentional and illegal transboundary pollution.354 
The Supplementary Protocol confers jurisdiction upon states to implement national legislation to 
apportion liability, encouraging states to claim costs relating to response measures directly from 
the ‘guilty’ operators in accordance with their national law.355 States are further required to apply 
their existing domestic law, or develop such laws, in proceeding against operators for civil 
damages resulting from the pollution.356 States are granted a discretion to determine the standard 
of liability, including the right to impose strict liability.357 States are also permitted to define the 
elements of damages,358 standing,359 and channelling of liability.360 It is submitted that this 
Protocol could serve as a model for the Kuwait, Barcelona and similar conventions that have 
elected to include a pactum de contrahendo concerning liability. The Supplementary Protocol 
has created a clear framework for imposing liability whilst still permitting states the discretion of 
selecting the exact standard of liability (a palatable clause for states that are otherwise reluctant 
to accede to such agreements). The Supplementary Protocol also envisages the provision of 
financial security, with such security being regulated by the domestic laws of states. 
Furthermore, the protocol has tasked states with undertaking a comprehensive study of financial 
security arrangements, with the hopes of implementing such arrangements in the foreseeable 
future.361 Clauses mandating the provision of security and clearly regulating liability are vital to 
an efficient pollution treaty and it is hoped that the Cartagena Protocol represents a shift in treaty 
drafting to include such provisions.362 
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Another convention applicable to spills from offshore oil platforms is the Convention for the 
Protection of the Marine Environment and Coastal Area of the South-East Pacific (‘Lima 
Convention’).363 The Lima Convention contains the all-too-common provision envisaging future 
agreement on a liability framework,364 but also contains a provision binding states to ensure that 
civil claims (for compensation or other relief) against natural or juristic persons who caused 
pollution are available within their domestic legal system.365 Whilst the main text of the Lima 
Convention is silent on the costs incurred by assisting states, an accompanying protocol, the 
Supplementary Co-operation Protocol,366 allows assisting states to recover the actual costs 
incurred when performing clean-up operations.367 The liability framework created by the Lima 
Convention is thus fairly intriguing, as it clearly foresees the creation of a comprehensive 
liability framework but contains certain temporary measures - notably the requirement of states 
to ensure that civil claims against marine polluters is possible in terms of their domestic 
framework. Whilst not quite as detailed as the Cartagena Protocol, these provisions are a 
welcome addition to the convention and the approach adopted by the Lima Convention ought to 
be considered by the drafters of future conventions. 
 
A number of UNEP Conventions have continued the unfortunate trend of deferring the 
creation of liability frameworks until later negotiations. Near identical pactum de contrahendo 
liability clauses can be found in conventions such as the Nairobi Convention,368 the Noumea 
Convention,369 the Bucharest Convention,370 and the Abidjan Convention.371 Whilst this may not 
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necessarily be a problem, such controversial provisions are unlikely to be negotiated 
immediately and thus render the conventions impotent. A simple solution to this would be to 
include a temporary liability provision, as was done with the Madrid Protocol, until more 
comprehensive negotiations have taken place. 
 
Whilst not a convention, Directive 2004/35/CE of the European Parliament is a significant 
regional policy concerning ‘environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying 
of environmental damage’ (‘EU Directive’).372 The EU Directive seeks to unify the legal 
framework of EU states and thus mandates certain features that must be present in the latter’s 
domestic laws. The EU Directive begins by recognising the polluter-pays principle, stating that 
the fundamental principle of the directive is that operators should be financially liable for any 
activity that causes environmental damage, as this will ‘induce’ operators to alter their practices 
so as to decrease the potential for environmental damage.373 The threat of liability alone might 
not induce operators to alter their drilling practices, but it is submitted that it is a potent weapon 
in a legislator’s arsenal. Coupled with stricter regulations, the threat of liability is a powerful 
motivator. 
 
Environmental damage is given a wide definition, including adverse water damage, land 
damage (land contamination posing a risk to human health), and damage that has an adverse 
effect on natural habitats or protected species.374 A broad definition is also given to the term 
‘damage’, encompassing any ‘measurable adverse change’ or ‘measurable impairment’ of a 
natural resource, with such resources being specified by the EU Directive or a member state.375 
Occupational activities that have the potential to harm either human health or the environment 
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fall within the ambit of the EU Directive,376 however claims for damage to private property or 
economic loss are excluded.377 This restriction is problematic in the context of a major offshore 
platform spill, as property damage and claims for economic loss would certainly form a large 
portion of the claim. Finally, where the claim is for environmental damage, the EU Directive 
recognises that individuals may lack the necessary standing to pursue a claim against operators, 
so non-governmental organisations that promote environmental protection are permitted to 
ensure that the directive is directly implemented.378  
 
The EU Directive defines ‘operators’ as natural or legal, private or public persons, who 
control (or have had control delegated to them) an occupational activity,379 with such activity 
falling within the ambit of the directive regardless of whether it is private or public, profit or 
non-profit in nature.380 Article 3(1)(a) states that the directive applies to any occupation activity 
listed in Annex III. Annex III lists a number of activities related to the offshore petroleum 
industry, including management operations (the collection, transport, recovery and disposal of 
waste); the transport by road, rail, inland waters, sea or air of dangerous or polluting goods; and 
transboundary shipment of wastes. Therefore any company that conducts activities listed in 
annex 3 can be held liable in terms of the EU Directive, including charterers, independent 
contractors and others.  
 
Operators are required to bear the costs of both remedial and preventative measures,381 and 
are liable for costs incurred by a competent authority who acts to assess or prevent a harm from 
occurring,382 although states may elect to bear the remedial costs themselves in the event that the 
operator was not negligent.383 The assets of the operator act as security in the event that a state 
takes remedial steps on the operator’s behalf.384 Operators may escape liability if the damage 
was caused by a third party or resulted from compliance with a compulsory order.385 The EU 
                                         
376 Ibid, para. 8. 
377 Ibid, para. 14. 
378 Ibid, para. 25. 
379 Ibid, art. 2(6). 
380 Ibid, art. 2(7).  
381 Ibid, art. 8(1). 
382 Ibid, para 18 and art. 5(4). 
383 Ibid, art. 8(4). 
384 Ibid, art. 8(2). 
385 Ibid, art. 8(3). 
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Directive recognises the need for operators to have financial security in order to adequately cover 
any potential costs, and thus encourages states to develop financial security instruments to cover 
any possible liability an operator may incur.386  
 
For the purposes of liability, the EU Directive does not require fault; merely that the damage 
is quantifiable, the polluter is identifiable and that causation is present.387 States may also choose 
to adopt more stringent provisions,388 and pass legislation that prevents the double recovery of 
costs.389 Claims are excluded where liability or compensation is subject to an existing 
international convention listed in annex IV, to which the member state concerned is a party.390 
Of these conventions, none are applicable to spills emanating from offshore oil platforms.391 
Thus there is no provision in the EU Directive that would narrow its scope to exclude an offshore 
platform spill.  
 
It is evident that the EU has adopted an aggressive approach to tackling marine pollution 
whilst being cognisant of existing international conventions. The EU Directive thus sets a 
commendable minimum threshold and imposes liability directly upon operators. By applying the 
polluter-pays principle and removing the requirement of fault (unless otherwise specified), the 
EU Directive has created a clear incentive for operators to avoid polluting. The recognition of the 
need for financial security instruments coupled with the right of states to hold an operator’s 
assets as security ensures that there should be assets available to address remedial costs as they 
arise. Despite these positive measures, the EU Directive has been criticised. Environmental 
NGOs have noted that whilst the EU Directive is applicable to offshore platform pollution, the 
provision of financial security is not yet compulsory.392 This is problematic as spill-related costs 
could easily exceed the value of the installation itself. Thus in the absence of additional financial 
security measures, it is uncertain whether the operator would be capable of financing clean-up 
operations. Furthermore, the EU Directive only becomes operable once very high damage 
                                         
386 Ibid, art 14(1) and para. 27. 
387 Ibid, para 13. 
388 Ibid, art. 16(1). 
389 Ibid, art. 16(2). 
390 Ibid, art. 4(2). 
391 The list of conventions includes the CLC and Fund Conventions and, as discussed in 2.1 above, these 
conventions only apply to vessels that carry oil in bulk as cargo. 
392 Luk & Ryrie (note 260 above) 12. 
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thresholds have been met, and there have been calls for a lowering of those thresholds.393 A final 
critique is that the EU Directive is not applicable to marine pollution that does not occur within 
inland and territorial waters, thus excluding offshore platforms as they operate beyond such these 
bodies of water.394 This would need to be amended to address oil pollution occurring in the EEZ 
or resulting from activities on the continental shelf. The conclusion is that whilst the EU 
Directive incorporates many welcome features, it alone is not sufficient as an instrument for 
combating offshore oil pollution. A specialised instrument is needed, and such an agreement is 




It is clear that the lacunae that exist in the global regulation of offshore platform pollution 
have been addressed by regional agreements, either between states or even between private 
operators. The success of these instruments is varied, especially as concerns liability. Certain 
instruments have adopted strict liability, albeit with a maximum claim limit, and this approach is 
congruent with instruments relating to tanker pollution (specifically the CLC and Fund 
Conventions). However, as with the tanker instruments, a strong argument could be made that 
the liability ceilings are too low. OPOL has set the maximum claim amount at 250 million US 
dollars, with that figure being divided into 125 million for ‘clean-up’ costs incurred by a public 
authority and 125 million for environmental damage. Whilst this ceiling may cover potential 
claims for fairly routine and small spills, it would be woefully inadequate in the event of a 
disaster akin to the Deepwater Horizon or Ixtoc I. It would perhaps be wise for the OPOL 
Association to recognise the potential for massive liability in the event of a well blowout, and 
raise the liability limit accordingly.  
 
In addition to the implementation of the strict liability standard, certain instruments have 
recognised the need for the provision of financial security. The EU Directive, whilst not 
                                         
393 Ibid, 11. 
394 Ibid, 10. EU Directive, art. 2(5). Article 2(5) states that the EU Directive is only applicable to waters falling 
within the ambit of Directive 2000/60/EC, which is restricted to the territorial waters of a state. 
395 P Dittrick ‘EU reaches preliminary agreement on offshore oil, gas safety directive’ Oil & Gas Journal 3 April 
2013, available at http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/volume-111/issue-3/general-interest/eu-reaches-preliminary-
agreement-on-offshore.html, accessed on 4 July 2013. 
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specifying that financial security is currently compulsory, does permit states to seize the assets of 
operators as security for costs incurred in the event of a spill. Other instruments such as the 
Supplementary Protocol to the Cartagena Convention envision the provision of security by 
operators, to be governed by the domestic laws of states. Similarly, the Barcelona Convention 
requires that states ensure that operators within their jurisdiction furnish security that would be 
sufficient to cover environmental damage caused by pollution. The recognition of the need for 
financial security by regional of instruments is notable departure from the global regulatory 
regime, and it is sorely needed. Given the potential costs that may result from a catastrophic oil 
spill, requiring operators to furnish security is prudent. The EU Directive’s approach is 
particularly novel, as by granting states security over the equipment of operators, it should 
prevent any state hesitation in clean-up activities motivated by financial constraints. It is 
submitted that provisions requiring the furnishing of financial security should be present in all 
regional instruments pertaining to offshore oil pollution, as there are great costs associated with 
environmental rehabilitation. Compulsory security coupled with a strict liability framework 
represents a strong weapon in the fight against pollution. 
 
Despite recognition at the regional level, the majority of instruments have not implemented 
the strict liability standard. A number of conventions have maintained the usual fault based 
liability standard, informed by the polluter-pays principle. The polluter-pays principle is featured 
in a number of regional instruments, including OSPAR, the Barcelona Convention and the 
Helsinki Convention. Whilst the presence of this principle in environmental instruments is 
beneficial, it is insufficient if not accompanied by detailed liability provisions. The lack of such 
detailed provisions is possibly the strongest critique of the current regional regulatory regime, as 
uncertainty is the enemy of accountability. Many conventions seek to address this concern with 
the inclusion of a pactum de contrahendo, but this approach is reliant on proactive negotiations 
between states in order to be effective. It is perhaps unsurprising that parties to the majority of 
conventions including such a clause have failed to agree on a clear framework of liability. It is 
submitted that the failure by a majority of the above-mentioned conventions to include detailed 
liability provisions renders them near useless as deterrents to large-scale offshore platform oil 
pollution. Their shortcomings, coupled with the lacunae present in the global regulatory regime, 
shift the burden of imposing liability to domestic legislation.  
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In conclusion, whilst a number of regional instruments have implemented novel and effective 
provisions pertaining to liability and the provision of financial security, the majority of 
instruments have failed to implement sufficiently clear liability provisions. Without recourse 
available at the global regulatory level, it is necessary to consider the domestic laws of select 
states to determine whether they hold the solution.  Considering that large-scale oil spills are 
often transboundary in nature, reliance on domestic legislation is clearly ill advised. 
64 
 
2.4. INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCLUSION: 
 
The analysis conducted in this chapter indicates that there is a clear lacuna in the 
international regulation of offshore platforms. This analysis began with a consideration of 
customary international law. CIL has developed to the point where there is a recognised state 
obligation to prevent an activity conducted in its territory from harming the territory of another 
state. This obligation has been recognised by the ILC in their 2006 Draft Principles as well as 
decisions of the ICJ and famously the Trail Smelter arbitration. However, as noted in that 
discussion, the standard of liability applicable to transboundary pollution remains uncertain. 
Whilst there has been some progress to recognising the strict liability standard in this context, the 
standard remains contentious amongst states and is unlikely to find acceptance from the 
international community. Thus, whilst a clear duty exists in CIL for holding states accountable 
for their polluting activities when the pollution harms another state, uncertainty remains 
concerning both the extent and standard of liability. 
 
Conventions presently form the bulk of international regulation of marine pollution. The 
‘global’ regulatory regime created conventions that regulate marine pollution and are presently 
effective at addressing tanker-source pollution, but these conventions are either not directly 
applicable to offshore platforms or they specifically exclude offshore platforms from their 
application. Whilst UNCLOS does create a rudimentary system concerning offshore platforms, it 
is largely silent on liability. MARPOL, the London Convention and the OPRC are variably 
applicable to offshore platforms, but are not directly applicable to oil spills and instead regulate 
ancillary aspects. The leading tanker-source pollution conventions, the CLC and Fund 
Conventions, specifically exclude offshore platform spills from their scope. The result of this 
regime is an incomplete and ineffective liability framework at the global international level.  
 
The absence of a global framework has been partially addressed by regional agreements. The 
majority of these agreements do not contain detailed liability provisions and merely require the 
parties to agree on liability at a later stage. A notable exception to this trend is OPOL, which 
creates a detailed liability regime specifically catering to offshore platforms, but this agreement 
is private (between operators, not states) and has a limited geographical coverage (it only extends 
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to platforms located on the UK continental shelf). Therefore, whilst a few regional agreements 
do improve on the liability regime created by UNCLOS, they remain largely insufficient in the 
context of liability. Most of the regional instruments canvassed above make reference to the 
polluter-pays principle, but this is largely meaningless in the absence of concrete liability 
provisions. In addition to these vague liability frameworks, the instruments rarely address 
pollution from offshore platforms, usually focusing on ship-source pollution. A positive step 
enjoying limited application by regional instruments is the need for financial security 
arrangements, but so far such recognition is limited as only the EU Directive and Barcelona 
Convention (of the conventions that were examined) contain any reference to financial security 
arrangements. Unfortunately, the conclusion that must be reached concerning regional 
instruments is that they are presently not sufficient for addressing an oil spill from an offshore 
platform, going only slightly further than the global framework. It is clear from this analysis that 
something must be done to improve international regulation of offshore platforms.396 
 
                                         
396 See the proposal for a global convention addressing offshore installations in chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE DOMESTIC LIABILITY REGIMES OF THE USA AND SOUTH 
AFRICA 
 
The international liability regime does not exist in isolation. States implement their own laws 
to give effect to international conventions and agreements, as well as to regulate the offshore oil 
industry in greater detail. Whilst it is desirable for the domestic law of a state to be congruent 
with international law, this has not been the case. UNCLOS confers coastal states the right to 
regulate offshore drilling where such drilling occurs in its EEZ or on its continental shelf, thus 
the coastal state has a significant regulatory role in the context of offshore platforms.  
 
3.1. THE DOMESTIC LIABILITY REGIME OF THE USA 
 
There are numerous differences between the legal systems of the USA and South Africa. 
South Africa addresses marine oil pollution and liability with all-encompassing national 
legislation. By contrast the USA deals with these matters through both federal and state 
legislation, but the present analysis is confined to the former.1 The USA passed aggressive 
marine pollution legislation in the wake of the Exxon Valdez spill, but some authors are 
concerned that these laws go beyond international law thresholds and are thus ultra vires.2 
 
3.1.1. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act: 
 
The OCSLA states that the US Constitution, laws, and civil and political jurisdiction of the 
USA is extended to the seabed and subsoil of the US continental shelf, and to installations and 
other devices that are permanently or temporarily attached to the seabed for the purposes of 
exploring for or developing resources therefrom.3 The OCSLA therefore confers upon the USA 
the right to regulate installations exploring for and exploiting minerals on its continental shelf, 
thus bringing the USA into conformity with international law, specifically article 77(1) of 
                                         
1 As each coastal US state may pass its own marine pollution legislation, it would not be feasible to consider each 
instrument here. 
2 D Dzidzornu and M Tsamenyi ‘Enhancing International Control of Vessel-Source Pollution Under the Law of the 
Sea Convention, 1982: A Reassessment’ (1990) 10 U. Tas. L. Rev. 269, 287. 
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UNCLOS.4 In addition to placing installations within the federal jurisdiction of the USA, the 
OCSLA provides that the criminal and civil laws of the adjacent state are applicable to 
installations, to the extent that these are not inconsistent with the provisions of the OCSLA or 
any other federal laws.5 This provision is only applicable to fixed installations,6 and thus 
excludes the application of state law to mobile installations such as the Deepwater Horizon.7 On 
the plain wording of the OCSLA, the only applicable law in the event of a spill from an offshore 
installation that was not permanently affixed to the seabed is general maritime law,8 and Acts of 
Congress.9  
 
Despite the seemingly clear wording of the OCSLA, controversy has arisen. In Union Texas 
Petroleum Corp. v PLT Engineering Inc. the court held that provided the cause of action arose 
upon an installation permanently or temporarily attached to the seabed, and that federal law does 
not apply of its own force, the law of the adjacent state will be applicable provided that it is not 
inconsistent with federal law.10 Despite this dictum being upheld by the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit, it has been the subject of intense academic scrutiny,11 as the plain wording of the 
OCSLA refers only to fixed structures when conferring jurisdiction upon adjacent states. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the question, so the Fifth Circuit’s 
decision remains binding in Louisiana. 
 
                                                                                                                                   
3 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §1331 (‘OCSLA’), §1333(a)(1). 
4 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3. (‘UNCLOS’). For further 
discussion on UNCLOS, see 2.2.1. of this dissertation. 
5 OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. §1333(a)(2)(A). 
6 Ibid. 
7 M Davies ‘Liability Issues Raised by the Deepwater Horizon Blowout’ (2011) 25 Austl. & N.Z. Mar. L.J. 35, 35. 
Davies notes that whilst §1333(a)(1) was amended in 1978 to include semisubmersible drilling rigs and other 
devices, §1333(a)(2)(A) was left untouched, thus demonstrating that state law was excluded from applying to non-
fixed installations. 
8 Article III, section 2 of the US Constitution grants federal courts the jurisdiction to hear maritime claims. See also 
Davies (ibid) 35. 
9 Davies (note 7 above) 36. 
10 Union Texas Petroleum v PLT Engineering, 895 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1990), 1047. For a discussion of the three 
pronged test created by the Union Texas case, see also Chandler, Myers and Domingo ‘Choice of Law on the Outer 
Continental Shelf: Is There Any Choice At All?’ available at http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/8167bb66-
0756-49c0-a5e5-25c0572a73e1/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/c8eb003c-cef4-4bb1-a408-
a5283217988d/choiceoflaw.pdf, accessed on 28 September 2013. 
11 Davies (note 7 above) 36. Whilst Davies emphatically states that ‘to put it bluntly, this just wrong’, Schilling is a 
bit more restrained, commenting that this aspect of the judgment is ‘particularly controversial’. See E Schilling 
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In the specific context of the Deepwater Horizon spill, Davies comments that BP’s liability is 
largely unaffected by the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the OCSLA, as federal and state law 
impose the same limits on liability.12 Difficulties emerge when considering the potential liability 
of BP’s contractors, as there is a possibility for a claim of product liability against the party 
responsible for the faulty blowout protector.13 Whilst federal law permits punitive damages for 
product liability claims, provided that the quantum of punitive damages may not exceed that of 
compensatory damages,14 Louisiana state law (the law that would be applicable to the Deepwater 
Horizon) does not.15 Thus determining which law is applicable to the incident is of vital 
importance and the controversy surrounding the interpretation of the OCSLA by the Fifth Circuit 
is concerning. 
 
In the context of liability for damage caused by pollution resulting from an oil spill, the 
OCSLA is silent (barring an action for the compensation of workers). The most important 
consequence of the OCSLA in the context of liability for an oil spill from an offshore installation 
is that it places installations operating on the US continental shelf (but beyond the territorial 
waters) within federal jurisdiction - and therefore within the ambit of federal oil pollution 
legislation. 
 
3.1.2. The Oil Pollution Act: 
 
The primary federal legislation addressing pollution is the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (‘OPA 
90’).16 The OPA 90 was the US’s legislative response to the Exxon Valdez spill.17 Prior to the 
OPA 90 the USA was woefully exposed to marine oil pollution as it is not party to the CLC and 
Fund Conventions.18 Although the USA has not incorporated the CLC and Fund Conventions 
                                                                                                                                   
‘Demette v Falcon Drilling Co.: The Sinking Ship of Fifth Circuit Precedent Construing the Outer Continental Shelf 
Lands Act and Maritime Law’ (2001-2002) 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1785, 1788.  
12 Ibid 
13 Ibid. 
14 Exxon Shipping Co. v Baker 128 S Ct 2605 (2008). See also Schoenbaum (note 18 above) 403. 
15 Davies (note 7 above) 36. 
16 Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §2701 (‘OPA 90’) 
17 R Perry ‘The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and the Limits of Civil Liability’ (2011) 86 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 49. 
18 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 29 November 1969, 9 ILM 45 (‘CLC’). 
Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 18 
December 1971, 11 ILM 284 (‘Fund Convention’). T Schoenbaum ‘Liability for Damages in Oil Spill Accidents: 
69 
 
into law, it has created a liability system that is similar in many respects and that - crucially - is 
applicable to spills emanating from offshore installations. 
 
The OPA 90 defines an offshore facility as a ‘facility of any kind located in, on, or under any 
of the navigable waters of the United States, and any facility of any kind which is subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States and is located in, on, or under any other waters, other than a 
vessel or public vessel’.19 The OPA 90 defines a ‘mobile offshore drilling unit’ as a vessel that 
can be utilised as an offshore facility,20 and defines an ‘outer continental shelf facility’ as an 
offshore facility operating (in whole or in part) on the outer continental shelf.21 The ‘responsible 
party’ for an offshore facility is defined as the ‘lessee or permitee of the area in which the facility 
is located or the holder of a right of use and easement granted under applicable state law or the 
OCSLA for the area in which the facility is located (if the holder is a different person than the 
lessee or permitee)’.22 The OPA 90, in contrast to the CLC 69,23 covers all kinds of oil 
pollution,24 and it is the ‘responsible party’ for a facility from which the oil is discharged (or is 
likely to be discharged) into either the navigable waters, the adjoining shorelines or the exclusive 
economic zone (‘EEZ’)25 that is liable for removal costs and damages.26  
 
The OPA 90 imposes strict liability upon the responsible party for an oil discharge.27 OPA 90 
provides that removal costs include all removal costs incurred by the US, a state or an Indian 
tribe and any removal costs incurred by a person for acts taken by that person which are 
                                                                                                                                   
Evaluating the USA and International Law Regimes in the Light of the Deepwater Horizon’ (2012) 24:3 Journal of 
Environmental Law 395, 397. 
19 OPA 90, §2701(22). 
20 OPA 90, §2701(18). 
21 OPA 90, §2701(25). 
22 OPA 90, §2701(32)(B). 
23 Schoenbaum (note 18 above) 398 notes that whilst the international regime excludes claims for ‘non-persistent 
oils’, the OPA 90 has a far greater scope and includes every kind and form of oil. 
24 OPA 90, §2701(23) defines oil to mean any kind or form of oil other than those specifically listed or designated a 
hazardous substance. 
25 OPA 90, §2701(8) defines the EEZ as the zone established by Presidential Proclamation 5050, dated 10 March 
1983. In this proclamation, President Reagan declared that the EEZ extended 200 nautical miles from the baseline of 
the territorial sea and that the USA would have all rights permitted by international law in this zone. For a further 
discussion of these rights, see 2.2.1. of this dissertation. 
26 OPA 90, §2702(a). 
27 J Goldberg ‘Liability for Economic Loss in Connection with the Deepwater Horizon’ (2011-2012) 30 Miss. C. L. 
Rev. 335, 342. 
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consistent with the US National Contingency Plan.28 The OPA 90 distinguishes between removal 
costs and other damages claims (addressed below) for the purposes of limiting liability. As a 
general rule, the responsible party for an offshore installation will be able to cap liability at $75 
million, excluding removal costs.29 The limitation on liability (and the instances where a 
responsible party may not avail himself of this limit) will be discussed below. 
 
In addition to removal costs, OPA 90 recognises six distinct forms of damages claims. They 
are as follows: (a) damages for injury, destruction, loss or loss of use of natural resources 
including reasonable costs of assessing the damage, recoverable by a trustee of the USA, state, 
Indian tribe or foreign entity;30 (b) damages for injury to or economic loss arising from 
destruction of real or personal property, claimable by the owner or lessee of that property;31 (c) 
damages for loss of subsistence use of natural resources, recoverable by the person who has lost 
use of such resources without regard to ownership or management of them;32 (d) damages equal 
to loss of revenues as a result of injury, damage, destruction or loss of property or natural 
resources, recoverable by the USA, state or political subdivision thereof;33 (e) damages for loss 
of profits or impairment of earning capacity due to injury, destruction or loss of property or 
natural resources by any claimant;34 and finally (f) damages for the net costs of providing public 
services during removal activities caused by the oil discharge, recoverable by a state or a 
political subdivision thereof.35 Whilst the OPA 90 allows for a very wide range of damages 
claims, it does not include claims for compensation for attorneys,36 nor does it permit personal 
injury37 or death claims.38 The OPA 90 has been interpreted to exclude punitive damages.39 The 
                                         
28 OPA 90, §2702(b)(1)(A)(B). 
29 OPA 90, §2704(a)(3). Interestingly, offshore facilities are the only source of pollution that OPA 90 prevents from 
including removal costs within the liability cap. See further Perry (note 17 above) 52. See also R Force, M Davies & 
J Force ‘Deepwater Horizon: Removal Costs, Civil Damages, Crimes, Civil Penalties, and State Remedies in Oil 
Spill Cases’ (2011) 85 Tul. L. Rev. 889 (‘Force 2011’), 944. 
30 OPA 90, §2702(b)(2)(A). 
31 OPA 90, §2702(b)(2)(B). 
32 OPA 90, §2702(b)(2)(C). 
33 OPA 90, §2702(b)(2)(D). 
34 OPA 90, §2702(b)(2)(E). 
35 OPA 90, §2702(b)(2)(F). 
36 Schoenbaum (note 18 above) 403. 
37 Perry (note 17 above) 52. 
38 D Robertson ‘Criteria for Recovery of Economic Loss under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990’ (2011-2012) 7 Tex. J. 
Oil Gas & Energy L. 241, 242. 
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range of permissible claims under the OPA 90 is so wide, the judge hearing the Deepwater 
Horizon matter has ordered that the cases be divided and heard in ‘bundles’, with each bundle 
concerning a different form of damages.40  
 
Certain authors comment that the OPA 90 appears to allow claims for pure economic loss, 
although there has yet to be a decisive ruling on this issue.41 Prior to the OPA 90, the US courts 
had been reluctant to recognise claims for pure economic loss. In the Supreme Court case of 
Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co v Flint it was held that a time charterer could not sue a party for 
loss of profits resulting from damage to the chartered vessel, as the damaged property did not 
belong to the time charterer.42 The court held that the time charterer only had a contractual 
interest, and as the negligent party was not party to the time charter, it was not liable for the time 
charterer’s pure economic loss.43 Davies writes that in the Robins Dry Dock case, the Supreme 
Court created the ‘bright line’ rule, stating that ‘only those suffering personal injury or property 
damage may recover economic losses consequential on that injury or damage’.44 The OPA 90 
states that a claimant may recover damages ‘equal to the loss of profits or impairment of earning 
capacity due to the injury, destruction, or loss of real property, personal property, or natural 
resources’.45 This provision clearly indicates that OPA 90 provides for claims of pure economic 
                                                                                                                                   
39 Perry (note 17 above) 56. Perry cautions that it would be premature to consider the interpretation excluding 
punitive damages as decided law as the OPA 90 states that it does not affect maritime and admiralty law ‘except as 
otherwise provided in this Act’. 
40 Schoenbaum (note 18 above) 407/408. 
41 Schoenbaum (note 18 above) 411. 
42 Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co v Flint 275 US 303, 48 S Ct. 134 (1927). See Schoenbaum (note 18 above) 
408/409. South African law permits claims for loss of profit provided that the claims are not ‘too speculative or 
remote’, see in this regard John Hare Shipping Law and Admiralty Jurisdiction in South Africa 2nd Ed. (2009) (‘Hare 
2009’), 368. In Herschel v Mrupe 1954 (3) SA 464 (A) at 490A the Appellate Division, per Van Den Heever JA, 
held that damages in respect of the Aquilian action can only be awarded if the defendant  ‘made an invasion of rights 
recognised by the law as pertaining to the plaintiff; apart from that, loss lies where it falls’. The dictum from 
Herschel was repeated by the Appellate Division in Osborne Panama SA v Shell & BP South African Petroleum 
Refineries (Pty) Ltd and others 1982 (4) SA 890 (A) at 900H, per Wessels JA, who held that ‘in the absence of a 
legal duty there can be no unlawfulness’. The United Kingdom has a similar view to the USA, with Hewson J in 
Konstantinidas v World Tankers Corp Inc, The World Harmony [1965] 2 All ER 139 at 155 stating ‘There is no 
reported case, so far as I am aware, in the long history of chartering where a time charterer has recovered damages 
for pecuniary loss because of a damage by a third party to the chartered vessel.’ This dictum was subsequently 
endorsed by the House of Lords in Candlewood Navigation Corp Ltd v Mitsui OSK Lines Ltd and another, The 
Mineral Transporter, The Ibaraki Maru [1985] 2 All ER 935 at 940. 
43 Schoenbaum (note 18 above) 409. 
44 Davies (note 7 above) 38. 
45 OPA 90, §2702(b)(2)(E). 
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loss,46 and this is consistent with the intention of Congress when promulgating this Act.47 There 
is some academic concern that where the responsible party limits its liability in terms of OPA 90, 
permitting claims for pure economic loss will ‘dilute the pool for compensating claimants’.48 
This would result in no single claimant adequately recovering their losses.49 
 
As noted earlier, OPA 90 does allow a responsible party to limit its liability. The responsible 
party may escape all liability if it can establish on a balance of probabilities that the actual or 
threatened discharge of oil and its resulting damages or removal costs were solely caused by an 
act of God,50 an act of war,51 an act or omission of a third party,52 or any combination thereof.53 
Where the discharge or damage resulted from an act or omission of a third party, the responsible 
party will not escape liability if the third party was its employee or agent, or if the act or 
omission of the third party occurred in connection with a contractual relationship between it and 
the responsible party.54 Finally, where the damage occurred as the result of an act or omission of 
a third party, the responsible party must establish that it exercised due care with respect to the oil 
concerned,55 and that it took reasonable steps against foreseeable acts or omissions by the third 
party, in order to escape liability.56 It is worth noting that a party may not utilise these defences 
in the event that it failed to report the incident or if it failed to provide reasonable cooperation 
and assistance to a responsible official in connection with removing the pollution.57 
 
In addition to the above ‘complete defences’ to liability, the OPA 90 allows the responsible 
party to limit its liability to the extent that the claimant caused the incident due to their own gross 
negligence or wilful misconduct.58 The OPA 90 also contains general liability limitations 
                                         
46 Schoenbaum (note 18 above) 412. 
47 Congressional Record - 101st Congress (1989-1990), Conference Report on H.R. 1465, Oil Pollution Act of 1990 
(House of Representatives - August 03, 1990) at page H6939. 
48 Davies (note 7 above) 53. 
49 A comprehensive analysis detailing claims for economic loss in terms of the OPA 90 can be found in Robertson 
(note 38 above). 
50 OPA 90, §2703(a)(1). 
51 OPA 90, §2703(a)(2). 
52 OPA 90, §2703(a)(3). 
53 OPA 90, §2703(a)(4). 
54 OPA 90, §2703(a)(3). 
55 OPA 90, §2703(a)(3)(A). 
56 OPA 90, §2703(a)(3)(B). 
57 OPA 90, §2703(c). 
58 OPA 90, §2703(b). 
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available to the responsible party, with the limits dependant on the nature of the vessel. Where 
the vessel is an offshore installation, the liability limit is the total of all removal costs plus $75 
million.59 This liability limit will not be available if the incident was proximately caused by the 
gross negligence or wilful misconduct of the responsible party,60 or if a federal regulation was 
violated by the party, its agents, employees or a party in a contractual relationship with the 
responsible party.61 The figure of $75 million has been criticised as insufficient in the wake of 
the Deepwater Horizon spill,62 and the White House is presently considering increasing the 
liability limits (with some law makers calling for an increase to $10 billion).63 Perry comments 
that the liability caps in the OPA 90 appear to be arbitrary, as they are ‘insensitive to factors that 
seem relevant in determining the proper scope of liability, such as the fact that many relational 
losses are not true social costs’.64 However, where the responsible party fails to report the 
incident or cooperate with the responsible authorities, it will not be entitled to limit its liability.65 
Perry comments that the OPA 90 removes liability limits in events that would usually result in 
punitive damages under general maritime law.66 Notwithstanding any of these limitations, the 
owner or operator of an offshore facility operating on the continental shelf must bear all the 
removal costs incurred by the USA authorities.67  
 
It is readily apparent that the USA has created a liability regime for spills emanating from 
offshore platforms. It has created a similar framework to that found in international law 
addressing tanker spills.68 The key features of both regimes are strict liability with few 
exceptions, coupled with a liability limitations. A further similarity between the two regimes is 
the method by which money is made available to compensate claimants.69 The OPA 90 allows 
claimants to proceed against the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (‘Fund’), established by Article 
                                         
59 OPA 90, §2704(a)(3). 
60 OPA 90, §2704(c)(1)(A). 
61 OPA 90, §2704(c)(1)(B). 
62 Force 2011 (note 29 above) 945 writes that the limit of $75 million is insufficient for modern drilling activities. 
63 M Soraghan ‘White House Proposes Bill to Lift Caps on Offshore Oil Spill Liability’ The New York Times 12 
May 2010, available at www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/05/12/12greenwire-white-house-proposes-bill-to-lift-caps-on-
offs-45047.html, accessed on 28 September 2013. 
64 Perry (note 17 above) 68. 
65 OPA 90, §2704(c)(2)(A-B). 
66 Perry (note 17 above) 54. 
67 OPA 90, §2704(c)(3). 
68 Schoenbaum (note 18 above) 400. See also Chapter 2 of this dissertation for a detailed analysis of the 
international law regime and its applicability to offshore platforms. 
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26, section 9509(a). The fund may only provide compensation for certain expenditure, including 
claims for payment of removal costs, expenses, claims and damages referred to in section 1012 
of the OPA 90.70 The amount of compensation provided in such instances is limited, with no 
payment exceeding $1 billion permitted for a single incident.71 Where the costs relate to natural 
resource damage assessments and claims, compensation shall not exceed $500 million per 
incident.72 Perry comments that these limitations demonstrate that the fund does not guarantee 
full compensation, even where all prerequisites for payment have been satisfied.73 Furthermore, 
Perry strongly argues that the amount provided by the fund is clearly inadequate in instances 
such as the Deepwater Horizon spill.74 This is because there will be insufficient funds for 
individual victims after the fund has paid for harm to natural resources and removal costs - as 
Perry writes, this leaves ‘individual victims with only a forlorn hope of recovery’.75 
 
The claimant must first seek compensation from the responsible party, before he may 
approach the fund.76 A party may proceed directly against the fund in limited circumstances: (1) 
the President has advertised or advised claimants that they may do so; (2) the claimant is the 
responsible party and is recovering costs it paid in excess of its liability limitation;77 (3) the 
claimant is a state which is recovering removal costs; or (4) the oil was discharged by a foreign 
offshore unit for which the fund is liable.78 Of particular interest is the provision permitting the 
responsible party to claim from the fund. A responsible party may not claim from the fund where 
the incident was caused by its own gross negligence or wilful misconduct.79 Perry summarises 
the position of a responsible party who acted with gross negligence or wilful misconduct as 
follows: (1) there will be no available liability cap; (2) the responsible party will be barred from 
claiming compensation from the fund; (3) no punitive damages claims are allowed against the 
                                                                                                                                   
69 Schoenbaum (note 18 above) 400. 
70 U.S.C. 26, §9509(c)(1)(A). 
71 U.S.C. 26, §9509(c)(2)(A)(i). 
72 U.S.C. 26, §9509(c)(2)(A)(ii). 
73 Perry (note 17 above) 57. 
74 Perry (note 17 above) 57/58. 
75 Perry (note 17 above) 58. These individuals include affected tourism, fishing and real estate businesses. In this 
regard see chapter 1, page 2 of this dissertation. 
76 OPA 90, §2713(a). Force 2011 (note 29 above) 949/950. 
77 See OPA 90, §2708. 
78 OPA 90, §2713(b)(1)(A-D). 
79 OPA 90, §2712(b). 
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responsible party.80 Perry is critical of this position, suggesting that the OPA 90 does not 
consider the relative gravity of the responsible party’s negligence.81 Provided the responsible 
party is more than merely negligent, he argues, the OPA 90 will summarily impose unlimited 
liability.82 He further states that ‘while general maritime law responds to severe misconduct by 
allowing a very exclusive group of successful claimants to obtain extra-compensatory payments, 
the OPA removes the statutory limit of the defendant’s liability to a much more inclusive group 
of recognized [sic] claimants’.83  
 
To properly assess Perry’s critique that the OPA 90 fails to consider the relative gravity of 
the responsible party’s negligence, one must briefly consider how the courts distinguish between 
ordinary and gross negligence.  The US Supreme Court in Exxon Shipping Co. v Baker, in 
defining what is meant by recklessness (gross negligence) held that ‘recklessness may consist of 
either of two types of conduct. In one the actor knows, or has reason to know… of facts which 
create a high degree of risk of… harm to another, and deliberately proceeds to act, or to fail to 
act, in conscious disregard of, or indifference to, that risk. In the other the actor has such 
knowledge, or reason to know, of the facts, but does not realize or appreciate the high degree of 
risk involved, although a reasonable man in his position would do so.’84 Perry’s contention is 
therefore that the OPA 90 does not distinguish between instances where the responsible party 
‘consciously disregards the risk’ and instances where it intentionally causes the harm. It is 
submitted that whilst these two concepts are notionally different, they are difficult to distinguish 
in practice. Conventions such as the CLC 92 also remove all limits on liability if the claimant can 
                                         
80 Perry (note 17 above) 58. It is appropriate to reiterate that the matter of punitive damages under OPA 90 has yet to 
be definitively resolved, see Perry ibid, 59. 
81 Perry (ibid) 68. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Perry (ibid) 58. 
84 Exxon Shipping Co. v Baker (note 14 above) at 20. South African law also distinguishes between ordinary and 
gross negligence. In MV Stella Tingas; Transnet Ltd t/a Portnet v Owners of the MV Stella Tingas and another 2003 
(2) SA 473 (SCA) Scott JA considered whether Transnet could avail themselves of a liability exemption contained 
in paragraph 10(7) of Schedule 1 to the Legal Succession to the South African Transport Services Act 9 of 1989. 
This exemption would allow Transnet to escape liability if the loss or damage resulted from a negligent act or 
omission on the part of the pilot. This liability exemption would not be available if the pilot acted with gross 
negligence. At page 481A-C, the court held that ‘to qualify as gross negligence the conduct in question, although 
falling short of dolus eventualis, must involve a departure from the standard of the reasonable person to such an 
extent that it may properly be categorised as extreme; it must demonstrate, where there is found to be a conscious 
risk-taking, a complete obtuseness of mind or, where there is no conscious risk-taking, a total failure to take care. If 
something less were required, the distinction between ordinary and gross negligence would lose validity.’ 
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establish gross negligence,85 presumably for this same reason. Thus the OPA 90’s failure to 
consider the relative gravity of the operator’s conduct beyond mere negligence is not anomalous 
and is in fact congruent with international law. 
 
The final aspect of OPA 90 to be considered is its financial security provisions. The 
responsible party for an offshore installation is required to furnish evidence of financial 
responsibility amounting to $35 million if the installation is located seaward of the seaward 
boundary of a state, or $10 million if located inland thereof.86 The President may determine that 
a higher amount, not exceeding $150 million, is appropriate based on factors such as operation, 
environmental and human health risks.87 The President may also consider the quantity and 
quality of the oil being drilled or explored for in determining the final amount.88 Where the same 
responsible party owns or operates more than one offshore installation, they need only furnish 
security equal to the amount applicable to the facility with the greatest financial responsibility 
requirement in terms of the OPA 90.89 The OPA 90 confers upon the claimant the right to 
proceed directly against the guarantor, the latter being entitled to invoke any defences that would 
have been available to the responsible party.90 The guarantor is thus precluded from raising any 
defence that might have been utilised in proceedings brought by the responsible party.91 
However, the claimant may only proceed against the insurer if the responsible party has denied 
or failed to pay the claim, is insolvent, has petitioned for bankruptcy or the claim is being filed 




The OPA 90 creates an effective liability regime that is directly applicable to offshore 
installations. Whilst concerns remain over the scope of claims for pure economic loss and natural 
                                         
85 CLC 92, art. 4(2). 
86 OPA 90, §2716(c)(1)(B). 
87 OPA 90, §2716(c)(1)(C). 
88 Ibid. 
89 OPA 90, §2716(c)(1)(D). 
90 OPA 90, §2716(f)(1)(A). 
91 Force 2011 (note 29 above) 955. 
92 OPA 90, §2716(f)(2)(A-C). 
77 
 
resource damage,93 as well as the arbitrary nature of the liability caps applicable to offshore 
installations,94 it is submitted that the OPA 90 is a far more effective regulatory instrument for 
offshore installations than those that exist at the international law level. The OPA 90 imposes 
strict liability, with limited exceptions, it provides clear caps on liability, creates a fund to 
compensate claimants and mandates financial security measures. It is clear that many finer 
criticisms of the OPA 90, which have yet to be resolved by the courts, will likely be addressed in 
the litigation resulting from the Deepwater Horizon spill. 
 
The USA’s legislative regime is interesting as it is not party to the CLC and Fund 
Conventions. Following the Exxon Valdez spill, it was clear that the USA had to implement some 
form of pollution control legislation and the end result  - the OPA 90 - appears to be very similar 
to that created by the CLC convention. Furthermore, instruments imposing criminal sanctions 
such as the Clear Water Act have purposely been excluded from the scope of this analysis, but 
will be used to fine BP significant sums of money.95 Congress has allowed individual states the 
discretion to impose additional liability for oil pollution occurring within their territory, leading 
to the impression that ‘state and general (federal) maritime law should be cumulative’.96  
 
The effectiveness the civil liability provisions of the OPA 90 will ultimately be determined in 










                                         
93 Schoenbaum (note 18 above) 416. 
94 Perry (note 17 above) 68. 
95 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §1251. 
96 Davies (note 7 above) 42. 
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3.2 THE DOMESTIC LIABILITY REGIME OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
The final liability regime to be considered is that of South Africa. Offshore oil exploitation is 
not currently a major industry in South Africa and therefore the potential for disaster is minimal. 
This potential is further reduced when one considers that established offshore platforms currently 
operate in shallow waters, a factor that would significantly reduce the time taken to seal a well 
blowout. Whilst present offshore oil operations in South Africa may therefore present minimal 
risk, there has been increased interest in exploring for oil in deeper waters along South Africa’s 
coast,97 as well as the coasts of neighbouring states.98 As exploration increases, so too does the 
likelihood of an oil spill occurring in South Africa’s waters. There is also a risk that a spill may 
occur in the waters of a neighbouring state and that such a spill could be carried onto South 
African shores by ocean currents.  
 
3.2.1. THE LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
There are many different pieces of legislation that address marine pollution in South Africa.99 
A number of these statutes attempt to incorporate international conventions into South Africa 
law whilst others merely codify principles found in South Africa’s domestic law. In order to 
                                         
97 C Assis ‘Exxon signs deal to look for oil in South Africa’ MarketWatch, The Wall Street Journal 17 December 
2012, available at http://www.marketwatch.com/story/exxon-signs-deal-to-look-for-oil-in-south-africa-2012-12-17, 
accessed on 10 November 2013. Exxon Mobil Corp. has obtained a partial interest in the Tugela South Exploration 
Right, granting it exploration rights to an 18 million acre area off the coast of Durban. Off South Africa’s western 
coast, Shell has been granted the right to explore the Orange Basin Deep Water are (an area of approximately 37 000 
square kilometres) for oil and natural gas. See http://www.shell.com/zaf/aboutshell/shell-businesses/e-and-p/orange-
basin-old.html, accessed on 10 November 2013. Other operators include BHP Billiton, which is investigating an 
area of South Africa’s south coast believed to be rich in oil. See J Roux, D van der Spuy and V Singh ‘Deepwater 
drilling on the way of South Africa’ 2 February 2004 Offshore Magazine, available at http://www.offshore-
mag.com/articles/print/volume-64/issue-2/features/deepwater-drilling-on-the-way-off-south-africa.html, accessed on 
10 November 2013. See also Appendix 4 for a map of South African petroleum resources, available at 
http://www.petroleumagencysa.com/images/pdfs/Hubmap10a13.pdf, accessed on 12 November 2013. 
98 Recently there has been increased exploration for oil and gas of Mozambique’s coast and there is a strong 
likelihood that Mozambique could become a major player in the offshore energy industry. See E Gismatullin ‘Oil 
Hunted in Mozambique after World’s Largest Gas Discoveries’ Bloomberg 14 June 2013, available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-14/oil-hunted-in-mozambique-after-world-s-largest-gas-discoveries.html, 
accessed on 9 November 2013. See also World Oil News Centre ‘Eni discovers gas offshore Mozambique’ World 
Oil Online 9 April 2013, available at http://www.worldoil.com/Eni_discovers_gas_offshore_Mozambique.html, 
accessed on 9 November 2013. 
99 H Staniland ‘Should Foreign Maritime Liens Be Recognised?’ (1991) 108 S. African L.J. 293, 300. Staniland 




unpack this convoluted state of affairs, the various pieces of legislation applicable to offshore 
platforms spills will be separately addressed.  
 
3.2.1.1. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa: 
 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (‘the Constitution’) is the supreme law of 
South Africa.100 Chapter 2 of the Constitution contains the Bill of Rights and the state has a duty 
to ‘respect, protect, promote and fulfil’ these rights.101 Amongst these rights is the right for 
everyone to ‘an environment which is not harmful to their health or well-being’.102 Additionally, 
the section provides that everyone has the right to an environment protected  for present and 
future generations through legislative or other measures that ‘prevent pollution and ecological 
degradation’.103 Couzens comments that this section is ‘less a fundamental right than a policy 
principle’ as a claimant is required to utilise statutory remedies prior to resorting to constitutional 
provisions due to the principle of constitutional avoidance.104 Couzens’s comment seems to be 
supported by the judgment given in the HTF Developers case,105 in which Murphy J held that 
section 24 of the Constitution has an ‘aspirational form’ and identifies key areas that must be 
considered by legislators.106 Kuschke writes that section 24 creates a ‘third generation right’, 
meaning that it is a ‘right for the public at large’ instead of a right of an individual.107  It would 
therefore appear that section 24 of the Constitution was envisioned as a policy template, not 
primarily as an actionable provision (although general constitutional remedies will be available 
to a litigant).108 
 
                                         
100 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (‘The Constitution’), s2. 
101 The Constitution, s7(2). 
102 The Constitution, s24(a). 
103 The Constitution, s24(b)(ii). 
104 E Couzens ‘The incorporation of international environmental law (and multilateral environmental agreements) 
into South African domestic law’ (2005) 30 SAYIL 128, 138. 
105 HTF Developers (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others 2006 (5) SA 512 (T). 
106 Ibid 518. 
107 Birgit Kuschke Insurance Against Damage Caused By Pollution (unpublished LLD thesis, University of South 
Africa, 2009) 61. 
108 Kuschke (ibid) 67 and 72. See also Minister of Health and Welfare v Woodcarb (Pty) Ltd and another 1996 (3) 
SA 155 (N) at 164 where the court held that the Minister of Health and Welfare had locus standi to obtain an 
interdict to protect the respondent’s neighbour’s right to an environment which is not detrimental to their health or 
well-being. See further Sibiya & Others v DPP: Johannesburg High Court & Others 2005 (5) SA 315 (CC) at para. 
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Section 39 of the Constitution states that when a court, tribunal or forum interprets a 
provision of the Bill of Rights, it must consider international law.109 It is therefore submitted that 
since section 24 mandates the creation of legislation to protect the environment, it will be 
necessary to consider international law to determine whether such legislation is adequate in 
terms of section 24.110 The system established by the Constitution for incorporating international 
law into South African domestic law has been defined as a ‘combined monist and dualist 
approach’.111 International agreements are incorporated into South African law by an Act of 
Parliament.112 Where such an instrument has attained the status of international customary law 
(an example of this would be UNCLOS)113 such law is binding in South Africa unless it is 
inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament.114  
 
The Constitution clearly recognises the need for environmental protection. It delegates the 
protection of this right to legislative and other measures, and crucially, the Constitution requires 
that international law must be considered in effecting environmental protection. 
 
3.2.1.2. Maritime Zones Act: 
 
The Maritime Zones Act115 was promulgated by Parliament to give effect to the various 
maritime zones created by UNCLOS.116 The Maritime Zones Act does not deviate from the 
provisions of UNCLOS. South Africa has rights and powers over minerals in its internal waters, 
territorial waters, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf.117 As per UNCLOS, this 
includes the right to ‘adopt laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the 
marine environment arising from or in connection with seabed activities subject to their 
                                                                                                                                   
22 where the court further noted that it could grant a supervisory or structural interdict to enforce environmental 
obligations. 
109 The Constitution, s1(b). 
110 Couzens (note 104 above) 138 fn. 34. 
111 Couzens (note 104 above) 128. 
112 The Constitution, s231(4). 
113 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3. (‘UNCLOS’). 
114 The Constitution, s232. 
115 Act 15 of 1994. 
116 Couzens (note 104 above) 135. See also E Couzens ‘Sea and Seashore’ in: (2010) 24 LAWSA (‘Couzens 2010’) 
para. 132.  
117 Maritime Zones Act, s7. 
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jurisdiction from artificial islands, installations and structures under their jurisdiction…’118 As 
noted earlier, installations operating in the EEZ, or in the waters above the continental shelf,119 
are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the coastal state.120 It is submitted that the imposition 
of criminal or civil liability by the South African legislature for polluting activities by an owner 
or operator falls comfortably within the provisions of UNCLOS. 
 
The Maritime Zones Act contains provisions detailing the application of laws in respect of 
installations. The term ‘installation’ is widely defined by the Act to mean ‘any of the following 
situated within internal waters, territorial waters or the exclusive economic zone or on or above 
the continental shelf… (b) any exploration or production platform used in prospecting for or the 
mining of any substance’.121 The Act states that any law in force in South Africa, including the 
common law, applies on and in respect of an installation,122 and that installations are deemed to 
be within the jurisdiction of the magistrates’ court nearest to the installation (unless the Minister 
of Justice designates otherwise).123 
 
Whilst this Act is silent on issues of pollution and liability, it is noteworthy as it allows a 
potential litigant to rely on common law principles in addition to statutory remedies in a matter 
involving an installation, where such claim would usually be excluded due to the claim arising 
outside of the court’s traditional territorial jurisdiction.124 It is submitted that the effect of the 
Maritime Zones Act is that statutes, which ordinarily would not apply beyond South Africa’s 





                                         
118 UNCLOS, art. 208(1). 
119 UNCLOS, art. 81. 
120 UNCLOS, art. 60(2). See 2.2.1 for a detailed discussion of UNCLOS provisions applicable to offshore 
installations operating within the EEZ or the waters above the continental shelf. 
121 Maritime Zones Act, s1(b). 
122 Maritime Zones Act, s9(1). 
123 Maritime Zones Act, s9(2)(3). 
124 See for example Schlumberger Logelco Inc v Coflexip SA 2000 (3) SA 861 (SCA) in which the Supreme Court of 
Appeal (‘SCA’) held that the Patents Act applied to installations within the exclusive economic zone. 
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3.2.1.3. Marine Pollution (Control and Civil Liability) Act: 
 
South Africa became party to CLC 69125 in 1976, although it later denounced the convention 
in 2004.126 The Marine Pollution (Control and Civil Liability) Act (‘MPCCLA’)127 sought to 
incorporate a number of CLC 69’s provisions into South African law but did not include the 
original text of the convention as a schedule.128 The Act was not an attempt to mirror CLC 69 
and as a result its scope was expanded to include offshore installations. ‘Offshore installation’ is 
defined by the Act to include ‘any exploration or production platform situated within the 
prohibited area and used in prospecting for or the mining of natural oil’.129 In the context of 
offshore installations, the term ‘prohibited area’ includes the internal waters, territorial waters, 
the exclusive economic zone (‘EEZ’) and the sea within the limits of the continental shelf.130 The 
MPCCLA imposes both criminal and civil liability upon polluters, but the following discussion 
is primarily concerned with civil liability.131 
 
Civil liability for an oil spill emanating from an offshore platform is governed by section 9 of 
the MPCCLA, stating that the owner of an offshore platform will be liable for ‘any loss or 
damage caused, elsewhere than on such … offshore installation, in the area of the Republic by 
pollution resulting from the discharge of oil from such … offshore installation’.132 The 
MPCCLA defines ‘area of the Republic’ to include ‘the internal waters and the territorial 
waters’.133 The owner will also be liable for any measures taken by the South African authorities 
for the purposes of reducing or preventing loss or damage caused by the discharge of any oil 
                                         
125 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 29 November 1969, 9 ILM 45.  
126 Status of CLC 69 published by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority, available at 
https://imo.amsa.gov.au/public/parties/clc69.html, accessed 16 September 2013. 
127 Act 6 of 1981. 
128 Couzens 2010 (note 116 above) para. 236. 
129 MPCCLA, s1. 
130 MPCCLA, s1. 
131 Sections 2 of the MPCCLA states that it is an offence to discharge oil from an offshore installation. The section 
contains provisions allowing an accused to escape criminal liability, but the onus of proving such an exemption rests 
on the accused. 
132 MPCCLA, s9(1)(a). 
133 MPCCLA, s1. 
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from the installation.134 Finally, the owner will be liable for any loss or damage caused by 
measures taken or caused to be taken after a discharge from the installation.135  
 
Section 9 also imposes liability for measures taken by the South African authorities.136 The 
owner of the installation will be liable for expenses reasonably incurred in connection with the 
taking of such measures,137 in addition to any expenses incurred in rescuing, treating, 
rehabilitating, feeding or cleaning coastal birds that have been polluted by the oil discharged 
from the installation.138  
 
The MPCCLA has therefore adopted the same strict liability standard implemented by CLC 
69.139 The Act stopped short of imposing absolute liability as there are limited situations where 
the owner of the offshore installation may escape liability. The owner will not be liable for any 
loss resulting from a discharge if it is able to prove that the discharge ‘resulted from an act of 
war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection or an exceptional, inevitable and irresistible natural 
phenomenon’.140 The owner may also escape liability if the discharge was ‘wholly caused by an 
act or omission on the part of any person, not being the owner or a servant or agent of the owner, 
with intent to do damage’.141 Finally, the owner will not be liable in the event that the discharge 
‘was wholly caused by the negligence or other wrongful act of any government or other authority 
responsible for the maintenance of lights or other navigational aids, in the exercise of that 
function’.142   
 
Where an owner is not able to escape liability in terms of the MPCCLA, it may be possible 
for it to limit its liability. In the event the owner of the installation incurs liability in terms of 
section 9 but the incident was not caused by the owner’s actual fault or privity, its liability will 
be limited to an amount not exceeding fourteen million units of account (or a sum determined by 
                                         
134 MPCCLA, s9(1)(b). 
135 MPCCLA, s9(1)(c). 
136 MPCCLA, s1 defines the ‘authority’ as the South African Maritime Safety Authority (‘SAMSA’). 
137 MPCCLA, s9(2)(b)(i) 
138 MPCCLA, s9(2)(b)(ii). 
139 See 2.2.5. of this dissertation. For a commentary on the strict liability standard, see 4.3. 
140 MPCCLA, s9(3)(a). 
141 MPCCLA, s9(3)(b). 
142 MPCCLA, s9(3)(c). 
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the Minister of Transport).143 Therefore the owner of an installation, provided it was not at fault 
for the spill, would be liable for a maximum amount of approximately R200 million.144 
Furthermore, the owner of an installation will not be liable for any costs, loss or damages defined 
in section 9 of the MPCCLA otherwise than under the provisions of the Act,145 and agents as 
well as servants of the owner of excluded from liability for such claims.146  
 
It is readily apparent that the MPCCLA has adopted the framework of the CLC 69 i.e. strict 
liability with limit exceptions and a cap on liability. However, MPCCLA has deviated from the 
terms of the CLC 69 by including installations in its ambit - a category of vessels that the 
original text of the convention specifically excluded.147 Whilst the MPCCLA may directly cater 
for oil spills from offshore installations, it is submitted that the Act is out of date and alarmingly 
insufficient. The first area of concern is the limitation of liability available to an owner, 
specifically fourteen million Special Drawing Rights (‘SDR’). Hare states that this amount is 
‘paltry’.148 Hare’s dismay is well-warranted, especially when one considers that British 
Petroleum (‘BP’) has already agreed to pay 30 billion US Dollars in the wake of the Deepwater 
Horizon spill (with the civil suit still pending).149 A claimant may only act against the polluter in 
terms of the MPCCLA, therefore the South African state would have to bear its own costs 
beyond fourteen million SDR.150 This low limitation likely exists for two reasons. First, as the 
MPCCLA was created to correspond with the CLC 69, it is plausible that the drafters of the Act 
merely included installations within the scope of the Act without determining that the liability 
limitation (created to address pollution from tankers) would be insufficient for a spill from an 
installation. Second, the MPCCLA was drafted to conform to the CLC 69 but not any of its later 
                                         
143 MPCCLA, s9(5)(b)(ii). A ‘unit of account’ is defined by s5(8)(b) as being a Special Drawing Right as defined by 
the International Monetary Fund (‘IMF’). 
144 The current value of the Special Drawing Right is available from the IMF at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/data/rms_sdrv.aspx. On 18 September 2013, 14 million Special Drawing Rights 
was equivalent to R209 759 825.00. 
145 MPCCLA. s10(1). 
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147 CLC 69, art. 1(1). 
148 Hare 2009 (note 42 above) 566. 
149 Tom Fowler ‘Settlement Offer to BP Takes Shape’ The Wall Street Journal 24 February 2013, available at 
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150 See letter from UCT Professor John Hare to the Minister of Transport, in which he raises his concerns on this 
issue, available at www.mlasa.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Prof-John-Hare-Letter2.pdf, accessed on 20 
March 2013 (‘Hare Letter’) page 2. 
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protocols.151 This has resulted in the South Africa’s liability limitations, in the words of Hare, 
‘falling far behind international norms’.152 The lack of political will to update South Africa’s 
marine pollution legislation has been the subject of frequent criticism, with Hare (in an open 
letter to the Minister of Transport) exclaiming ‘it would seem that polluted coastlines are too far 
from Pretoria for there to be any real appreciation of the enormity of our exposure’.153  
 
A second concern is the geographical scope of the MPCCLA in the context of civil liability. 
Section 9(1)(a) of the Act states that the owner is liable for loss or damage caused by pollution 
‘in the area of the Republic’. ‘Area of the Republic’ is defined by the MPCCLA to include the 
internal waters and the territorial waters.154 This is in stark contrast to criminal liability, which is 
extended to pollution occurring within the prohibited area,155 an area that includes the EEZ and 
the sea within the limits of the continental shelf.156 This is disconcerting as offshore oil platforms 
may well be located in the EEZ or in the waters above the continental shelf.157 Section 9(1) of 
the Maritime Zones Act could possibly be utilised by a litigant to address this lacuna. The 
litigant could potentially argue that installations, as a result of the Maritime Zones Act, fall 
within the definition of ‘area of the Republic’, but to date this remains untested. It is unlikely that 
this line of reasoning would find favour with the courts, as the defendant owner of the offshore 
platform would vehemently argue that civil claims concerning installations in the EEZ and 
continental shelf have been specifically excluded by the MPCCLA. Therefore it is submitted that 
an amendment is needed to remedy this uncertainty.  
 
A third concern is the lack of compulsory insurance for offshore platforms operating in South 
Africa’s territory. The MPCCLA, following the provisions of CLC 69,158 requires every tanker 
                                         
151 Hare 2009 (note 42 above) 565. See also M Verwey Liability for Oil Pollution Damage: An Anglo-South African 
Comparison in Light of the International Dispensation (unpublished LLM thesis, Northwest University, 2005) 26. 
152 Hare 2009 (note 42 above) 565. Hare’s letter was concerned with South Africa’s failure to incorporate the 1992 
CLC and Fund Protocols into law. Subsequent to the letter, Parliament is indeed deliberating on bills (attached as 
appendixes to this dissertation) that will hopefully be tabled before the National Assembly shortly. 
153 Hare Letter (note 150 above) 2. 
154 MPCCLA, s1(1). 
155 MPCCLA, s2 and 3. 
156 MPCCLA, s1(1). 
157 D Devine ‘Legal Protection of Offshore Installations Outside South African Territorial Waters’ (1993) 11 J. 
Energy & Nat. Resources L. 281 (‘Devine 1993’), 281/282.  See also D Devine ‘South African Civil Law and 
Offshore Installations’ (1994) 111 S. African L.J. 736 (‘Devine 1994’), 736. 
158 CLC 69, art. VII. 
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carrying more than 2000 tons of oil in bulk as cargo to demonstrate proof of financial security 
that is sufficient to cover any potential claim brought against the owner in terms of section 
9(1).159 Hare notes that pollution cover is provided by Protection and Indemnity Clubs (‘P&I 
Clubs’), who issue a ‘green card’ as proof of such cover.160 Significantly, P&I Clubs do not 
cover offshore platforms.161 This creates the undesirable situation where, in the event of a spill, 
there is no assurance that the owner of an offshore installation will be able to cover the 
associated costs. The MPCCLA attempts to remedy this by requiring the owner of an installation 
to furnish a written guarantee for costs incurred (or likely to be incurred) by SAMSA when 
taking measures to reduce damage resulting from the oil pollution.162 In the event that the owner 
fails to furnish a guarantee or fails to pay the costs specified by section 9(1)(b), SAMSA may 
detain the installation (or any other ships of the installation owner) until payment is made or the 
guarantee is furnished.163 If the owner fails to pay or furnish the required guarantee, the 
installation may be sold to cover SAMSA’s costs.164 It is submitted that these financial security 
measures are utterly inadequate, as they do not contemplate claims exceeding the value of the 
installation itself. If South African law requires financial security for oil tankers (vessels carrying 
oil in bulk as cargo) entering its waters, why not installations? Installations are easily capable of 
causing pollution equivalent to (or in excess of) that caused by oil tankers, and there is no 
compelling reason to exempt them from furnishing some measure of security. The USA requires 
the owners and operators of installations to furnish financial security up to $150 million.165 It is 
submitted that an amendment to the MPCCLA is necessary to address this situation.  
 
The MPCCLA is the primary Act in South Africa addressing civil liability in the event of an 
oil spill from an offshore platform. This is because the Act states that ‘when an incident has 
occurred in respect of a … offshore installation the owner of such … offshore installation shall 
                                         
159 MPCCLA, s13(1). Note that the Merchant Shipping (Civil Liability Convention) Bill, No. 20B of 2013 is 
repealing sections 13, 14 and 15 and substituting them with new financial security provisions. Bill available at 
http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/commonrepository/Processed/20130722/524991_1.pdf, accessed 10 August 2013, 
s8. Attached to this dissertation as appendix one. 
160 Hare 2009 (note 42 above) 566/567. 
161 S Rares ‘An International Convention on Off-Shore Hydrocarbon Leaks?’ (2012) 26 Austl. & N.Z. Mar. L.J. 10, 
17. See also 4.4. of this dissertation. 
162 MPCCLA. s16. 
163 MPCCLA, s19(1)(a)(i). 
164 MPCCLA, s19(1)(a)(ii). See also s19(3) which provides that SAMSA’s claim for the costs it incurred take 
preference over any lien or mortgage associated with the installation or ship. 
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not be liable otherwise than under the provisions of this Act to any person for any – (a) loss or 
damaged referred to in section 9(1)(a) or (c); or (b) costs referred to in section 9(1)(b), suffered 
or incurred as a result of that accident.166 Whilst this provision does not present difficulty if the 
claim arises in the internal waters or territorial waters of South Africa, it is extremely 
problematic if the installation is located in the EEZ or on or above the waters of the continental 
shelf. This is because the section 9(1) provisions are only applicable to claims arising in the 
internal and territorial waters. The result is that section 10 appears to exclude claims in terms of 
another statute or the common law against the owner. Fortunately, this exclusion would not be 
applicable to an operator of an installation, so the possibility for damages outside of section 9 
remains open in that situation. Whether section 9 of the Maritime Zones Act could remedy this 
defect will be discussed below, but the current wording of the MCCPLA creates the possibility 
that claims against owners of installations operating in the EEZ or continental shelf are not 
possible, and thus this section is in dire need of amendment. 
 
Whilst the MPCCLA may implement strict liability, the quantum limitation on claims is 
presently far too low. As Hare writes, this limitation is paltry and leaves South Africa 
‘dangerously and… shamefully inadequately covered.’167 Whilst draft legislation intended to 
give the CLC 92 and the 1992 Fund Convention the force of law in South Africa would raise this 
limitation in respect of claims against oil tanker owners, it will be of no application to 
installations.168 Similarly, the problem of civil claims arising in the EEZ is resolved by draft 
legislation that extends the court’s jurisdiction to hear claims arising in the EEZ, but again only 
in the context of oil tanker spills.169 Whilst marine pollution laws in South Africa are evolving to 
grant courts the jurisdiction to hear tanker pollution claims arising in the EEZ, they are leaving 





                                                                                                                                   
165 OPA 90, §2716(c)(1)(C). 
166 MPCCLA, s10(1). 
167 Hare Letter (note 150 above) 3. 
168 See draft bills attached as annexures 1 and 2 to this dissertation. 
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3.2.1.4. The National Environmental Management Act: 
 
The National Environmental Management Act (‘NEMA’) contains a general duty to prevent 
pollution or degradation to the environment.170 Pollution is defined as ‘any change in the 
environment caused by … substances … emitted from any activity … where that change has an 
adverse effect on human-health or well-being or on the composition, resilience and productivity 
of natural or managed ecosystems …’171 Where a person causes, has caused or may cause 
significant pollution, he must take measures to prevent such pollution from occurring, continuing 
or recurring, or to minimise or rectify the pollution.172 The liability implications resulting from 
section 28(1) are immense. In Bareki v Gencor,173 the provincial division of the Transvaal High 
Court held that section 28(1) creates a standard of strict liability.174 Furthermore, the court held 
that in the absence of statutory exemptions in favour of the polluter, section 28(1) may be said to 
create a standard of absolute liability.175 Liability may exist even where the pollution is 
authorised by law or cannot reasonably be avoided or stopped.176 Unlike the MPCCLA, NEMA 
does not contain any liability limitations, with the court stating that ‘[it] is important to note that 
there is no monetary limit to such liability. The liability can potentially be a very heavy one.’177  
 
NEMA envisages the intervention by a relevant authority in certain instances.178 NEMA sets 
out a framework for the control of emergency incidents, defining an incident as ‘an unexpected 
sudden occurrence, including a major emission, fire or explosion leading to serious danger to the 
public or potentially serious pollution of or detriment to the environment, whether immediate or 
delayed.’179 NEMA requires the responsible person (defined as the person responsible for the 
incident, owning the substance involved in the incident or in control of the substance at the time 
                                                                                                                                   
169 Ibid, s4. 
170 Act 107 of 1998 (‘NEMA’), s28. 
171 NEMA, s1. 
172 NEMA, s28(1). 
173 Bareki NO and Another v Gencor Ltd and Others 2006 (1) SA 432 (T). 
174 Ibid, 440H. 
175 Ibid, 440I - 441B. 
176 Ibid. 
177 Ibid, 440H. 
178 NEMA, s30. 
179 NEMA, s30(1)(a). 
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of the incident)180 to take all reasonable measures to contain and minimise the effects of the 
incident, undertake clean-up procedures, remedy the effects of the incident and assess the effects 
of the incident on the environment and public health.181 Where the relevant authority has 
incurred costs in controlling the incident,182 it may claim reimbursement from every responsible 
person jointly and severally.183  
 
NEMA creates an interesting, and as yet unresolved, dilemma as there is a possibility that 
NEMA could be applicable to marine pollution claims arising in the EEZ or on or above the 
continental shelf. NEMA does not expressly restrict its territorial application, and would 
therefore be enforceable in internal and territorial waters. It is therefore arguable that as a result 
of section 9(1) of the Maritime Zones Act, it is applicable to offshore installations operating 
within the EEZ and continental shelf.  As Devine states, unless a statute indicates that it is not 
applicable to offshore installations, it will apply.184 However, NEMA’s provisions appear to 
conflict with the MPCCLA as the latter states that the owner of an offshore installation will not 
be liable for any loss, damage or costs contemplated in section 9(1) of the Act otherwise than 
under the provisions of the MPCCLA.185 Where the harm falls outside the scope of section 9(1), 
NEMA would surely be applicable, but the wording of MPCCLA excludes liability for claims 
against the owner for oil pollution damage that fall within the section 9(1).186 As the MPCCLA 
only excludes claims against the owner, it is submitted that one could proceed against the 
                                         
180 NEMA, s30(1)(b). 
181 NEMA, s30(4). Failure to adhere to this section constitutes an offence, with the responsible person facing a 
potential fine of R1 million or 1 year imprison or both in terms of s30(11). In Truck and General Insurance Co Ltd v 
Verulam Fuel Distributors CC and Another 2007 (2) SA 26 (SCA) at para. 20, the court held that s30(4) requires 
that the responsible person act immediately upon knowledge of the incident, and that such person need not wait for 
direction from the relevant authority nor wait for such authority to act. 
182 NEMA, s30(8). 
183 S30(9) 
184 D Devine ‘The Application of South African Law to Offshore Installations’ (1994) J. S. Afr. L. 229 (‘Devine 
1994(2)’), 230. 
185 MPCCLA, s10(1). 
186 In Government of the Republic of South Africa and another v Government of KwaZulu and Another 1983 (1) SA 
164 (A) at 200E, the Appellate Division, per Rabie CJ, stated that a repeal of an earlier statute by implication ‘is 
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conflicts with the other, that we are justified in coming to the conclusion that the earlier Act has been repealed by 
the later one.’ It will therefore fall to the courts to determine whether there is a conflict of laws situation between the 
provisions of NEMA and the MPCCLA, but it is submitted that on the plain wording of the MPCCLA, NEMA 
ought to apply to installations located in the EEZ and above the continental shelf, as these territories are specifically 
excluded from the ambit of the MPCCLA. 
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operator of the installation in terms of NEMA, provided that operator was not the owner of the 
installation. It could also be argued that, as section 9(1) of the MPCCLA is silent on pollution 
occurring in the EEZ or on or above the continental shelf, there is no direct conflict between its 
provisions and the provisions of NEMA in such instances. Thus the only time the MPCCLA 
would expressly prohibit marine pollution claims to be heard in terms of NEMA would be where 
the pollution occurs within the internal waters or territorial waters. 
 
One possible way to resolve any difficulties relating to section 10 of the MPCCLA would be 
to amend the section to allow claims against installations under NEMA or the common law. A 
potential drawback however is that the potential for absolute, unlimited liability could deter 
platform operators from operating within South Africa’s jurisdiction. Section 28(2) of NEMA 
which states that, without limiting the general nature of section 28(1), the persons on whom 
s28(1) ‘imposes an obligation to take reasonable measures include the owner of the premises, a 
person in control of the premises, or a person who has a right to use the premises in which (a) 
any activity or process is or was performed or undertaken or (b) any other situation exists, which 
causes or is likely to cause significant pollution or degradation of the environment.’187 Section 28 
is therefore well suited to addressing offshore installation pollution as, unlike the MPCCLA, it 
recognises the role of the operator (the owner of an installation will likely be a foreign entity 
with no presence in South Africa). Extending the obligation to take reasonable measures to 
minimise or prevent pollution to the operator of an installation is certainly desirable. 
Furthermore, allowing offshore installation claims to be heard in terms of NEMA would bypass 
the ‘paltry’ liability limitation of R200 million. 
 
In conclusion, extending NEMA to apply to offshore installations would certainly warm the 
hearts of environmentalists due to the possibility of unlimited and absolute liability. However, 
such an approach presents more difficulties than it ultimately solves. Unlimited liability is a 
rarity in maritime law, and ought only to apply in instances where the pollution was caused by 
wilful misconduct or gross negligence. To impose unlimited liability upon an owner or operator 
who was not negligent is not congruent with current international law, or with the practice of 
states such as the USA. As such, it is submitted that the more desirable short-term solution would 
                                         
187 NEMA, s28(2). 
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be to amend the MPCCLA to recognise civil claims arising in the EEZ and continental shelf, 
coupled with an increased limitation amount. In the absence of a regional convention applicable 
to offshore installations operating off South Africa’s coast, the desirable long term solution 
would be the creation of a global convention applicable to offshore installations, with South 
Africa becoming a party to such a convention. Merely extending the provisions of NEMA is not 
the answer. 
 
3.2.1.5. Other relevant legislation: 
 
Beyond the statutes already discussed there is additional legislation that is relevant in the 
context of liability for an offshore platform oil spill, albeit in a limited manner. The Marine 
Pollution (Prevention of Pollution from Ships) Act gives effect to the MARPOL convention in 
South African law.188 The provisions of this Act make it an offence to dump in or otherwise 
pollute the ocean in the course of operating a vessel.189 In the specific context of offshore 
platforms, MARPOL (and thus the Act) prohibit discharges from the installation whilst it is in a 
mobile configuration but the release of harmful substances directly arising from the exploration, 
exploitation and associated offshore processing of sea-bed mineral resources is specifically 
excluded from its ambit.190 MARPOL, and the Prevention of Pollution Act, are therefore of 
limited application in the context of offshore platforms. 
 
The Dumping at Sea Control Act prohibits the unauthorised dumping of any substance (or 
the loading of any substance onto a vessel or installation for the purposes of dumping) into the 
sea.191 The Dumping Act defines the ‘sea’ to include the internal waters, the territorial waters 
and the waters within the EEZ.192 The onus is on the accused to demonstrate that the dumping 
was necessary to save human life, secure the safety of the installation or to prevent damage to the 
                                         
188 Act 2 of 1986 (‘Prevention of Pollution Act’). International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships, 1973, 2 November 1973, 1340 UNTS 184, 2 October 1983, amended by Protocol of 1978 Relating to the 
International Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Ships 1973, 17 February 1978, 1340 UNTS 
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189 Prevention of Pollution Act, s3A. 
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installation.193 The Dumping Act, pending Presidential proclamation, has been wholly repealed 
by the National Environmental Management: Integrated Coastal Management Act.194 
NEMICMA prohibits the dumping of any waste or other material within the coastal waters or 
EEZ of South Africa, or on the high seas, from a platform or other man-made structure.195 
Dumping is defined as the ‘deliberate disposal’ of any waste or other material at sea.196 It is 
doubtful that these provisions would cover a serious spill emanating from an offshore platform, 
as such a spill is unlikely to be deliberate. Such a spill would fall within the ambit of the 
MPCCLA.197  
 
The Marine Pollution (Intervention) Act198 incorporates the International Convention 
Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties (‘Intervention 
Convention’)199 into South African law. The Intervention Convention sought to empower states 
to intervene in the event of a maritime casualty in order to protect its coast. However, the 
convention (and thus the Act) defines a ship to include a floating craft ‘with the exception of an 
installation … engaged in the exploration and exploitation of the resources of the sea-bed and the 
ocean floor and the subsoil thereof’.200 Therefore the Intervention Act, whilst possibly applicable 
to a collision involving an offshore platform in a mobile configuration, would not be applicable 
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3.2.2. ISSUES PERTAINING TO THE ENFORCEMENT OF CLAIMS 
 
The nature of the claims that might arise under the common law, and whether they would be 
based in contract, delict or some other grounds, is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Suffice 
to say that there may be instances where a claimant can formulate a common law claim and may 
wish to pursue such a claim. In this case, as well as in the case of claims arising under statute, the 
procedure by which such a claim might be enforced must be considered. 
 
3.2.2.1. Admiralty Law: 
 
South Africa’s admiralty law has been codified into a single piece of legislation - the 
Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act (‘AJRA’).201 In terms of AJRA, a litigant may commence 
an admiralty action in order to enforce a maritime claim. The definition of ‘maritime claim’ 
includes ‘pollution of the sea or sea-shore by oil or any other substance emanating from a 
ship’.202 The term ship is defined to mean ‘any vessel used or capable of being used on the sea or 
internal waters, and includes any… oil or other floating right, floating mooring installation or 
similar floating installations, whether self-propelled or not’.203 AJRA’s definition of ship may 
exclude fixed installations,204 but would include semi-submersible installations such as the 
Deepwater Horizon.205 It is therefore apparent from section 1 of AJRA that an oil spill from an 
offshore platform (albeit a floating platform) would fall within the definition of maritime claim. 
 
AJRA contemplates two forms of proceedings, an action in rem against the installation itself 
or an action in personam against the person causing the harm.206 An action in rem is commenced 
by the arrest of the installation,207 or an associated ship,208 and may only be used to enforce a 
                                         
201 105 of 1983. 
202 AJRA, s1(1)(z). AJRA also contains a ‘catch-all’ provision in s1(1)(ee), stating that a maritime claim will 
‘include any other matter which by virtue of its nature of subject matter is a marine or maritime matter, the meaning 
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205 R Abeyratne ‘The Deepwater Horizon Disaster - Some Liability Issues’ (2010) 35 Tul. Mar. L. J. 125, 126. 
206 Devine 1993 (note 157 above) 283. 
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maritime claim in two instances: the claimant has a maritime lien over the property to be 
arrested,209 or the owner of the property to be arrested would be liable to the claimant in an 
action in personam in respect of the cause concerned.210  An action in personam can only be 
instituted against a person who is resident or conducts business in South Africa,211 whose 
property within the court’s area of jurisdiction has been attached to found or confirm 
jurisdiction,212 who has consented to the jurisdiction of the court,213 in respect of whom the court 
has jurisdiction in terms of the Insurance Act, 1943,214 or in the case of a company, the company 
has a registered office in South Africa.215 In the specific context of offshore installations, it is 
quite likely that the party operating the installation will be a foreign company. For an action in 
personam to be instituted in such a case, the claimant would have to attach the property 
belonging to the party who is liable in respect of the claim to found or confirm jurisdiction. 
 
Whilst these two actions differ in both practical and theoretical respects, they both share a 
common limitation - the arrest or attachment must be effected within the territorial waters of 
South Africa.216 This presents a clear difficulty as offshore installations are likely to operate in 
the EEZ or in the waters above the continental shelf,217 beyond the reach of AJRA’s provisions. 
This problem could be solved by the Maritime Zones Act, as it states that any law applicable in 
South Africa is applicable to offshore installations,218 and that an installation falls under the 
jurisdiction of the closest magisterial court district.219 This approach seems congruent with 
international law, as UNCLOS confers upon coastal states the exclusive right to construct, 
operate and regulate structures that are exploring for and exploiting minerals within both the 
                                         
209 AJRA, s3(4)(a). Whether oil pollution damage creates a maritime lien is subject to debate. Staniland (note 96 
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EEZ and continental shelf.220 Devine argues that extending jurisdiction over installations 
operating in the EEZ and continental shelf is fundamentally different from extending jurisdiction 
to cover tankers and other such vessels, as the latter would infringe upon the vessels’ right to 
navigation.221 It is submitted that the clearest solution to this dilemma would be to amend AJRA 
to clearly permit the arrest or attachment of an installation in the EEZ or continental shelf.222 
 
3.2.2.2. Common Law: 
 
Incidents where a litigant may proceed against the owner or operator of an offshore 
installation under the common law are limited. In the event that the pollution damage falls within 
the scope of section 9 of the MPCCLA, the claimant is barred from proceeding in terms of the 
common law. Where the claim falls outside of this section 9 definition, a claimant would rather 
resort to NEMA, as it relieves them of establishing fault. Finally, where the installation is not 
affixed to the sea bed, any pollution claim from an installation would more than likely constitute 
a maritime claim, which will decided in accordance with the principles of admiralty law.223 
Therefore, there are extremely limited circumstances when a claimant may resort to South 
Africa’s common law. 
 
As Devine notes, there are situations where a claim would not arise under admiralty law and 
it would be possible for a claimant to rather rely on the law of delict if the claim involves 
pollution from a platform affixed to the sea bed.224 Such claims are perfectly permissible as 
AJRA states that where a claim is not recognised under English maritime law, it will be 
determined according to principles of Roman-Dutch law.225 The immediate concern, which has 
been raised repeatedly in this chapter, is that of jurisdiction. The South African courts may only 
exercise their common law jurisdiction for delicts that occurred within the territorial waters and 
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internal waters.226 However, the Maritime Zones Act explicitly states that common law shall 
apply on an in respect of an installation.227 Therefore, it is clear that the common law will be 
applicable to an offshore platform that is located in the EEZ or on or above the continental shelf.  
 
A further challenge as there is no general duty in the South African common law not to 
pollute. When claiming for pecuniary loss, the plaintiff would have to establish that they are 
entitled to compensation because the defendant ‘[unreasonably], or contrary to the boni mores or 
legal conventions of the community, failed to prevent harm to the plaintiff.’228  Negligence alone 
is not sufficient to attract liability. In Telematrix (Pty) Ltd t/a Matrix Vehicle Tracking v 
Advertising Standards Authority SA229 the Supreme Court of Appeal, per Harms JA, stated that 
‘the fact that an act is negligent does not make it wrongful, although the foreseeability of damage 
may be a factor in establishing whether or not a particular act was wrongful. To elevate 
negligence to the determining factor confuses wrongfulness with negligence …’230 The courts, in 
imposing liability for an omission, will consider whether there is a legal duty to prevent the harm 
by bearing in mind the risk of the potential harm and the cost to prevent the harm from 
occurring.231  
 
After a potential claimant has overcome the hurdles of jurisdiction and establishing a legal 
duty, another difficulty awaits him - establishing the element of fault.232 Fault may take the form 
of either intention (dolus) or negligence (culpa).233 It is perhaps safe to assume that instances 
where an owner or operator intentionally caused oil pollution are a rarity, and that pollution is far 
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233 Devine 1993 (note 157 above) 287. 
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more likely to result as a product of negligence. As was noted in chapter 2, offshore oil 
exploration and exploitation is considered an ultra-hazardous activity.234 It is an activity that 
stretches the limits of human ingenuity and technical capability. This results in a situation where 
disaster may strike even where the operator of the platform has exercised reasonable care.235 It is 
precisely for this reason that international law (and the law of foreign states)236 has embraced the 
standard of strict liability for ultra-hazardous activities. South Africa, through NEMA, has 
embraced strict liability in its statutes, but the common law principles of delict have been slow to 
implement the standard.237 Therefore, if an owner or operator is able to demonstrate that they 




Whilst an owner or operator of an offshore platform could be held liable for an oil spill in 
terms of South African law, a confused legislative patchwork renders the situation complex. The 
state has certainly attempted to satisfy the constitutional requirement to enact laws to protect the 
environment, but these laws lack the cohesion of their USA equivalents. The MPCCLA is based 
on a dated convention, the CLC 69, a convention that was never designed to cater for offshore 
installations. The result is that installation owners are not required to furnish any financial 
security, and owners are able to limit their liability to paltry amount. A further concern is that 
civil claims involving installations drilling in the EEZ or continental shelf are not possible in 
terms of the MPCCLA. In these two areas, claims in terms of other legislation (notably NEMA) 
or under the common law might also be excluded due to the wording of section 10 of the 
MPCCLA. It is submitted that Parliament must amend the MPCCLA to recognise claims 
involving installations arising in the EEZ or the continental shelf. Further amendments that ought 
to be enacted include raising the amount of the owner’s liability limitation, allowing for the 
                                         
234 4.3. of this dissertation contains a focused discussion on liability for ultra-hazardous activities in international 
law. 
235 See 2.1.1. for a commentary on the Ixtoc 1 spill, a spill that occurred despite the operators taking reasonable steps 
to prevent and minimise the harm. 
236 Rylands v Fletcher (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 300. Green v General Petroleum Corporation 205 Cal. 328, 270 P. 952 
(1928) Both these cases recognised that oil drilling constituted such an abnormally dangerous activity, that 
demonstrating reasonable care was insufficient for escaping liability. 
237 Loubser and Midgley (note 228 above) 22/23. The authors note that there are instances where the common law 
recognises strict liability, but these relate to vicarious liability or some other form of control or agency (such as 
owners being held liable for the failure to control their animals). 
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imposition of liability against the operator instead of merely the owner, and introducing 
compulsory financial security measures. Only through such steps can South Africa truly give 
effect to the Constitution’s mandate for protecting and preserving the environment. 
 
3.3. COMPARISON AND CONCLUSION 
 
The domestic legislation of the USA and South Africa appear, at least superficially, to be 
quite similar in their approach of imposing liability for offshore pollution. Both the OPA 90 and 
the MPCCLA impose strict liability upon polluters with limited defences available to the 
polluter.238 Both statutes include ‘liability caps’ that are available to a defendant in limited 
circumstances,239 with the limits of both caps being the subject of considerable academic 
criticism.240 However, despite both systems sharing this same general framework, they differ 
significantly in a number of respects. 
 
Where the pollution emanates from an offshore installation, OPA 90 does not limit claims 
relating to removal costs. In addition to these costs, a claimant may seek six detailed forms of 
damages including pure economic loss.241 As noted above, the OPA 90 does not include claims 
for personal injury or death.242 Claims under South African law are not as clear as under its 
American counterpart. The MPCCLA allows claims for measures taken to reduce or prevent 
damage resulting from the pollution as well as claims for any loss or damage resulting from the 
pollution.243 The MPCCLA is based on the CLC 69, and the liability provisions of the CLC 69244 
have been interpreted to include clean-up and preventative measures, property damage (and loss 
consequential to that damage), pure economic loss, environmental damages and attorney costs.245 
The CLC 69 does not allow claims for lost government income or for an increase in the price of 
government services, something the OPA 90 does permit.246 However, since the CLC 69 was not 
                                         
238 OPA 90, §2702; MPCCLA, s9. 
239 OPA 90, §2703; MPCCLA, s5(b)(ii). 
240 Force 2011 (note 29 above) 945. See also Hare (note 42 above) 141. 
241 OPA 90, §2702(b)(2). 
242 Robertson (note 38 above) 242. 
243 MPCCLA, s9(1). 
244 CLC 69, art. III. 




included as a schedule to the MPCCLA,247 it is submitted that it remains unclear whether South 
African courts would interpret the liability provisions in the same manner. Differences between 
the OPA 90 and the MPCCLA are compounded by varying liability caps. The OPA 90 does not 
limit claims relating to recovery costs where the source of an oil spill is an offshore facility,248 
whereas the MPCCLA does not differentiate between the various forms of damages for 
limitation purposes.249  
 
A crucial difference between OPA 90 and the MPCCLA is the party that may be held 
accountable. OPA 90 allows claims against the responsible party in the event of an oil spill,250 
but the MPCCLA only permits claims against the owner of an installation.251 It is submitted that 
the use of the term ‘owner’ is a fundamental error on the part of South African legislators. 
Whereas the entirety of the USA’s federal marine pollution law is captured in the OPA 90, South 
Africa does not enjoy the same all-encompassing approach. Due to the unfortunate wording of 
section 9 of the MPCCLA, in that it only mentions ‘owners’, it is quite probable that claims 
against offshore oil operators may be entertained in terms of other legislation, specifically 
NEMA,252 by virtue of the Maritime Zones Act.253 Unlike the OPA 90 and the MPCCLA, 
NEMA does not include a cap on liability,254 nor does it provide the operator with defences 
exempting or limiting liability.255 Therefore it is submitted that under South African law the 
operator of an offshore installation may potentially face unlimited, absolute liability. Whilst this 
will surely lift the spirits of a plaintiff, unlimited liability renders a risk uninsurable and this 
lacuna should be addressed by the legislature.  
 
Another difference between the USA and South Africa are provisions relating to financial 
security. The OPA 90 requires offshore operators to furnish security, with the amount being 
                                         
247 Couzens 2010 (note 116 above), para. 236. 
248 OPA 90, §2704(a)(3). 
249 MPCCLA, s5(b)(ii). 
250 OPA 90, §2701(25). 
251 MPCLLA, s9. 
252 MPCCLA, s10(1) states that the owner of the installation is not liable otherwise than under the provisions of the 
act. Crucially, the definition of ‘owner’ does not include operators (unless the owner is the state) and this leaves the 
operator open to a variety of other claims. 
253 Maritime Zones Act, s9. 
254 Bareki (note 173 above) 440H. 
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determined in the light of numerous factors indicating the level of risk.256 The offshore operator 
may be required to furnish up to $150 million in security.257 South Africa unfortunately has no 
equivalent provision, requiring security only for vessels carrying oil in bulk as cargo.258 This is a 
direct consequence of South African legislators copying provisions of the CLC 69 into a statute, 
but failing to adequately alter its provisions to cater for offshore installations. The mimicking of 
the CLC 69’s provisions has a second consequence. A claimant will not be able to claim from the 
International Oil Pollution Fund (or supplementary fund) as such claims are excluded.259 
Furthermore, the MPCCLA does not require the creation of a similar fund for offshore 
installations. This is in stark contrast to the USA, which has created the Oil Spill Liability Trust 
Fund,260 a fund that can pay a claimant up to $1 billion in the event of a spill from an offshore 
installation.261 South Africa is currently readying legislation that would update its laws to 
conform to CLC 92, but this has no effect on offshore installations as the amendment bill does 
not repeal the existing law, nor does it amend any provision relating to offshore installations. 
South Africa is therefore woefully unprotected in comparison to the USA, for whilst it may be 
able to impose liability on the owners and operators of offshore installations, there is no 
guarantee that the polluter would be able to satisfy the claim. 
 
In conclusion, whilst the USA and South Africa both have legislation addressing spills from 
offshore platforms, the USA enjoys far greater protection in the event of a spill. This is perhaps 
unsurprising as the Gulf of Mexico is an oil rich area that hosts numerous offshore platforms 
whilst South Africa is still developing its offshore petroleum industry. The OPA 90 was passed 
in the wake of the Exxon Valdez spills, an event that forced US legislators to address the threat 
posed by marine pollution. The Deepwater Horizon will be the first true test of the OPA 90’s 
provisions and it is likely that the litigation will be drawn out for many years. South Africa, it 
seems, has yet to truly awaken to the potential harm posed by the offshore oil industry. 
                                                                                                                                   
255 This led the Transvaal High Court in Bareki (ibid) at 440I-441B to comment that NEMA may actually impose 
absolute liability due to the absence of any statutory exemptions. 
256 OPA 90, §2716(c)(1)(C). 
257 Ibid. 
258 MPCCLA, s13(1). 
259 CLC 69, art. 1 defines a ship as a sea-going vessel actually carrying oil in bulk as cargo. For this reason, claims 
involving offshore installations do not fall within the ambit of the CLC 69. 
260 U.S.C. 26, §9509(c)(1)(A). 
261 U.S.C. 26, §9509(c)(1)(A)(i). 
101 
 
CHAPTER 4: A PROPOSAL FOR A GLOBAL CONVENTION REGULATING 
OFFSHORE OIL PLATFORMS 
 
It is clear that international law, be it in the form of customary international law principles, 
global and regional instruments, or even a private voluntary agreement, is presently insufficient 
to properly address an oil spill emanating from an offshore platform. International law applicable 
to offshore platforms is piecemeal, and this is illustrated by the varying domestic legislation of 
the two states considered in chapter 3. Nowhere is this ‘piecemeal’ approach more evident than 
in the specific context of liability. It is submitted that states have been reluctant to address this 
regulatory dilemma for two primary reasons: 1) large-scale spills from offshore installations are 
infrequent, and 2) the offshore petroleum industry generates a significant amount of tax revenue 
and states are loathe to disrupt the industry. Due to recent spills that have garnered international 
media attention, it is hoped that states re-examine the laws applicable to the offshore petroleum 
industry. It is therefore necessary to consider a number of proposed solutions to this problem. 
There are many aspects of the offshore oil industry that could benefit from global regulation such 
as safety standards, licensing aspects, wreck disposal and salvage but for present purposes 
discussion will be limited to those pertaining to civil liability arising from oil pollution. An 
argument will be made for the adoption of a global convention dedicated to offshore platforms 
and the various strengths (and accompanying weaknesses) of this proposal will be canvassed. In 
proposing a ‘global’ convention, various aspects will be explored including the standard of 
liability, financial security, definitions of pollution, operator vs. state liability and dispute 
resolution. It is hoped that this analysis will reveal a viable solution to resolve the identified 
lacuna that presently exists in international law, which will hopefully result in more uniform 
domestic legislation. 
 
4.1. CURING DEFICENCIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH A GLOBAL 
CONVENTION: 
 
A global convention dedicated to the regulation of offshore platforms and similar 
installations is not a novel concept, and there have been a number of proposals and draft 
conventions to this effect. In 1977 the Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 
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Resulting from Exploration for and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources (‘CLEE’)1 was 
signed and although regional in its application, it seemed to be a model for future conventions. 
Unfortunately CLEE failed to garner the requisite number of signatures in order to come into 
force, although it did serve as a forerunner to the OPOL agreement.2 Attempts at drafting a 
convention dedicated to offshore platforms did not cease with CLEE’s failure. In 1977, the 
Comite Maritime International (‘CMI’) drafted a Convention on Offshore Mobile Craft in its 
conference at Rio de Janeiro (‘the Rio Draft’).3 Attention was diverted from the Rio Draft due to 
other international maritime law concerns.4 In 1994 the CMI accepted an amended version of the 
Rio Draft, now referred to as the ‘Sydney Draft’.5 
 
Before considering the substance of a global convention as proposed by the CMI, the 
question that must be addressed is whether a global convention is truly the most appropriate tool 
for regulating offshore platforms. The approach of relying on regional instruments appears to be 
favoured at present,6 so it is necessary to consider the merits of a ‘global’ approach. A number of 
authors suggest that reliance on regional regimes is flawed due to the international nature of 
deep-sea mineral exploration and exploitation. Justice Rares notes that ‘ingenuity and economic 
imperatives are likely to make it feasible at some future time for hydrocarbons to be discoverable 
and recoverable in international waters.’7 Troianiello supports Rares’ call for global regulation, 
writing that ‘global regulation is indispensable because an oil spill caused by an offshore 
                                         
1 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from Exploration for and Exploitation of Seabed 
Mineral Resources, 1 May 1977, 16 ILM 1451 (‘CLEE’). 
2 Offshore Pollution Liability Agreement, (1974) 13 I.L.M. 1409 and (1975) 14 I.L.M. 147, available at 
http://www.opol.org.uk/downloads/opol-agreement-jul12.PDF, accessed on 1 June 2013 (‘OPOL’). See discussion 
at 2.3.1. of this dissertation. 
3 R Shaw ‘Regulation of Offshore Activity - Pollution liability and other aspects’ Paper presented at the CMI 
Conference 2012, Beijing, 14 − 19 October 2012, available at 
http://www.cmi2012beijing.org/dct/attach/Y2xiOmNsYjpwZGY6Mjg5NDY=, accessed 10 June 2013. 
4 Canadian Maritime Law Association ‘The Draft Convention on Offshore Units, Artificial Islands and Related 
Structures’  Comite Maritime International Newsletter No. 1 (2004), available at 
http://www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/Newsletters/2004/Binder1.pdf, page 2. 
5 Convention on Offshore Units, Artificial Islands and Related Structures Used in the Exploration for and 
Exploitation of Petroleum and Seabed Mineral Resources, 200 (OUC 200) May 2001 Draft, available at 
http://www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/Newsletters/2004/Binder1.pdf, page 3 (annexure 3). 
6 See International Maritime Organisation, Resolution A.448(XI), 15 November 1979. 




exploration or exploitation accident meets no boundaries and might occur anywhere.’8 Agyebeng 
comments that ‘the high seas and other areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction become 
even more vulnerable to the deleterious effects of pollution in the absence of a global instrument 
on civil liability’.9 The concern of these authors is well warranted, as it would be naive to rely on 
the benevolence of platform operators to clean up any oil pollution in international waters 
without the economic or political pressure of a state encouraging them to do so. An additional 
concern with the reliance on regional regulatory regimes is fragmentation. It is clear from the 
earlier analysis of regional instruments that they differ significantly in a number of respects, 
especially the allocation and extent of liability (which is arguably the most contentious issue). A 
global convention, unlike its regional counterparts, has the potential to obtain the status of 
customary international law thus potentially allowing its provisions to bind states that are not 
signatories.10 Such an approach would not fall foul of UNCLOS provisions, provided that the 
powers of coastal states are not diminished.11 Uniformity also leads to commercial convenience, 
as a uniform set of regulations creates certainty, which in turn facilitates trade and avoids 
disputes and conflict of laws.12 Offshore oil leaks could potentially affect international trade by 
sea as large leaks could disturb shipping lanes and lead to navigation difficulties.13 A final, albeit 
philosophical, point in favour of a global convention is found in UNCLOS’s recognition that the 
ocean and its resources are ‘the common heritage of mankind.’14 As Tharpes explains, there is 
‘need for a collective effort, comprised of all countries, to prevent and control transnational 
pollution. In short, an international regime is necessary.’15 It follows that a patchwork of regional 
conventions does not truly protect ‘mankind’s’ rights, as not all states will be party to such 
                                         
8 A Troianiello ‘Deep Sea Mining: A New Frontier for International Environmental Law’ (2012) available at 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=antonino_troianiello, accessed 7 June 2013, 
page 8. 
9 K Agyebeng ‘Disappearing Acts - Toward a Global Civil Liability Regime for Pollution Damage Resulting from 
Offshore Oil and Gas Exploration’ (2006) Cornell Law School Graduate Student Papers, Paper 11. Available at 
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/lps_papers/11, page 6. The author stresses that despite legal boundaries, the 
world’s oceans comprise of a single body of water and thus large-scale pollution will inevitably be transboundary. 
10 Carroll B ‘Drilling in the Deep: Jurisdiction over Oil Rigs Operating Outside of the Territorial Zone in Light of 
the Deepwater Horizon Spill’ (2011) 18 Sw. J. Int’l L. 667, 684. 
11 Ibid, 685. 
12 The need for commercial convenience was recognised in the Preamble of the Sydney Draft. 
13 Rares (note 7 above) 15. 
14 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3 (‘UNCLOS’), art. 136. 
15 Y Tharpes ‘International Environmental Law: Turning the Tide on Marine Pollution’ (1989) 20 U. Miami Inter-
Am. L. Rev. 579, 598. 
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agreements. Only a global instrument, attaining the status of customary international law, could 
truly meet this (perhaps lofty) ambition. 
 
If one accepts the need for a global convention focusing on offshore platforms, it is necessary 
to consider the scope of such an instrument. Should such an instrument seek to set minimum 
thresholds and rely on states to elaborate, or should the instrument contain detailed provisions 
and remove some discretion from state lawmakers? Would granting states a wide discretion 
defeat the very uniformity a global convention seeks to create?16  In order to truly appreciate the 
possible merits of a global convention, it is appropriate to explore current (and past) attempts at 
drafting such a convention. In addition to this examination, consideration will be given to other 
notable global conventions relating to offshore platforms (as well as transboundary harm in 
general) in an attempt to create a contemporary framework addressing pollution from offshore 
platforms and similar structures. 
 
4.2. SCOPE OF THE PROPOSED CONVENTION: 
 
A starting point for any convention is its scope. The convention should be global in nature 
and focus specifically on offshore installations conducting deep sea drilling. Whilst the focus of 
the present discussion is oil pollution, it should be noted at this juncture that offshore platforms 
are used for a variety of purposes, including gas exploitation. It is presumably for this reason that 
CLEE had a very wide ambit, defining an ‘installation’ as ‘any well or other facility, whether 
fixed or mobile, which is used for the purpose of exploring for, producing, treating, storing, 
transmitting or regaining control of the flow of crude oil from the seabed or its subsoil’.17 CLEE 
further included ‘any well which is used for the purpose of exploring for, producing or regaining 
control of the flow of gas or natural gas liquids from the seabed or its subsoil during the period 
that any such well is being drilled…’18 CLEE’s definition of installation also included wells that 
are used for exploring for any minerals other than crude oil, gas or natural gas liquids’ provided 
                                         
16 B Dubais ‘The 1976 London Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage from Offshore Operations’ 
(1977-1978) 9 J. Mar. L. & Com. 61, 76. 
17 CLEE, art. 1(2). 
18 Ibid, art. 1(2). 
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that such exploration involves ‘the deep penetration of the subsoil of the seabed.’19 The 
definition also made provision for facilities used solely for storing crude oil that has been 
removed from the seabed or subsoil.20 Finally, the definition specifically excludes any vessel that 
is defined as a ship by CLC 69.21 It is clear from this very wide definition that CLEE was drafted 
with the intention of complementing the liability regime created by the CLC and Fund 
Conventions. 
 
CLEE, drafted in 1977, was one of the earliest attempts at creating a convention dedicated to 
addressing pollution emanating from offshore platforms. The CMI has subsequently prepared a 
number of draft conventions addressing offshore platforms, the most recent of which being the 
Sydney Draft. The Sydney Draft distinguishes between artificial islands and offshore units. An 
artificial island is defined as a ‘permanent installation or structure rigidly affixed to the sea bed 
and used or intended for use for economic activities…’22 The term offshore unit is defined as any 
structure that is not permanently affixed to the sea bed and is capable of being moved while on 
water, is ‘used for economic activities’ and includes accommodation for personnel and 
equipment.23 A definition is also provided for ‘related appurtenances’ which are defined as 
‘structures or installations associated with artificial islands or offshore units’ and are used in 
relation to ‘economic activities’.24  
 
The most apparent difference between the Sydney Draft and CLEE definitions is that the 
latter gives the term ‘installation’ a broad, all-encompassing meaning whereas the Sydney Draft 
instead follows a more nuanced approach, recognising a variety of platforms and affording them 
separate definitions. Considering the scale of a global convention covering offshore platforms, it 
is wise to distinguish between various forms of installations and structures in the definitions in 
order to enable the convention to regulate the different structures more effectively. Whilst this 
differentiation may not be vital in the context of liability, it would allow for more detailed 
                                         
19 Ibid, art. 1(2). 
20 Ibid, art. 1(2). 
21 Ibid, art. 1(2). 
22 Sydney Draft, art. 1(1)(a). This definition expressly excludes pipelines. 
23 Ibid, art. 1(1)(h). 
24 Ibid, art. 1(1)(n). 
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provisions relating to safety standards and other aspects.25 As a global convention relating to 
offshore platforms would certainly extend beyond mere liability provisions, a targeted approach 
to regulation is clearly desirable.26 
 
A second difference between CLEE and the Sydney Draft is their varying definitions of 
pollution. CLEE defines ‘pollution damage’ as ‘loss or damage outside the installation caused by 
contamination resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from the installation and includes the 
cost of preventive measures and further loss or damage outside the installation caused by 
preventative measures.’27 Thus CLEE’s definition of pollution actually indicates the extent of 
potential liability, but limits pollution to ‘oil pollution’. Although CLEE’s definition of pollution 
initially appears to have a wide ambit, Dubais notes that ‘damage’ must be given a narrow 
interpretation, excluding damage resulting from ‘fire, explosion, consequential and ecological 
impairment’, the same interpretation given the 69 CLC Convention.28 The Sydney Draft contains 
a slightly more precise definition, defining a ‘pollutant’ as the ‘escape of any substance or the 
application of any energy process which is deleterious to the marine environment.’29 It is 
suggested that the approach of the Sydney Draft is preferable, as it allows for a more nuanced 
liability provision i.e. it would allow the drafters of a global convention to avoid restrictive 
interpretations of ‘damage’ and rather define the exact ambit of an operator’s liability. This 
suggestion may be countered by arguments favouring an ambiguous definition of pollution, for 
as Hunt notes, the definition of pollution damage in the CLC and Fund Conventions (and thus 
                                         
25 Increasing safety measures and strictly regulating other operational practices could potentially reduce the 
frequency of large oil spills. Indeed, the OPRC (see 2.2.3. of this dissertation) does contain some measures 
applicable to offshore platforms. Llewelyn Usher Offshore Drilling in Ocean Waters and its Adverse Effect on the 
Potential of Blue Carbon of Coastal State: A Belize Perspective (unpublished LLM dissertation, IMO, International 
Maritime Law Institute, 2012) available at 
http://www.rempec.org/admin/store/wyswigImg/file/News/Forthcoming%20Meetings/Offshore%20Protocol%20WG
%20(Malta,%2013-14%20June%202013/WG%20384-%20INF.5%20-%20IMLI%20Doc%20-
%20Llewelyn%20Usher%20-%20E.pdf, accessed on 11 September 2013, 29 concludes that whilst the OPRC is 
presently the ‘most competent’ convention addressing safety and operational measures to minimise pollution from 
platforms, it is not sufficient. Unfortunately a detailed study of such measures is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. 
26 R Richards ‘Deepwater Mobile Oil Rigs in the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Uncertainty of Coastal State 
Jurisdiction’ (2011) 10 J. Int’l Bus. & L. 387, 388. Richards writes that ‘complete regulatory jurisdiction is required 
to prevent and ensure against an environmental disaster.’ 
27 CLEE, art. 1(6). The term preventive measure is defined in article 1(7). 
28 Dubais (note 16 above) 64. 
29 Sydney Draft, art. 1(1)(m). 
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also CLEE) grants local courts interpreting the convention some discretion in applying their own 
domestic law principles when giving effect to these two conventions.30  
 
The definitions of pollution found in the Sydney Draft and CLEE (and the CLC conventions) 
may be further contrasted with the definition of ‘pollution damage’ contained in the Bunker Oil 
Convention,31 which Rares considers a possible template for a global convention addressing 
spills from offshore platforms.32 The Bunker Oil Convention defines pollution damage to mean 
‘(a) loss or damage caused… by contamination resulting from the escape or discharge of bunker 
oil… provided that compensation for impairment of the environment other than loss of profit 
from such impairment shall be limited to costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement… and (b) 
the costs of preventative measures and further loss or damage caused by preventive measures.’33 
This definition is normally interpreted in a strict manner, prohibiting claims such as general 
environmental damage. Claims for loss of profit are recoverable and national courts interpreting 
the convention are given discretion when considering claims for personal injury.34 Whilst the 
Bunker Oil Convention caters to a different scale of oil spill (thus excluding claims for death and 
pure environmental damage), it continues the pattern established by the CLC (and therefore 
CLEE) of recognising claims for pure economic loss arising from pollution as well as the 
practice of granting national courts a measure of discretion in interpreting its liability provisions. 
 
It is clear that an examination of existing definitions of pollution and pollution damage 
reveals diverging definitions. Considering that a global convention regulating offshore platforms 
ought to cover a variety of platforms and industries, CLEE’s definition of ‘pollution damage’ 
(which exclusively applies to oil pollution) is not sufficient. As offshore platforms are not 
                                         
30 John Hunt A comparative analysis of the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions, TOVALOP and CRISTAL, the U.S. 
Federal Oil Pollution Act and U.S. State Legislation, as legal mechanisms regulating compensation for tanker-
source oil pollution damage as of February, 1994 (unpublished LLM these, University of Natal, 1995) 66. Hunt 
suggests that a ‘uniform meaning of “pollution damage” may in truth be unobtainable.’ 
31 International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, 23 March 2001, ILM 40, 1493, 21 
November 2008 (‘Bunker Oil Convention’). 
32 Rares (note 7 above) 17. 
33 Bunker Oil Convention, art. 1(9). 
34 K Bachxevanis ‘The Bunker Pollution Convention’ (2009) Reed Smith LLP, litigation department publication, 
available at http://www.reedsmith.com/files/Publication/3e41481a-9716-47ed-98bd-
ca5a84194932/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/c04f9b80-455d-432f-85f8-




isolated to oil exploitation alone, the inclusion of gas extraction facilities (and other facilities 
located offshore) seems prudent.35 The definition of pollution contained in the Sydney Draft 
ought to be favoured as it recognises different forms of pollution, allowing for a more specific 
provision allocating liability (it would allow the possibility of differing liability provisions 
depending on the nature of the platform). Continuing the trend established by CLC 69 and the 
Bunker Oil Convention, national courts ought to be granted discretion when interpreting the 
liability provision to ensure that it is congruent with their domestic law principles, but not too 
great a discretion that could undermine the uniform application of the convention.36 
 
4.3. LIABILITY UNDER THE PROPOSED CONVENTION: 
 
Liability is likely to be the most contentious issue in any proposed global convention. The 
reluctance of states to accept liability has been demonstrated by CLEE’s failure to gain 
ratification, the Sydney’s Drafts failure to progress into anything more than a draft, and the on-
going debate concerning the ILC’s Draft Principles on transboundary harm37 - a debate that has 
continued for three decades without reaching a workable resolution.38 This creates the unnerving 
impression that states are unlikely to agree on far-reaching liability provisions. It is hoped that 
recent large-scale spills from offshore installations will motivate states to create a liability 
framework applicable to installations, in the same way that tanker pollution prompted the 
creation of the CLC and Fund conventions. Nevertheless, it is vital that this impasse is resolved 
as the success of any global convention regulating offshore platforms is largely dependent on the 
effectiveness of its liability provisions. There must be a clear allocation of liability; clear 
criterion for incurring such liability and the exact quantum of any potential liability must be clear 
                                         
35 Whilst the subject of regulating gas extraction facilities definitely merits a thorough discussion, it is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. 
36 Dubais (note 16 above) 76 writes that a global convention regulating offshore platforms ought to promote 
uniformity. Dubais bemoans CLEE’s apparent departure from promoting uniformity as creating a ‘dangerous 
precedent’. 
37 2004 draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising out of Hazardous 
Activities (ILC, 2004) available in Report of the International Law Commission on its Fifty-Sixth Session (UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/L.661, 8 July 2004) (‘2006 Draft Principles’) See 2.1.2 for further commentary on the 2006 Draft 
Principles. 
38 C Foster ‘The ILC Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising out of 
Hazardous Activities: Privatizing Risk?’ 14 Review of European Community & International Environmental Law 
265 provides a detailed discussion on the development history and substance of the draft articles. 
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from the outset - a necessity for insurers.39  Furthermore, no matter the nature of the liability 
regime created by a global convention, it is necessary that states be compelled to respect that 
regime. If states are able to disregard the convention and impose their own standard of liability, it 
would result in uncertainty and render the convention useless.40 The standard of liability imposed 
by a convention is therefore of paramount importance. 
 
CLEE imposed strict liability upon operators of installations in the event of a spill,41 except 
in limited circumstances.42 These limited circumstances allow an operator to escape liability for 
pollution damage if ‘he proves that the damage resulted from an act of war, hostilities, civil war, 
insurrection, or a natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable and irresistible character.’43 
CLEE also states that an operator will not be liable for damage occurring more than five years 
after the well was abandoned,44 nor will it be liable if the pollution damage ‘resulted wholly or 
partly either from an act or omission done with intent to cause damage by the person who 
suffered the damage or from the negligence of that person.’45 The liability framework created by 
CLEE is nearly identical to that of CLC 69 but there is one significant difference. As Dubais 
notes, CLC 69 exonerated the owner of tanker where the damage was ‘wholly caused by an act 
or omission done with intent to cause damage to a third party’, allowing the operator to escape 
liability in the case of sabotage.46 This exception is not found in CLEE.47 Dubais suggests that 
the drafters of CLEE may have been ‘unduly influenced by the potentiality of a well blow-out’ 
thus causing them to remove sabotage as an exemption to liability.48 Instead, in the context of 
liability for sabotage, CLEE appears to have been modelled after conventions regulating liability 
for pollution from nuclear installations,49 specifically the Paris Convention on Nuclear Third 
                                         
39 Rares (note 7 above) 21, in which he argues that ‘if liability of a rig controller is unlimited, it will be uninsurable.’ 
40 Ibid. 
41 CLEE, art. 3(1). 
42 Ibid, art. 3(3)(4)(5). 
43 Ibid, art. 3(3). 
44 Ibid, art. 3(4). 
45 Ibid, art. 3(5). The wording of this exemption is very similar to that found in the Convention on Limitation of 
Liability for Maritime Claims, 18 November 1976, 1456 U.N.T.S. 221, 1 December 1986 (‘Limitation Convention’), 
art. 4; the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (‘OPA 90’) §2703(a)(3), and the Marine Pollution (Control and Civil Liability) 
Act 6 of 1981 (‘MPCCLA’), s9(3)(b). 
46 Dubais (note 16 above) 64. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 29 November 
1969, 9 ILM 45 (‘CLC 69’), art. 2(b). 





Party Liability (‘1960 Paris Convention’).50 Dubais argues that comparing offshore installations 
to nuclear installations for the purposes of ‘sabotage liability’ is flawed, as ‘nuclear plants are 
closely guarded and protected by sophisticated means that an offshore operator cannot afford or 
is not entitled to.’51 Whilst conventions allocating liability for nuclear pollution may be useful 
when drafting provisions addressing transboundary harm, it is submitted that CLEE’s deviation 
from the CLC 69 in this instance was unwise. As Dubais concludes, ‘there is simply no 
justification for such transfer of a political risk onto private industry.’52 
 
CLEE envisaged a similar liability framework to CLC 69, save the sabotage exclusion 
discussed above. Operators of installations are strictly liable for pollution damage (save for 
limited circumstances) but such liability is capped.  CLEE capped liability at 30 million Special 
Drawing Rights (SDR) for five years, with the amount increasing to 40 million SDR thereafter.53 
CLEE states that ‘the operator shall not be entitled to limit his liability if it is proved that the 
pollution damage occurred as a result of an act or omission by the operator himself, done 
deliberately with actual knowledge that pollution damage would result.’54 In order to benefit 
from this limitation, the operator must have contributed to a fund representing the limit of his 
liability.55 Once this fund has been constituted, the claimant will only be able to proceed against 
that fund (and not against other assets held by the operator). Although Article 6 of CLEE created 
the liability limitation, it is possible for states to deviate from its terms. Article 15 of CLEE 
allows states to provide for ‘unlimited liability or a higher limit of liability than that currently 
applicable under Article 6 for pollution damage caused by installations for which it is the 
controlling state and suffered in that state or in another state party; provided however that in so 
doing it shall not discriminate on the basis of nationality.’56 Dubais is critical of this provision as 
                                         
50 Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, 29 July 1960, 956 U.N.T.S. 251, 1 April 1968. 
51 Dubais (note 16 above) 65. 
52 Dubais (note 16 above) 65. See also Dubais, page 77, where the author concludes rather cynically that the liability 
regime created by CLEE proves ‘that common sense cannot be expected to prevail when responsible governments 
are faced with domestic political and social pressures.’ 
53 CLEE, art. 6(1). Article 9 of CLEE established a committee comprising of representatives from each state. This 
committee would review the liability limitation, and increase the amount provided the state parties accept the new 
limit. 
54 Ibid, art. 6(4). 
55 Ibid, art. 6(5). 
56 Ibid, art. 15(1). 
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the drafters of CLEE originally sought to create a harmonised system of rules,57 which he argues 
is of paramount importance, but the drafters appear to have ultimately favoured a system that 
encourages diversity.58 Dubais is very critical of CLEE’s provisions allowing states to increase 
the liability limitation (potentially removing it) whilst reducing the defences available to the 
operator to escape liability (in comparison to CLC 69).59 One may be tempted to conclude that 
Dubois’s criticism has been weakened in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon incident (as that 
spill demonstrated the potential for catastrophic economic and environmental harm), but it would 
be unwise to do so. The entire purpose of a global convention is the implementation of a uniform 
liability standard, and if states disregarded this standard the convention would be rendered 
useless.60 The need for clear liability limits is necessary for purposes of insurance, whilst states 
currently enjoy the right to implement stricter liability regimes for pollution occurring within 
their own territory.61 It is submitted that a uniform system with a high liability limitation is 
preferable.  
 
The liability regime created by CLEE thus shares many similar attributes to that created by 
the CLC, save for a few aspects identified above, and therefore it is possible that a similar regime 
would be accepted by the international community in a convention addressing offshore 
platforms. Whilst CLEE did not receive the requisite signatures, it is submitted that a global 
convention may spared the same fate as the international community is now more alive to the 
risk of oil pollution from installations, and unlike in the case of CLEE, there are no comparable 
global instruments that address oil pollution from offshore platforms. The CLEE regime creates a 
clear liability limit that ought to satisfy insurers and the adoption of the strict liability standard is 
welcome as it relieves the evidentiary burden on the claimant. This form of liability framework 
has thus far proven very successful with oil spills from tankers, and it is hoped that its success 
can be carried over to an offshore platform convention.62 
 
                                         
57 The Preamble of CLEE states that the parties were ‘desiring to adopt uniform rules and procedures for 
determining questions of liability and providing adequate compensation in such cases.’ 
58 Dubais (note 16 above) 76. 
59 Ibid, 77. 
60 Rares (note 7 above) 21. 
61 Indeed, UNCLOS confers this right exclusively upon coastal states. See 2.2.1. for a detailed discussion of 
UNCLOS. 
62 Shaw (note 3 above) 7 notes the success of the CLC and Fund Conventions. 
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The Sydney Draft proposes a liability regime that shares a number of similarities with CLEE 
as it creates a system of strict liability coupled with a cap on liability. In the event that an 
offshore platform causes pollution, a claimant may proceed against the owner of that platform.63 
Where the pollution damage is caused by pollutants from ‘natural reservoirs or other geologic 
formations’ the claimant must proceed against the licensee of the platform.64 Pollution damage is 
defined as ‘loss or damage caused outside an offshore unit, artificial island or related 
appurtenance or outside a natural reservoir or other geologic formation, by the discharge of a 
pollutant and includes the costs of preventive measures and further loss or damage caused by 
preventive measures.’65 As with CLEE, a licensee or owner can avoid liability under the Sydney 
Draft in limited circumstances, specifically stating that ‘no liability for pollution damage shall 
attach to an Owner or Licensee if it proves that the damage resulted from an act of war, 
hostilities, civil war, insurrection, or a natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable and 
irresistible character.’66 Additionally, the Sydney Draft states that ‘if the Owner or Licensee 
proves that the pollution damage resulted wholly or partly either from an act or omission done 
with intent to cause damage by the person who suffered the damage or from the negligence of 
that person, the Owner or Licensee may be exonerated wholly or partly from his liability to such 
person.’67 The Sydney Draft does not allow an operator to escape liability for pollution damage 
resulting from the intentional act of a third party who did not himself suffer the harm. Provision 
is however made for cases where the loss is caused by two or more persons and the individual 
party’s liability is proportionate to the degree to which they are respectively at fault or 
negligent.68 The two or more parties are jointly and severally liable, but they are liable to each 
other for their proportionate share of the damage.69 This might allow an operator or licensee to 
have some recourse against a third party who intentionally caused (but did not suffer) the harm, 
but it would be preferable to include sabotage as an exemption to liability.70 
 
                                         
63 Sydney Draft, art. 11(4). 
64 Ibid, art. 11(5). A licensee is defined by article 1(f) and (g) as any person or corporation who holds a licence, 
concession, permit or other authorisation issued by a coastal state for economic activities. 
65 Ibid, art. 11(1). 
66 Ibid, art. 11(7) 
67 Ibid, art. 11(9). 
68 Ibid, art. 12(2). 
69 Ibid, art. 12(3). 
70 Dubais (note 16 above) 65. 
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The terms of the Sydney Draft allow owners and licensees to limit liability for ‘claims in 
respect of loss of life, personal injury or loss of damage to property in direct connection to the 
operation of the offshore unit’; claims for loss resulting from infringement of non-contractual 
rights; and claims in ‘respect of removing, raising or rendering harmless’ the offshore structure.71 
The Sydney Draft did not include detailed liability limits, but indicated that such limits would 
differentiate between pollution and non-pollution damage and would be based on ‘units of 
account per mass ton or deadweight ton’.72 In a similar vein to CLEE, owners and operators are 
required to create a fund in order to limit their liability.73 A party will not be able to limit their 
liability where ‘the loss resulted from [a] personal act or omission, committed with intent to 
cause such loss, or recklessly and with the knowledge that such loss would probably result.’74 
This provision prevents limitation in instances where the operator either intentionally causes the 
harm or the harm results from his gross negligence (recklessness). It therefore differs from 
CLEE, which only prevents a limitation of liability in instances of intentional conduct where the 
operator knew pollution damage would result.75 It is submitted that if one considers that the 
purpose of a global convention is to hold the polluter accountable for the harm resulting from 
their activities, it would not be conscionable to permit such a polluter to limit their liability 
where they have acted recklessly. It is strongly suggested that a global instrument must prevent a 
reckless polluter from benefiting from a liability limitation.  
 
It is clear that CLEE and the Sydney Draft both impose the strict liability standard. This form 
of liability originated in the English case of Rylands v. Fletcher,76 and has subsequently been 
recognised in a number of international instruments. The case concerned the improper 
construction of a subterranean reservoir that caused damage to a neighbouring mine. In what has 
become a famous decision, the House of Lords, quoting the judgment of the court below, stated 
that ‘the person who, for his own purposes, brings on his land and collects and keeps there 
anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril and if he does not do so, is 
prima facie answerable for all the damages which is the natural consequence of its escape. He 
                                         
71 Sydney Draft, art. 13(3). 
72 Ibid, art. 13(5). 
73 Ibid, art. 13(8)(9)(10). 
74 Ibid, art. 13(4). 
75 CLEE, art. 6(4). 
76 (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 300. 
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can excuse himself by shewing [sic] that the escape was owing to the Plaintiff’s default; or, 
perhaps, that the escape was the consequence of vis major, or the act of God.’77 The principle 
confirmed by the House of Lords is still followed and it is submitted that the reasoning of the 
court remains sound. Thus in the context of offshore platforms, this principle would hold the 
operator or owner of a platform liable for a spill, irrespective of fault. The appeal of the strict 
liability standard is that it holds polluters accountable, minimising their ability to avoid liability. 
As Agyebeng notes, whilst it may seem harsh to impose liability on an operator or owner without 
establishing fault, it is even more unreasonable and unfair to the sufferer of the harm if they are 
made to bear the loss if the responsible party is able to show due care.78 This approach has been 
successful in the context of tanker pollution conventions and it is prudent that the Sydney Draft 
(or any such convention) incorporates such an approach. 
 
The similarity of the Sydney Draft to tanker pollution conventions is no coincidence. The 
CMI (specifically the delegation from the Canadian Maritime Law Association) proposed a set 
of principles that should be incorporated in any global convention dedicated to offshore 
platforms, one of which states ‘offshore regime provisions should be consistent with other 
generally accepted international maritime conventions except where the liability and operating 
environments of the offshore industry are distinct or markedly different from the operation of 
mobile seagoing commercial vessels as to require distinct international rules.’79 Interestingly, a 
notable difference between oil tanker pollution liability and that of offshore platforms is that the 
latter is explicitly excluded from limiting liability in terms of the 1976 Convention on Limitation 
of Liability for Maritime Claims (‘Limitation Convention’).80 White notes that this is because the 
Limitation Convention determines liability limitations based on a vessel’s tonnage, a metric that 
is inappropriate in the context of offshore platforms since the spill size bears little correlation to 
                                         
77 Rylands v. Fletcher, 339-340. 
78 Agyebeng (note 9 above) 35. 
79 CMI Newsletter, available at http://www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/Newsletters/CMI%20News%202011-3.pdf, 
at page 3. 




the platform’s mass.81 The idea of emulating tanker conventions may be wise considering their 
success,82 but there is one significant caveat - the absence of state liability. 
 
As noted earlier,83 states have been reluctant to accept liability in cases of transboundary 
pollution. Whilst the Sydney Draft and CLEE could conceivably be used to hold states liable, 
this would only be the case where the state was the owner, operator or licensee of the offshore 
platform.84 There are a number of reasons favouring state liability for spills occurring within 
their jurisdiction - that is, within their EEZ, territorial waters or on their continental shelf. 
Hancock and Stone suggest three such reasons in their argument that states should be primarily 
liable in the event of the spill.85 They contend that: 1) direct state liability would encourage states 
to ensure that operators are financially capable of meeting any claims under a convention; 2) the 
state that benefited the most from the offshore operation would bear the ultimate burden of 
recovery of damages from the owner or operator who caused the pollution; and 3) such a duty 
would be consistent with the principle confirmed by the Trail Smelter arbitration86 and Principle 
21 of the Stockholm Convention87 that states must ensure that activities within their territory do 
not cause harm to the territory of another state.88 The duty on states to prevent harm in 
neighbouring states has been recognised in a number of international instruments and ICJ 
decisions.89 By channelling claims through the coastal state it would remove any concerns of 
insolvency on the part of the private owner or operator, and thus ensure compensation for the 
claimant. Further reasons favouring state liability are noted by Caron who suggests that a system 
imposing such liability encourages reciprocal protection, prevents extra-legal consequences and 
supports the notion of an international community favouring a regime of law over one of self-
                                         
81 M White ‘Offshore Craft and Structures: A Proposed International Convention’ (1999) 18 Australian Mining & 
Petroleum L.J. 21, 25. 
82 A Boyle and G Handl ‘International law and the Liability for Catastrophic Environmental Damage’ (2011) 105 
Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 423, 428 favour an offshore convention emulating tanker conventions. 
83 See 2.1. of this dissertation. 
84 It is interesting to note that article 14(7) of the Sydney Draft states that where the owner or licensee of a platform 
is a state party, there is no need for it to furnish financial security to cover its liability. 
85 W Hancock and R Stone ‘Liability for Transactional Pollution Caused by Offshore Oil Rig Blowouts’ (1981) 5 
Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 377, 394. 
86 3 R. Int’l Arb. Awards 1938 (1941). 
87 The Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 16 June 1972, U.N. 
Doc. A/Conf. 48/14 at 2-65 (1972) (‘Stockholm Declaration’). 
88 Hancock and Stone (note 85 above) 394/395. 




help.90 States would obviously be reluctant to accept liability for polluting the coasts of their 
neighbours, but they would be able to recover their costs from the responsible operator.  
 
In discussing instances of state liability, it is helpful to consider other instruments regulating 
transboundary pollution, as oil is not the only pollutant subjected to regulation by international 
law. Similarities exist between the international regime governing marine oil pollution and that 
governing damage resulting from nuclear activities.91 One of the greatest similarities between 
these industries is that both are considered ultra-hazardous activities.92 Since both are ultra-
hazardous activities with the potential to cause transboundary pollution, it is clear that the 
liability regime created by nuclear conventions ought to be considered when drafting an 
instrument concerning offshore platforms. Doeker and Gehring note that ‘nuclear conventions’ 
channel liability onto the party operating the nuclear facility and hold that party solely 
accountable.93 The nuclear compensation regime resembles CLEE and the Sydney Draft in that it 
imposes strict liability upon operators whilst limiting the liability of responsible parties.94 As 
discussed above, even international acts of sabotage (or terrorism) by a third party against the 
nuclear installation will not be sufficient for the operator to limit his liability.95 Commentators 
have suggested that strict liability was favoured in the context of nuclear pollution due to the 
enormity of the possible damage, the challenges in proving responsibility for the harm suffered 
                                         
90 D Caron ‘Liability for Transnational Pollution Arising from Offshore Oil Development: A Methodological 
Approach’ (1982-1983) 10 Ecology L.Q. 641, 654-656. Caron is arguing for a clear liability regime promoting 
accountability of nations, national companies and private industries. Thus, whilst he is not arguing solely for state 
liability, the reasons he provides clearly encompass such a notion. 
91 G Doeker and T Gehring ‘Private or International Liability for Transnational Environmental Damage - The 
Precedent of Convention Liability Regimes’ (1990) 2 J. Envtl. L. 1, 8 fn 50. The authors analyse five conventions 
addressing transboundary nuclear pollution. Where one of these conventions is addressed in this dissertation, their 
full citation will be given. For a comprehensive analysis of all five conventions the reader is directed to the Doeker 
and Gehring article, as such an analysis is unfortunately beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
92 L Malone ‘The Chernobyl Accident: A Case Study in International law Regulating State Responsibility for 
Transboundary Nuclear Pollution’ (1987) 12 Colum, J. Envtl. L. 203, 212. See also Doeker and Gehring (note 
above) 2. 
93 Doeker and Gehring (note 91 above) 8-9. 
94 Ibid, 9. See for example the 1960 Paris Convention, art. 3(1) which states that ‘the operator of a nuclear 
installation shall be liable… for (1) damage to or loss of life of any person; and (2) damage to or loss of any 
property… upon proof that such damage or loss was caused by a nuclear incident in such installation or involving 
nuclear substances coming from such installation...’ 
95 Dubais (note 16 above) 65. See also M Faure and T Borre ‘Compensating Nuclear Damage: A Comparative 




and the possible multiplicity of claims against the responsible party.96 It is submitted that these 
three factors are all present in instances of oil spills from offshore platforms. 
 
The nuclear compensation regime shares similar characteristics to the regime created by the 
CLC and Fund Conventions as it creates two additional levels of compensation in the event that 
the amount payable by the operator is insufficient.97 These two additional tiers are created by 
1963 Brussels Supplementary Convention.98 The first fund is made available by the state in 
whose territory the nuclear installation is located,99 with the second fund being financed jointly 
by all states party to the 1963 Brussels Supplementary Convention.100 Whilst the intricacies of 
the nuclear compensation regime are well beyond the scope of this dissertation,101 the nuclear 
regime demonstrates that the creation of additional funds by individual states and the 
international community can work well for activities that have the potential for colossal 
economic and environmental fallout. It is fair to comment that the nuclear liability regime, 
although placing primary liability on operators, has created a framework that places the eventual 
cost upon the shoulders of the state. The amount actually borne by the operator is so low, that 
Doeker and Gehring conclude that the state faces a disproportionate amount of liability in the 
event of a nuclear accident.102 Therefore this system results in state liability for transboundary 
harm.103 It is submitted that this framework represents a growing willingness on the part of the 
international community to accept state liability for transboundary harm. There are certainly 
significant economic and political differences between the nuclear and petroleum industries, and 
it would not be reasonable to expect states to bear the brunt of the costs resulting from the 
actions of a private entity.104 However, the model of channelling liability through states onto 
operators is appealing as it ensures that compensation for pollution damage is available. Doeker 
                                         
96 A Lester ‘River Pollution in International Law’ (1963) 57 Am. J. Int’l L. 828, 850. 
97 Faure and Borre (note 95 above) 236. 
98 Nuclear Energy Agency, Convention of 31st January 1963 Supplementary to the Paris Convention of 29th July 
1960, as amended by the Additional Protocol of 28th January 1964 and by the Protocol of 16th November 1982, 
available at http://www.nea.fr/html/law/nlbrussels.html, accessed 8 September 2013 (‘1963 Brussels Supplementary 
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100 Ibid, art. 3(2)(3). See also Faure and Borre (note 490 above) 236. 
101 For a more detailed consideration of the nuclear compensatory regime, see Faure and Borre (note 95 above), 
Doeker and Gehring (note 91 above) and also Malone (note 92 above). 
102 Doeker and Gehring (note 91 above) 10. 
103 Ibid, 12, fn. 77. 
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and Gehring’s concerns can be allayed by simply increasing the amount of liability borne by the 
operators so that it does not place a disproportionate burden upon the state.  
 
The practice of imposing the strict liability standard in claims against private operators has 
become commonplace in international environmental law. Strict liability is utilised in the CLC 
and Fund Convention, the European Environmental Liability Directive (‘EU Directive’),105 the 
Kuala-Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the United Nations 
Convention on Biological Diversity (‘the Supplementary Protocol’),106 and the voluntary OPOL 
agreement amongst others.107 Cates notes that ILC reports and comments from the UN General 
Assembly demonstrate that there is increasing support for the imposition of strict liability in 
international law.108 The imposition of strict liability against states may be an emerging trend, 
but is by no means an established practice. An example of this emerging trend is the Space 
Objects Convention, which directly implements the strict standard against states due to the 
hazardous nature of launching objects into orbit.109  
 
The Space Objects Convention contains several provisions that would be well suited to a 
convention addressing offshore platform oil pollution.110 The convention allows the state that 
paid compensation to claim compensation from other states involved in the failed launch, as they 
are jointly and severally liable.111 Cates notes that a similar provision in an offshore oil platform 
                                                                                                                                   
104 Ibid, 13. Doeker and Gehring warn that the political background to the nuclear conventions is significantly 
different to that of the oil pollution conventions, and thus one must take care when comparing the two regimes. 
105 Directive 2004/35/CE of the European Parliament and of the Council, 21 April 2004, L143/56 Official Journal of 
the European Union 30.4.2004 (‘EU Directive’). 
106 Nagoya - Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety, 15 October 2010, 50 I.L.M. 105 (2011) (‘Supplementary Protocol’). 
107 Note 2 above. 
108 M Cates ‘Offshore Oil Platforms Which Pollute the Marine Environment: A Proposal for an International Treaty 
Imposing Strict Liability’ (1983) 21 San Diego L. Rev. 691,708. 
109 In the United States case of Green v General Petroleum Corporation 205 Cal. 328, 270 P. 952 (1928) the court 
held that despite the defendant exercising care when drilling for oil, he was liable for the harm caused to his 
neighbour’s land as the activity was ‘abnormally dangerous’. Cates (note 108 above) 702, provides a list of US cases 
following the precedent set by Green. Furthermore, Cates, at 703, writes the following as a justification for strict 
(no-fault) liability: ‘the creator of an abnormally great risk is strictly liable because, between the creator and the 
innocent victim, the one who engages in the dangerous profit-making activity is best able to predict and allocate the 
risk of loss. The enterprise can spread the loss through slightly higher prices to consumers whereas an innocent 
victim cannot.’ 
110 Cates (note 108 above) 700. 
111 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 29 November 1971, 961 U.N.T.S. 
187, 1 September 1972 (‘Space Objects Convention’), art. V(1)(2). 
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convention would be appropriate, as it would allow states to compensate victims of pollution and 
then recoup their expenses from the responsible platform owner or operator.112 The Space 
Objects Convention states that compensation ‘shall be determined in accordance with 
international law and the principles of justice and equity’ and must be sufficient to repair any 
damage to the state it was in prior to the harm occurring.113 Cates mirrors Hancock and Stone by 
arguing that state liability would encourage better regulation of offshore activities, as well as 
their contention that the Space Objects Convention could serve as a model for an oil platform 
convention.114   
 
The final aspect of liability to be discussed is the nature of claims for which compensation is 
made available. As discussed above, both CLEE and the Sydney Draft make provision for 
pollution damage. These instruments state that compensation must be made available in the event 
that pollution from a platform causes any loss or damage, and such compensation must also 
cover any preventative measures.115 Handl writes that the convention should ‘cover property 
damage, pure economic loss, impairment of the environment, and the costs of preventative 
measures.’116 Handl notes that whilst such claims are catered for by oil tanker conventions 
(specifically the CLC and Fund Conventions), this should be expanded for offshore platforms to 
include certain claims not covered by tanker conventions notably claims for personal injury, loss 
of life, and claims for environmental loss.117 Ultimately the extent of claims covered by a global 
convention would be decided by the will of the states negotiating it. The wider the scope of 
claims actionable in terms of a convention, the greater the potential liability of states and thus the 
greater the reluctance on the part of states to ratify such a convention. At a minimum, it is 
submitted that for a convention to be of any real significance, it must allow claims for property 
damage, economic loss, loss of life, personal injury claims and the costs of preventative 
                                         
112 Cates (note 108 above) 700. 
113 Space Objects convention, art. XII. 
114 Cates (note 108 above) 700, fn. 52. Cates notes that state liability is endorsed by the Corfu Channel case as well 
as the Trail Smelter arbitration, but this argument is flawed. Neither of these two decisions endorsed the strict 
liability standard, they only recognised that states should be held accountable for any harm they cause to another 
state. 
115 CLEE, art. 1(6). Sydney Draft, art.11(1). 
116 Boyle and Handl (note 82 above) 428. 
117 Ibid. A useful reference is USA law, which permits a wide range of claims including claims for pure economic 
loss. See OPA 90, §2702(b)(2). 
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measures.118 Claims for environment rehabilitation are obviously desirable, but permitting such 
claims may result in significant reluctance on the part of states and could result in a convention 
that never enters into force.119 
 
It is therefore submitted that the liability provision in a global convention should have the 
following key features: 1) strict (no fault) liability with limited exceptions; (2) a clear liability 
limitation; (3) primary state liability and (4) a fairly broad scope of actionable claims. Such a 
provision would encourage states to better regulate offshore drilling occurring within their 
jurisdiction,120 ensuring that the victims of pollution are able to obtain redress. The states could 
then seek indemnification from the responsible owner or operator, thereby placing the final 
financial burden on the owner or operator. A clear liability limit would allow owners and 
operators to obtain insurance, and would create a similar liability framework to that which exists 
for oil tanker pollution. As with CLEE, the Sydney Draft and the CLC and Fund Conventions, 
exceptions should be available to operators that would allow them to escape liability completely. 
Such exceptions would encompass scenarios where the harm occurred without a sufficient causal 
link to the operator or owner (an example of this being an act of war). Complementing these 
exceptions, provisions must exist whereby an operator would be unable to avail itself of the 
liability limitation in the event that they were grossly negligent or intentionally caused the harm. 
If this liability regime could attain the status of customary international law, it would largely 
resolve any lacunae that presently exist in international law relating to offshore platforms. 
 
4.4. FINANCIAL SECURITY UNDER THE PROPOSED CONVENTION: 
 
If a strict liability regime is implemented that renders a state or an owner liable for the costs 
of a large offshore platform-source oil spill, it is clear that the total compensation payable could 
reach very large figures. In the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon spill, British Petroleum 
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(‘BP’) agreed to pay $30 billion in clean-up costs, penalties and fines,121 with the civil suit still 
pending. Whilst BP may be willing and able to provide such a substantial amount of 
compensation, it is quite likely that a number of offshore operators are not. Certain jurisdiction 
issues pertaining to security exacerbate the difficult scenario caused by operators’ reluctance to 
furnish security. White comments that it would presently not be feasible for a coastal state to 
exercise a right of security over an offshore platform,122 as UNCLOS provides that such 
platforms would not be considered part of a state’s territory unless located in the state’s 
territorial sea.123  It is for this reason that a comprehensive offshore platform convention must 
make provision for the furnishing of financial security, be it in the form of insurance or a 
guarantee, and that the convention allows coastal states to exercise rights of security over 
platforms in its EEZ and continental shelf. A further possibility is the creation of a fund - similar 
to that created by the Fund Convention and the nuclear compensation regime124 - that requires 
the contribution of owners, operators and states, from which victims would be able to claim in 
the event that the platform owner/operator is incapable of satisfying the claim. 
 
It is clear from the outset that obtaining insurance to cover an oil spill from an offshore 
platform will be considerably different to obtaining similar cover for a spill originating from a 
tanker.125 The proposed convention would require the participation of insurers in order to be of 
any practical use.126 Shaw points to the CLC and Fund regime, as well as that of OPOL,127 in 
arguing that an insurance scheme for oil platforms is possible.128 In terms of the OPOL Rules 
(which are based on CLEE) an operator must demonstrate that it is financially responsible in 
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124 See International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution 
Damage, 18 December 1971, 1110 U.N.T.S. 57 (‘Fund Convention’), art. 4(4) and 1963 Brussels Supplementary 
Convention, art. 3(2)(2). 
125 Dubais (note 16 above) 67. 
126 Shaw (note 3 above) 7. 




order to join the OPOL Association.129 Financial responsibility is defined by OPOL as the 
capability of fulfilling its obligations under clause 4 of OPOL,130 and the OPOL Association 
requires operators to furnish proof of insurance, guarantee or self-insurance in order to obtain 
membership.131 It will be necessary for a global convention to specify forms of financial security, 
such as was done with OPOL, as Protection and Indemnity Clubs (‘P&I Clubs’) generally refuse 
to cover offshore platforms used in the exploration for and exploitation of oil.132  
 
The Sydney Draft contains similar provisions to OPOL in the context of financial 
responsibility, requiring the owners of offshore units to have and maintain insurance (or any 
comparable type of financial security required by the flag state), with such funds being no less 
than the largest liability limitation amount.133 The draft further requires all licensees to have and 
maintain insurance or other security on terms specified by the authority that granted the licence, 
with such amount being no less than the largest liability limitation amount.134 Any financial 
security that could cease before more than two months’ notice is given to the flag state or the 
authority that granted the license will not satisfy the requirements of the Sydney Draft.135 Once 
the financial security has been given, a claimant proceeding against the owner or the operator for 
pollution damage may instead elect to proceed first against the insurer, irrespective of whether 
the owner or operator acted with gross negligence.136 In the event that the owner or the operator 
of the platform is a state party, they shall not be required to furnish or maintain financial 
security.137 
 
                                         
129 Rules of the Offshore Pollution Liability Association Limited (as at 1 January 2012), available at 
http://www.opol.org.uk/downloads/OPOL-Rules-Jan2012.pdf, accessed on 1 June 2013 (‘OPOL Rules’), Part II, 
2.2. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid, Form B. 
132 Rares (note 7 above) 17. 
133 Sydney Draft, art. 14(1). See also article 14(2) which requires the operator of an artificial island or related 
appurtenance to maintain insurance or other financial security as required by the license grantor, provided such 
security is no less than the liability limitation amount. 
134 Ibid, art. 14(3). 
135 Ibid, art. 14(4). 
136 Ibid, art. 14(5). 
137 Ibid, art. 14(7). 
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The Sydney Draft thus adopts a system very similar to CLEE (and therefore OPOL). The 
system created by OPOL has thus far proven to be successful,138 so it would rational to 
incorporate many of its provisions into a global framework. The Sydney Draft differs from 
OPOL in a significant respect as it states that the flag state has the right to specify a form of 
insurance that must be provided by the owner of a platform.139 This is problematic, as a flag state 
has little to lose in the event of a spill, as the pollution is unlikely to reach its shores whilst the 
coastal state will be burdened with the clean-up costs.140 A cynical observer would be entitled to 
question whether such a system is prone to abuse. This situation could potentially be remedied 
by the operator of the rig maintaining insurance to the standard and form specified by the coastal 
state (who presumably would require comprehensive insurance as they are likely be the victims 
of any major spill).141 It is submitted that it would be more appropriate to require that the owner 
obtain insurance or some other financial security that satisfies the licensing state, as such a 
system is less prone to abuse. An interesting provision included in the EU Directive, and a 
possible supplement to compulsory insurance, is a right of security granted to states over a 
platform in the event of a spill.142 This would certainly be insufficient in the event of a 
catastrophic spill and would therefore be better suited for common, minor spills where the total 
clean-up cost of the spill is less than the value of the platform itself. 
 
A relevant framework that ought to be considered is that created by the CLC and Fund 
Conventions. As noted earlier,143 these two conventions create a system whereby ship owners 
contribute to a fund. Where a contributing ship owner causes pollution damage, a claimant may 
claim from the CLC fund. A claimant may claim from the fund created by the Fund Convention 
in the event that the damage exceeds the amount available under the CLC Convention; the ship-
                                         
138 See 2.3.1. of this dissertation. 
139 Sydney Draft, art. 14(1). 
140 Richards (note 26 above) 387. 
141 Dubais (note 16 above) 67 is concerned that ‘offshore operators might well be subjected, as regards these 
financial guarantees, to unreasonable and costly obligations.’ Dubais concern can be contrasted with a point raised 
by Richards (note 26 above) 395 who argues that large oil spills threaten to cause long-term environmental damage 
to the coastal state as well has having a definite impact on that state’s economy. Whilst Dubais concern may be well 
founded, it would seem unlikely that coastal states would waive a right to comprehensive security from operators in 
the name of international uniformity. Indeed, the USA requires offshore operators to furnish security to an amount 
not exceeding $150 million. See OPA 90, §2716(c)(1)(C). The UK also requires operators drilling on its continental 
shelf to join the OPOL Association, see 2.3.1 of this dissertation. South Africa, unfortunately, requires no security 
from operators drilling in its jurisdiction. 
142 EU Directive, art. 8(2). 
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owner is not liable under the CLC Convention or the ship-owner is unable to meet their financial 
obligations under the CLC Convention and sufficient insurance was not available to cover the 
entire claim.144 The application of this model to the offshore petroleum industry is attractive. An 
oil spill from an offshore platform may be sufficiently large that the operator or owner would not 
be able to cover the resulting costs, thus necessitating the creation of a fund. The CLC and Fund 
Conventions require contributions from a party who receives a certain quantity oil, thus placing 
the financial burden on those who are utilising or reselling the product.145 As noted earlier,146 the 
nuclear compensation regime could also serve as a model for creating a fund. The nuclear 
compensation regime differs from that created by the CLC and Fund conventions, as it requires 
the state in whose territory the installation is located to contribute to the first tier of the fund,147 
and all states party to the convention to contribute to the second tier of the fund.148 The creation 
of an industry-wide fund is also encouraged by the ILC’s 2006 Draft Principles,149 which 
recognises the need for operators to establish and maintain financial security in order to cover the 
costs associated with transnational pollution.150 It is submitted that there is no reason why such a 
system ought not to be introduced for the offshore petroleum industry.151  
 
From an analysis of a number of marine pollution instruments (whether addressing tanker-
source pollution, general pollution or specifically concerned with offshore platform pollution) it 
is clear that there is recognition of the need for some measure of financial security to be 
furnished by the owners or operators of offshore installations.152 The establishment and 
                                                                                                                                   
143 See 2.2.5. of this dissertation for a detailed analysis of the CLC and Fund Conventions. 
144 Rares (note 7 above) 22. 
145 Ibid. See Protocol of 2003 to the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992, 16 May 2003, IMO Doc. LEG/CONF. 14/20, 5 March 2005 (‘2003 
Protocol’), art. 10. See also Boyle and Handl (note 82 above) 428/429 where Handl writes that the contribution of 
states to a third tier fund for pollution claims is an example of states providing compensation even where they 
themselves have not acted wrongfully. 
146 See 4.3. of this dissertation. 
147 1963 Brussels Supplementary Convention, art. 3(2)(2). 
148 Ibid, art. 3(2)(3). 
149 2006 Draft Principles, principle 4(4). 
150 Ibid, principle 4(3). 
151 Indeed, similar systems exist outside of the context of marine pollution. See Boyle and Handl (note 82 above) 
429, where the authors note that the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, 29 
September 1997, 36 ILM 1473, art. 3(1), 4, requires the contribution of installation states to help cover the costs of a 
significant nuclear incident. 
152 This has been recognised by the international community as there are provisions addressing compulsory financial 
security in a number of instruments addressing transboundary pollution, such as the ILC Draft Principles, the 1963 
Brussels Supplementary Convention and the various iterations of the CLC and Fund conventions, 
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maintenance of financial security must be compulsory if any global convention is to be 
successful. This is due to the potential for catastrophic spills that may well result in claims 
exceeding the value of the owner’s or operator’s assets. The financial security provisions of the 
Sydney Draft are well suited to the task, as both the operator and the owner of a platform are 
required to furnish security. However, unlike the Sydney Draft, it would perhaps be wise if both 
these parties were required to furnish security to the satisfaction of the coastal state.153 To require 
the owner to furnish security to the satisfaction of the flag state would leave the system open to 
abuse, and there seems no clear reason why the flag state should be able to dictate the terms of 
the security.154 The flag state is not likely to be the victim of a spill from the platform. The party 
that dictates the terms of the financial security ought to be the state that is most at risk in the 
event of a spill - the coastal state.155 As required by both CLEE and the Sydney Draft, the 
amount of financial security required must be sufficient to meet the largest possible claim in 
terms of the convention’s limitation provisions. This approach would result in an international 
system where the amount of financial security is set according to international standards, yet the 
precise form of the financial security would be dictated by the coastal state. This system of 
financial security should be supplemented by the creation of a tiered fund system, similar to that 
of the CLC and Fund Conventions (and possibly the nuclear compensation regime).156 It is 
submitted that such a system in conjunction with the liability regime proposed would result in an 
offshore oil industry that is required to and capable of covering any claims for pollution from 
deep sea drilling. The only aspect of this system that has yet to be addressed is the manner in 





                                         
153 Dubais (note 16 above) 67/68 warns that allowing coastal (or flag) states discretion to require their own standards 
of financial security could place unreasonable burdens on operators. He is also concerned that such an approach 
would undermine the uniformity of a global convention. See also note 141 above. 
154 Richards (note 26 above) 388 comments that this state of affairs has likely emerged from offshore platforms 
being treated as vessels. Richards argues that this is not desirable as there are significant differences between oil 
spills from vessels and offshore platforms, as the latter has the potential to spill for an ‘open-ended’ period of time 
and may affect a very large area. 
155 Ibid, 395. 
156 Rares (note 7 above) 22. 
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4.5. DISPUTE RESOLUTION UNDER THE PROPOSED CONVENTION: 
 
The method by which a claim is resolved is significant, as there are major cost and time 
implications involved. It is necessary to consider some possible systems that may be 
implemented by a global convention.157 The resolution of claims that have a transboundary 
character has been particularly difficult, with Handl noting that ‘settling claims through litigation 
may prove exceedingly time-consuming, expensive, and ultimately inequitable. Some private 
lawsuits are too big for courts to handle.’158 The proposed state, operator and owner aspects of 
the global convention further complicate the issue, as does the choice of financial security 
arrangement. 
 
Where a claim lies between an operator or owner, and the coastal state, it would certainly be 
possible to resolve the claim through the courts of that state. An alternative is to make use of 
arbitration, as there is often a large amount of technical evidence that would best be weighed by 
arbitrators who are familiar with the offshore oil industry.159 The issue grows more complicated 
where the claim lies between two states, as domestic courts would usually lack jurisdiction to 
hear the matter.160 A proposed solution to this difficulty is the establishment of a permanent 
arbitral tribunal.161 Such a tribunal could utilise technical experts and scientific data, and would 
thus serve as an ideal forum for disputes arising from transboundary pollution caused by offshore 
oil spills. Given the very technical nature of deep sea drilling, a specialised arbitral body is 
                                         
157 Whilst the issue of dispute resolution is perhaps inseparable from that of liability, a detailed discussion of dispute 
resolution methods is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
158 Boyle and Handl (note 82 above) 430. 
159 R Graving ‘The International Commercial Arbitration Institutions: How Good a Job Are They Doing?’ (1989) 4 
Am. U.J. Int’l L. & Pol’y. 319, 324. Graving lists a number of factors favouring the use of arbitration in general. 
These include assurances of neutrality, expert arbitrators, flexible procedure, privacy, potential for reduced costs, 
and international enforcement amongst others. See also A Budiman ‘On Liability for Offshore Oil Spillage: Strictly 
Settled’, International Bar Association - Oil and Gas Law Publications, available at 
http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=FCEBAB31-12B0-4F19-B5F6-1259FD824FBC, 
accessed on 7 June 2013, page 5. 
160 Caron (note 90 above) 657. It is perhaps trite law that domestic courts lack the jurisdiction to adjudicate on 
claims between sovereign states. Caron notes that it may be possible to act against a foreign state where they have 
assets within the jurisdiction of a domestic court, but that such a scenario is ‘a fortuitous and slender reed upon 
which nations should not rely when designing compensation schemes for their citizens.’ Caron further reiterates this 
by stating that ‘it must be borne in mind that international accountability is fundamentally different from domestic 
accountability’. 
161 L Cahalan ‘Compensating Private Parties for Transnational Pollution Injury’ (1984) 58.3 St. John’s Law Review 




ideal.162 International instruments addressing pollution often mandate arbitration between 
parties,163 but such arbitration is mostly ad hoc and not conducted by a permanent tribunal. An 
example of an ad hoc arbitral body is that created by the Space Objects Convention. The Space 
Objects Convention is relevant in the context of dispute resolution, as it contains provisions for 
the settlement of disputes concerning transboundary harm. The convention encourages 
diplomatic negotiations, but in the event that these are unsuccessful, the parties resolve the 
dispute through the establishment of a claims commission.164  
 
Whilst the establishment of a permanent arbitration tribunal would be desirable, it is unlikely. 
International marine pollution instruments (and others) often contain arbitration provisions, but 
these are predominantly conducted on an ad hoc basis and it would appear unlikely that the 
international community would deviate from this established practice. In conclusion, a global 
convention dedicated to offshore platform spills is most likely to gain international acceptance if 
it contains an ad hoc arbitration provision for instances where the claim lies between states, with 
claims between operators/owners and a state being resolved through domestic courts or 
arbitration. 
 
4.6. ALTERNATIVES TO A GLOBAL CONVENTION: 
 
Whilst the creation of a global liability regime for offshore platforms has been motivated, 
consideration must be given to critiques of this approach and possible alternatives. Tetley writes 
that ‘the need for an international convention on offshore mobile craft appears doubtful, at least 
for the present, as legal problems relating to the operation of such craft tend to be local or 
regional, rather than international, and so lend themselves more readily to national legislation.’165 
This critique is common and rational, as a regional framework is presently the favoured approach 
for offshore platforms (which Tetley refers to as mobile craft). The benefits of national 
legislation (and regional agreements) are clear; they offer specialised regulation and can be 
                                         
162 Boyle and Handl (note 82 above) 427, where Boyle writes that there is a ‘strong argument for a permanent body 
to facilitate mass claims.’ 
163 See for example the Barcelona Convention, art. 28(2), OSPAR, art. 32(1), OPOL, clause 9. 
164 Space Objects Convention, art. XIV. 
165 W Tetley QC ‘Uniformity of International Private Maritime Law - The Pros, Cons, and Alternatives to 
International Conventions - How to Adopt an International Convention’ (1999-2000) 24 Tul. Mar. L.J. 775, 802. 
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amended faster than a global convention. It follows that a solution to the present lamentable state 
of the international liability regime relating to offshore platforms could be provided by the 
amendment of existing regional instruments. A number of commentators have proposed that 
existing compensation regimes applicable to tanker pollution, such as the CLC and Fund 
Conventions, should be expanded to cover such spills (which are presently excluded).  
 
A common feature of many regional instruments is the inclusion of a pactum de contrahendo 
concerning liability. A number of these conventions are based on a model convention drafted by 
the United Nations Environmental Programme (‘UNEP’), so presumably, should UNEP draft a 
model liability provision that specifically apportions liability in the event of an oil spill from an 
offshore platform, states may be encouraged to incorporate such a provision into the existing 
regional instruments. Hancock and Stone provide a compelling example of a successful regional 
instrument, OPOL, and argue that since offshore platforms drill along a narrow strip of the 
continental shelf (or in other shallow areas), regional agreements can serve as effective 
regulation.166  
 
It is submitted that the method of including or amending liability provisions in existing 
regional instruments is plausible, but this would require states party to a number of instruments 
to agree on amendments. Almost every regional instrument (as they are presently written) would 
require some form of amendment. It would simply be more practical to create a single new 
instrument, but there is merit in the concern that the greater the number of states involved in 
negotiation, the more divergent the views. It is desirable to address offshore platforms in a 
separate convention from other ‘vessels’ as the potential liability is significantly different.167 The 
notion that offshore drilling occurs within a certain area and thus is manageable by regional 
regulation is correct, but respectfully, it is short-sighted. This is because increased technological 
development coupled with increasing demand for oil has resulted in offshore platforms drilling 
in ever-deeper waters.168 Thus it is submitted that the regional instruments will become less 
effective as time passes. A global convention avoids this failing as it caters for drilling in 
                                         
166 Hancock and Stone (note 85 above) 393. 
167 Richards (note 26 above) 338. 
168 See 2.2.6 of this dissertation where mention is made of the Maersk Discoverer, a platform with an operational 
drilling depth of 3 kilometres. 
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increasingly deeper waters by holding operators or owners accountable, even where the drilling 
is conducted in international waters. It is therefore a proposal that not only addresses present 
problems, but also regulates dilemmas that have yet to surface. Considering the slow pace of 
international law making, a convention that anticipates obstacles and pre-emptively resolves 
them is surely desirable. 
 
A second critique of the regional approach is that it has proven ineffective thus far. The 
earlier analysis of the regional international regime revealed that states have agreed to a large 
number of conventions, but that these conventions are largely silent on liability - especially in the 
context of offshore platforms. To amend every convention in order to incorporate detailed 
liability provisions is a Herculean task. Finally, as Tetley acknowledges, the benefits of creating 
a unified international regime outweigh the disadvantages.169 The advantages he lists include 
certainty, avoidance of a ‘conflict of laws’ scenario, economic development,170 and procedural 
effectiveness.171 A further advantage not stated by Tetley is that a convention, provided it finds 
enough state support, has the potential to achieve customary international law status.172 At the 
very least a global convention could entrench certain key principles as customary international 
law, including strict state, operator and owner liability. This would develop the customary 
international law, enhancing the definition of the ‘polluter-pays’ principle and thereby strengthen 




A global convention regulating oil platforms must contain a number of key features in order 
to be effective. The instrument must have a wide scope, wide enough to cover harm suffered as a 
result of oil pollution. The instrument must impose strict liability on the owners and operators of 
offshore platforms, and ideally upon states (although this is likely to meet with strong resistance 
from the international community). Such liability ought not to be unlimited (save in limited 
                                         
169 Tetley (note 165 above) 797. 
170 Tetley, ibid, writes that ‘uniform international law is a boon to international commerce and thereby contributes 
substantially to creating conditions that foster both national and international economic growth.’ In support of his 
contention, he cites the success of harmonisation of the insurance industry in the European Union. 
171 Ibid, 797-800. 
172 Carroll (note 10 above) 684. 
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circumstances)173 as liability limitations are required to make the risk insurable. In conjunction 
with this liability framework, insurance or some other form of financial guarantee must be 
compulsory for both operators and owners. This will ensure that claimants are able to obtain 
redress in the event that the liable party is financially incapable of paying, or unwilling to pay, 
compensation. The exact form of the financial security should be left to the discretion of the 
coastal state, as they are the mostly likely to suffer any harm caused by oil pollution from the 
offshore platform. An effective liability regime cannot exist without an effective dispute 
resolution mechanism, and the current favoured approach - arbitration - will likely be sufficient. 
Where the claim lies between two states, a permanent arbitral tribunal would be ideal but again, 
such a body is unlikely given past practices of the international community. 
Not all the aspects of a global convention catering to offshore platforms have been canvassed 
in this proposal. Such an instrument will obviously contain provisions covering a variety of 
different aspects including technical specifications, safety protocols, clean-up provisions and 
other industry-related issues. It is hoped that recent spills such as the Montara oil spill and the 
high-profile Deepwater Horizon spill will galvanise the international community into action. 







                                         
173 A good model would be Article 13(4) of the Sydney Draft which prevents an operator from limiting their liability 




CHAPTER 5: CONCLUDING REMARKS AND THE WAY FORWARD 
 
The purpose of this dissertation has been to determine the adequacy of international and 
domestic instruments regulating offshore oil platforms, specifically whether they contain clear 
and adequate provisions for civil liability. As liability provisions do not exist in isolation, other 
features such as financial security provisions and dispute resolution provisions were assessed in 
order to provide a holistic view of the various instruments. As was noted in the first paragraph of 
this dissertation, offshore installations have the potential to cause massive pollution. The 
Deepwater Horizon leaked nearly five million barrels of oil.1 The Deepwater Horizon may have 
been the largest offshore installation disaster in recent memory, but it is certainly not the only 
one. The Montara Wellhead Platform suffered a blowout on 21 August 2009, and whilst it may 
not have received the same attention in the media as the Deepwater Horizon, the resultant oil 
slick covered an estimated 90 thousand square kilometres - the largest oil spill in Australian 
history.2 This spill also damaged the Indonesian coast, thus making the spill an issue not solely 
of Australian law, but also international law. 
 
Chapter 2 sought to determine the applicability of existing international law principles and 
instruments to offshore installations, and whether they are sufficient to properly address 
situations such as the Montara and Deepwater Horizon spills. It soon became clear that the 
principles customary international law, whilst being applicable to offshore installations, are both 
unclear and difficult to enforce. Nowhere is this clearer than with the International Law 
Commission’s Draft Principles allocating loss for transboundary harm.3 It is telling that despite 
nearly three decades of work, the International Law Commission has been unable to produce 
anything more than a set of recommendations that are not binding on the international 
                                         
1 C Robertson and C Krauss ‘Gulf Spill is the Largest of its Kind, Scientists Say’ N.Y. Times 2 August 2010, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/03/us/03spill.html?_r=1&fta=y, accessed on 3 March 2013. 
2 M White ‘First Montara, then Deepwater Horizon - is Australia protected from catastrophic oil spills?’ The 
Conversation, available at https://theconversation.com/first-montara-then-deepwater-horizon-is-australia-protected-
from-catastrophic-oil-spills-996, accessed on 25 August 2013. 
3 2004 draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising out of Hazardous 
Activities (ILC, 2004) available in Report of the International Law Commission on its Fifty-Sixth Session (UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/L.661, 8 July 2004) (‘Draft Principles’). 
132 
 
community.4 Whilst the draft principles do encourage the implementation of strict liability,5 and 
recognise the need for adequate financial security,6 the dire reality is that these principles fall far 
short of a binding convention. Despite positive steps such as the Rio Declaration7 and the Space 
Objects Convention,8 which indicate a growing international consensus that the creator of a 
transboundary harm ought to compensate the victim, customary international law has not yet 
developed to the point where it directly addresses transboundary oil pollution. This leads to the 
conclusion that customary international law does not, in its present form, hold the answer for 
allocating liability in the event of a transboundary oil spill. 
 
Secondly it was concluded upon an analysis of global instruments addressing marine 
pollution that they do not adequately address offshore installations in the context of liability. 
Whilst UNCLOS9 clearly sets out the rights (and obligations) of states in relation to offshore 
instruments,10 it stops short at clearly imposing liability. UNCLOS also confers significant 
powers on the flag state, despite the coastal state being the state most likely to suffer harm in the 
event of an oil spill. When considering other conventions that are more focused on oil pollution, 
it is apparent that these conventions have been drafted to address pollution from oil tankers or 
cargo vessels. Offshore installations are either excluded (such as with the CLC11 and Fund12 
Conventions) or are dealt with in an ancillary manner (such as MARPOL,13 which imposes 
                                         
4 A Boyle ‘Globalising Environmental Liability: The Interplay of National and International Law’ (2005) 17 Journal 
of Environmental Law 3, 26. 
5 Draft Principles, principle 4(2). 
6 Draft principles, principle 4(3). 
7 Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 14 June 1992, U.N. 
Doc. A/Conf. 151/26 (Vol. I). 
8 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 29 November 1971, 961 U.N.T.S. 
187, 1 September 1972. 
9 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3 (‘UNCLOS’). 
10 Articles 60 and 80 of UNCLOS address the question of jurisdiction and rights over installations operating within 
the EEZ and the Continental Shelf. See 2.2.1 of this dissertation for a detailed discussion of these (and other) 
UNCLOS provisions. 
11 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 29 November 1969, 9 ILM 45 (‘CLC 
Convention’). 
12 Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 18 
December 1971, 11 ILM 284 (‘Fund Convention’). 
13 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, adopted 2 November 1973, 1340 
UNTS 184, (entered into force 2 October 1983), amended by Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Ships 1973, adopted 17 February 1978, 1340 UNTS 61 
(entered into force 2 October 1983) (‘MARPOL’). 
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liability for pollution from ‘fixed or floating platforms’,14 but not for pollution arising out of 
drilling activities).15 This state of affairs is clearly alarming, with some authors cautioning that 
states are reluctant to introduce greater international regulation to the offshore petroleum 
industry as they are reluctant to hamper the development of that industry.16 
 
As the global regulatory framework is currently underdeveloped, the International Maritime 
Organisation has encouraged the development of regional agreements to address marine 
pollution.17 Some of these regional instruments have proven to be very successful, chief amongst 
them the Offshore Pollution Liability Agreement (‘OPOL’).18 The success of this agreement is 
particularly encouraging as it is a voluntary agreement managed by the offshore operators 
themselves (as opposed to the states), with the operators satisfying any pollution related claims.19 
Whilst OPOL is not without its flaws - claims are limited to $250 million - it imposes strict 
liability,20 requires the furnishing financial security,21 and has thus far proven to be successful.22 
It is submitted that the OPOL model, which is itself modelled after the CLC Conventions, is a 
model that ought to be adopted in other regions. Whilst this would not solve the present issue of 
an erratic international law regime applicable to offshore installations, it can only be beneficial to 
introduce liability provisions to existing regional conventions. 
 
Whilst there are numerous regional instruments addressing marine pollution, most suffer 
from shared flaws. OSPAR,23 and the Barcelona Convention,24 explicitly endorse the polluter-
                                         
14 M Kashubsky ‘Marine Pollution from the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry: Review of Major Conventions and 
Russian Law (Part 1)’ (2006) 151 Maritime Studies 1, 4. 
15 MARPOL, art. 2(3)(b)(ii). 
16 W Hancock and R Stone ‘Liability for Transactional Pollution Caused by Offshore Oil Rig Blowouts’ (1981) 5 
Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 377, 391. 
17 International Maritime Organisation, Resolution A.448(XI), 15 November 1979. 
18 Offshore Pollution Liability Agreement, (1974) 13 I.L.M. 1409 and (1975) 14 I.L.M. 147, available at 
http://www.opol.org.uk/downloads/opol-agreement-jul12.PDF, accessed on 1 June 2013 (‘OPOL’). 
19 OPOL, clause II(c)(1). 
20 OPOL, clause IV. 
21 Rules of The Offshore Pollution Liability Association Limited (as at 1 January 2012), available at 
http://www.opol.org.uk/downloads/OPOL-Rules-Jan2012.pdf, accessed on 1 June 2013 (‘OPOL Rules’) Part II, 2.2. 
22 R Shaw ‘Trans-boundary Oil Pollution Damage Arising From Exploration and Exploitation of Offshore Oil. Do 
We Need An International Compensation Convention?’ (2011), available at 
http://www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/Newsletters/CMI%20News%202011-3.pdf, page 18. 
23 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic 1992, 22 September 1992, 
2354 UNTS 67, 25 March 1998. (‘OSPAR’). 
24 Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution 1976, 16 February 1976, 1002 UNTS 
27, 12 February 1978 (‘Barcelona Convention’). 
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pays principle.25 Whilst these conventions state that the loss resulting from pollution should be 
borne by the responsible party, both fail to adequately define the scope of loss covered or specify 
the exact limits of liability applicable. This problem is mirrored in similar regional instruments 
such as the Kuwait Convention,26 and the Helsinki Convention,27 which (as concerns liability) 
only contain a pactum de contrahendo - an agreement to agree on liability provisions at a later 
date.28 Thus the overwhelming majority of regional conventions addressing oil pollution either 
fail to directly address oil spills from offshore platforms, contain vague liability provisions or 
simply fail to contain any liability provisions at all. It is submitted that the present regional 
framework is simply not adequate to address the threat of large-scale oil spills from offshore 
platforms. 
 
After addressing the state of the present international law applicable to offshore installations, 
the dissertation next addressed the domestic law of select states - specifically the United States of 
America (‘USA’) and South Africa. The USA is currently adjudicating a number of civil claims 
between civilians affected by the Deepwater Horizon spill, British Petroleum (‘BP’) - the 
operator of the installation- and Transocean, the owner of the installation. The primary federal 
statute regulating oil pollution in the USA is the OPA 90.29 The USA is not party to the CLC and 
Fund Conventions, and created its own similar regime in the wake of the Exxon Valdez spill. 
Whilst a few smaller claims have been brought in terms of the OPA 90, the Deepwater Horizon 
will be the first true test of many of its provisions, hopefully resolving questions relating to 
claims for pure economic loss and punitive damages. The OPA 90, in a manner not dissimilar to 
OPOL, imposes strict liability upon operators. Where the plaintiff can demonstrate that the 
operator acted with gross negligence, there is no limit on the compensation payable by the 
operator of the installation.30 There are limited instances when an operator may limit its liability 
to $75 million plus removal costs,31 or escape liability all together,32 and these limitations closely 
                                         
25 OSPAR, art. 2(2)(b). Barcelona Convention, art. 4(3)(b). 
26 Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution, 24 
April 1978, 17 I.L.M. 511, 1 July 1979 (‘Kuwait Convention’). 
27 1992 Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, 9 April 1992, 13 I.L.M. 
546, 17 January 2000 (‘Helsinki Convention’). 
28 Ibid, art. 13(a). 
29 Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §2701 (‘OPA 90’). 
30 OPA 90, §2704(c)(1)(A). 
31 OPA 90, §2704(a)(3). 
32 OPA 90, §2703(a). 
135 
 
resemble those proposed in chapter 4. OPA 90 also permits plaintiffs to claim from a 
compensation fund,33 similar to the methodology under the CLC and Fund Conventions. 
Therefore, one can conclude that whilst the USA is not party to the CLC and Fund Conventions, 
it has created a comparable system. A key difference is that where the CLC and Fund 
Conventions exclude claims against offshore operators, such claims are permitted by OPA 90. 
Whilst the liability framework created by the OPA 90 is not entirely free from criticism – the 
liability limitation of $250 million (excluding clean-up costs) has been criticised as being too low 
– the Act ultimately creates a comprehensive liability regime that directly caters for spills from 
offshore installations.  
 
South Africa differs from the USA as the former has acceded to the CLC and Fund 
Conventions, as well as their accompanying 1992 Protocols, although South Africa is still in the 
process of incorporating the conventions into its domestic law.34 The primary legislation 
addressing marine pollution is the MPCCLA,35 which imposes a now-familiar system of strict 
liability coupled with a limit on the compensation payable by the owner of the installation. 
Unfortunately, the MPCCLA is quite dated and does not adequately address pollution emanating 
from an offshore installation. Whilst claims against the owners of an offshore installation are 
possible in terms of the MPCCLA, such claims are only possible if the installation is located 
within the internal or territorial waters of South Africa.36 Furthermore, the MPCCLA only 
permits claims against the owner of the installation,37 thus excluding claims against operators 
(unless they are also the owner of the installation). Claims (in the absence of fault) are limited to 
approximately R200 million38 - a paltry figure when one considers the potential costs of a large-
scale oil spill. The MPCCLA does not require the owner (or operator) of an offshore installation 
to furnish security, only requiring security from the owners of vessels carrying oil in bulk as 
cargo.39 
 
                                         
33 U.S.C. 26, §9509(c)(1)(A). 
34 The two draft bills incorporating the conventions and their protocols are attached as annexures to this dissertation. 
35 Marine Pollution (Control and Civil Liability) Act 6 of 1981 (‘MPCCLA’). 
36 MPCCLA, s9(1) read with s1. 
37 MPCCLA, s9(1) read with s1. 
38 MPCCLA, s5(b)(ii). 
39 MPCCLA, s13(1) 
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The South African legislative regime is further complicated by the Maritime Zones Act40, 
which states that laws applicable in the Republic are applicable to offshore installations 
operating within the EEZ or on the continental shelf.41 This could conceivably permit the 
provisions of NEMA42 to be used to impose liability on the operators of installations in the EEZ 
and continental shelf, and owners operating on the continental shelf. NEMA does not contain any 
liability limits,43 nor does it contain any statutory exemptions to liability - thus it imposes 
absolute liability.44 In addition to NEMA, the Maritime Zones Act permits the application of the 
common law to installations, although it seems unlikely that a plaintiff would elect to utilise the 
common law when he could proceed in terms of NEMA and avoid the burden of proving fault. 
 
The unfortunate conclusion is that South Africa is not adequately protected in the event of an 
oil spill from an offshore installation. To determine the extent of liability, the claimant it forced 
to decipher a needlessly convoluted legislative regime. The primary statute addressing offshore 
oil pollution, the MPCCLA, is based on a dated convention and Parliament failed to appreciate 
the unique issues related to offshore installations when drafting the Act. Offshore installations 
have merely been grouped together with oil tankers, regulated by a statute clearly designed to 
regulate the latter. The results are a low liability limitation, a muddled jurisdiction for civil 
claims and non-existent financial security measures. The MPCCLA must be amended to 
sufficiently address pollution from offshore installations. 
 
Due to a vague global liability regime (and a varied regional regime), Chapter 4 proposed a 
global convention addressing oil spills from offshore platforms. Whilst there is presently no 
global convention specifically concerning offshore platforms, there have been attempts at such a 
convention. The two most significant attempts are CLEE45 and the Sydney Draft,46 but neither is 
enforceable. Both attempts contain features found in other instruments addressing pollution, 
                                         
40 Act 15 of 1994. 
41 Maritime Zones Act, s9(1). 
42 The National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 (‘NEMA’). 
43 Bareki NO and Another v Gencor Ltd and Others 2006 (1) SA 432 (T), 440H. 
44 Ibid, 440I-441B. 
45 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from Exploration for and Exploitation of 
Seabed Mineral Resources, 1 May 1977, 16 ILM 1451 (‘CLEE’). 
46 Convention on Offshore Units, Artificial Islands and Related Structures Used in the Exploration for and 
Exploitation of Petroleum and Seabed Mineral Resources, 200 (OUC 200) May 2001 Draft, available at 
http://www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/Newsletters/2004/Binder1.pdf, page 3. 
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specifically the CLC and Fund Conventions, and OPOL. These include strict liability, a limit on 
compensation payable per claim, limited exceptions from liability, the settlement of disputes by 
means of private arbitration, and robust financial security measures. The proposed convention 
creates a liability framework resembling that created to apportion liability for failed satellite 
launches,47 and nuclear pollution.48 There are numerous challenges facing the creation of a 
global convention, evidenced by the fact that numerous attempts to create such a regime have 
failed. However, it is submitted that such a system is the best chance of replicating the success of 
the oil tanker liability regime.49  
 
In conclusion, the laws imposing liability for oil spills from offshore platforms are sporadic 
and inconsistent. One may expect some measure of deviation between the laws of different 
states, but it is unclear why uniformity should be absent from international law. Whilst there has 
been some recognition at both international and domestic law levels of strict liability, it is by no 
means an established norm. Furthermore, where the pollution is transboundary in nature, there is 
simply no definitive law applicable. One is therefore often forced to proceed by way of analogy 
and reliance on international customary law principles. Whilst there has been some success with 
instruments such as OPOL, such successes appear to be the exception and not the norm. It is 
submitted that this incomplete approach to regulation exists due to two factors: 1) the 
infrequency of large-scale spills from offshore installations, and 2) the desire of states to avoid 
interfering with the offshore petroleum industry.50 
 
The offshore oil industry is simply massive, and there is an ever-continuing threat of a major 
spill from an offshore platform. As noted in the introduction of this work, such a spill threatens 
not only the environment but also the economy, having a noted impact on the tourism, fishing 
and real estate industries. The current approach of relying on regional conventions has not been 
successful, as most of these conventions do not contain liability provisions. A global convention 
presents the opportunity to unify not only liability provisions affecting offshore installations, but 
                                         
47 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 29 November 1971, 961 U.N.T.S. 
187, 1 September 1972. 
48 G Doeker and T Gehring ‘Private or International Liability for Transnational Environmental Damage - The 
Precedent of Convention Liability Regimes’ (1990) 2 Journal of Environmental Law 1, 8. 
49 Shaw (note 22 above) 18. 
50 W Hancock and R Stone (note 16 above) 391. 
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also safety and operational regulations. This in turn would allow the domestic laws of states to be 
harmonised with the international regime, simplifying the regulatory burden facing the offshore 
industry. Ultimately, there may be some debate as to the best method to address the threat posed 
by offshore installation spills, but it should be abundantly clear to all parties that inaction is not 
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one iocidcnt 
Appljcatlon 
JO. ( I) Suhjcc! lo subSiOCtion (2). this Purttipplk·s to c.\•"Cry ship fist is c:frrying more 
thtlll 2 OOOtonnesof oil in bulk as C!l!¥O rind. where such ship ~ unregistered. 1his Ain 20 
nppl ics to d)st ship as if it 1,vcre n::.gistcr<.'d iil 1hestate "·hl>SC lhg tl)c ship is !lying. 
(2) This Pun docs not a-pply to a Q)\\':.rnmcnt ship. ot other s.hip opc.rnto.i by"' stme ... 
iocluding as.hip opcrntcd by the C'.ovcrnn'lt:nt o f lbc. Republ ic. that is bc.ing uSC!J for 
oon-oonm~ci:il purposes. 
Insurance certiflcutes to be ea rried on c~rta bl shi~ 
11. ( I) lf a shipe.ntcrsot k:a\u.or tiucntptStocnrcror to lcm-c. a pcm in the Re.publ ic~ 
or anivc.s tit ot l<:fl\.'C·S. ot tltlemprs to urrive tit ot to lc.svc . .ii tcr-n\i.nsl i.n tho:· tc-rrirotial 
\\'Sters of the Republ ic. \\' i fhc)llt h:iving on bo:ird the ship the tclC'r·oot iosur..incc. 
oen:i ficmc.thtit is in force-in respect o f t.hst ship. the. nt.tl$tcr und the.owner of the ship ~c 
25 
both !,,"Uil ty o f an offcnce.nOO l itiblc no con"' iction to a line not cxceo:ting R2.50 <XX>. JO 
(2) lf ti ship thm is tc,gistcrcd in the Republ ic cntC·ts ot leaves. or mtentptS ·I) e.ntc,r or 
to k .iive. a port in ll stt1tc other than the Republ ic. ot tlfri.,.-cs mot lca·vcs. orttncinpG-t<) 
urrive tit or to le.:ivc. :i Trn1inal in the tc.rrirorisl 9:n of wch .ii swte. without kvtng Oil 
bootd 1hes.bipt.hc relC"r·oot iM1irnnceccnificatc tb:a is in three in r~pcct of 1hm ship. 1hc 
Ol$te.rtind the ov.•ocrof thc.ship are brnh 1-uil.ty of M otrcno:-bOO l i sblc oo eonv·ictioll 3S 
to a fine no! exceeding R2.'i0 000. 
( 3) If. otho.':l'\\' i9: t.OOn in eireu.1n."'1ano:.sto '"hich sttbscc.tion( 1) appl ies<)I'. in rhcc:isc 
of a ship registered i n the. Republ ic. tP ,,,.hich subsccril,n (2) sppl ics. at any time a 
n::.IC\'SU! insttmoo:: ecr1ifi:-ttteis in fcm-e in respect o f s ship to " 'hicbthis Psrt sppl i~:tnd 
thm iMurttncccc.ni6cate is OO£ on boon! trut ship. the nms.te.r Md the O\\'ncr o f the :U\ip 40 
are both ~'Ui l ty o( sn olfcocennd l inble on conviction to fl Mc not exceeding R20 ()(X). 
(4) Anolliccr nwyrcquirethc. nuis.tcr orothc:r ~,rson incharg.:of a ship to prcxtuce.thc 
relc:vant insur.:ioce ccttificate.th:lt is in force in respect of tb:lt s hip sOO. if 1-hc n13s.tcr or 
other person refusc.s or fai ls to produce th:rt insu:mucecatificute to rhe.of6ccr. he o r s he 
is b.'llihy <lf 11n <llfcnce. Md l iable on <:on\·ietion to a fine. oot exceeding R20 <XXl. 45 
( 5) lf thc Authority htiS re&on.:iblc grounck t> bel ieve tb!lt W 1nsstcror01hcr person 
in chsrge.of fl ship is. :men1pting to t$.e the ship mu of a port in the- Republ ic :n fl ti'nte 
when thcs:hipdoc.snot h:l"'C on board t~ relevant i~1!rnllrocc.rti6.::sc that is in fur cc. i11 
respect o(dl!I! ship. iheAutbotity 1ntiy dc.t:iin the ship until such insurnnce ocrtificme i s 
obtsintd or prodlliced to the Authorit}: as .the c:aic nwy he.. 50 
(6) lf a ship detained ms pon in tcr~of s.ub9:-etion {5) lc!!Vcs the.pan bclbre i£ ks 
been relciiso:I from d<:te-ntioo. t~ nlflstcr t1ndthcov."OCTof tMt ship arc bolh guil ty of Sil 
olfcocennd l isbleon amviction to fl fine. fX)t exceeding R5CX) OOOortoi n1prisonn1ent for 




(7) For the pul"(Xl!SC.sof this.section. a relcvsm insumncccc.nificatc in res.pc ct o f :i AAip 
; -
((t) if th:. ship is rcgi~tcred in .the Rq>11bl ic and is oot a Govc-mn\CM ship. a 
ccnificatci~'UCd in tcnns <if Sttri<m 12 : 
(bJ if 1bc ship is registered in!! Oun.rooti i:tg: St$ennd is not a C'.o,1crnntents:hip. a 5 
ccrrifieatc t>.wcd in rcspcc·tof 1hlrtshipundcr a I.aw of the CcJintroctingSu1.:: in 
qu~rion giving c.d"o:t to Altic le VU of the 1992 Li.'lbi l i ty Con.,-c.nrion; 
(e-J if thcshipis rcgistcro:I in"' s1:1te that is not"' Contr!lcting Stitc and 1h.c ship is 
not ti Gatemmoot sh~, , a catilicutc issued in tc.ml.-t of sccriQn 12 or a 
ccrrifieatc that nn?i.~ be. rognrJcd ns !l YCbV!lnt insuroucc ccn ifiaite. for the ship 10 
for t.hc ptt."JXllSC.S of th:i'> paragraph in1crn16 of 1he rcgul:n.iom: 
(d} if thcsh.ipiso"·ncdby the ("'.o•lcrnulCntof thc Republic. a ccrrifieatc. i~'UCd in 
terntt o f szct.ion 14 : 
(~} if the. shij: is owncd by the. go.,-cmmcnr of a amuxting Suite. ti cc.rtific:itc 
i~1cd in x:s.pc.<.1 of thats:hip undc.ra krw of rhc Controcring Stmc. in quotion l .S 
giving effect t)Aniclc.Vfl of the 1992 Liability (bn.,t\flri<mor:i cc.nifictitc of 
the kind (Cfened r> in SCX'tiQn 14(1) i~al by the govcrnn1.cn.t ()f th:I! 
Conrnicririg Stat: or 
(j) if the ship is O\\'~d by =he go.,.crnnlCnt of ti s-t:rtc that 6 oot ti Conrrocri.ng 
Sroic. a Cnilicmc o f the ki.nd Tcf crred to in so:tion 14( I) i$l!Cd by the 20 
go.,.c.mnx:nt of thest3tc. in quc.stioo or :i ccrtificntc. thst inu.~ be regarded us a 
rclc:1;-snt i ts.uroocc ccrti~stc thr 1.hc ship for the purposes o f thi<> p:srngroph 
pre.scribed in c.rnlS of the regulatio1:is. 
( 8) lo this so:tion. • offio:r:· me~ t1 person who-
(a) is ttll o ffi c::'!I' o f cu.~onis vd:hin the. mcMing of the 01.~oms !Ind Excise Act. 25 
1964 (Ac1f\10 . 9 1of 1%4): 
(bJ is11 sµn.·c)ur fotthc-pu:rpmc.sof theMc:rch.'lntShipping:Act. 19$ 1 (Act!\°'(). 57 
of 1951): 1w 
(c) is tlP.JX>int:d ·by the. Altthoriry. in \\• ri ring. to be ;in oO-iccr for the ~s of 
d\is sccti<:n. JO 
l!iSIJe.of iM1.1ranre Cf:rlific.atts 
12. (I ) 1~ o·wne.r. nuistcr <»agent o f a ship that is registered in 1he Republic 0 1 thoo: 
is rcg:istcrcd ina surc-tha1 is not n Comrncting Sune. nl3y .:ippty tothc.Authori!.y for the. 
issue o f tin i11:Stl.TMC:: cc.nificate f<w fheship. 
(2)Tbc sppl iG'ltkJ1 in tcrnl.So f subsecti on. ('I) n)us:t be nmdc in the prescribcdnwnncr 3S 
and form t<)gc.!l\cr with W suppotring docuntc.nt.stion nndinfornl!ltion detcrn1inod by 
the Authority. 
f l) The. Authl>ri t) nrusr-
(a) if ir is s.'ltstio:I tM.1 the O\\'flC'r o f the ship is 01t1i&ttiiAing i nsurt1nCe <)I' <;rhC'r 
fi oont•inl s:curi ty tbrt.hc: s:hip inantunoum th:'lf "ill cover~ l iluitsof l inbil i ty 40 
prcscribod by psmgmph I o f Artidc V of the 1992 Litibilit)' Convcntbn i'n 
relation ,, the ship. iss.)ic to lhe~pli::nllt sn insurnnce cc:rtificmc for the ship:. 
(bJ if it is 1)()! so s:rtisficd. refuse to is.we socb !I ccrtificmc in respect of the ship. 
(4) An insumrKe ~cttifict1te is.~11cd unclcr this scc-tion in re.spc<.1 of :i ship- 4S 
(aJ mu~ he in accorditnt•e "ilh the prcsc-ribcd foou. being o fonn th.!1!: conu1iM. 
but is not Ii mired toooo1nining.1hep:iniculntsscto11ti n pur-sgrnph2of Anicl~ 
v u of t~ 1992 LitbilityCOIPlCnihn: 
(b) eomcs i nt• IOrcc on lhc doy 'J"Cificd ;n t he «nifiCJtc:ond 
f<'J rcnl3ins in ft'ICC. s.µ~jcctto tbi<> Psn. uM.il - SO 
~1 ) s <13te r i: nto1Uhs niter the <tiy on \\'IUCh mc.cc.mhcmc conl<:s 1nto 1<:.icc: 
"' (ii) the due thnt 1hc: Authorit)· is sati<;frd i<.c t he. lsst d.<ly in t.hc.hnlsncc.of the 
pcri<XI during \\<bich the insurnncc or other fi nancial security in respect of 
the Slip fa:: to renuiin i n tbrtt.. 55 




F.xtensloo, cance.lluth>U and lapsl..oj: of i.n~rance ce11ificates 
IJ. ( I) 11:._ 
'(aJ a ship for '''hich :in inmrtlficc cc.rti fic:nehss been issuOO under scc1ion 12 is 
not :n sport in the Republic trt the time \\1bcn thc.ccnificmc ex. pirc.sur is-about 
-~~~ 5 
(bJ the. Authority is st1tis-fi:d tllst. sftcr the day s:pl),,"il\':d in the inst1mBCc 
certificate as thcdtiy umil whkh theccnificutc is torc.nuiu in force. the.re will 
be in fbtcc u ocmmict o finsarnncc or <)fhcrfiooncial so:.-mity f()rthcship in nu 
~fllOW)t 1hM. \\<i ll co1.-cr the limi~ ()f l i $1b·iliry prc~txd by J)ll~gnqm I o f 
Alfie le. \' o f the 1992 Liulrlil)' Con•lcnticm in rdotion to the ship. 10 
t:OOAuihority'nuiycxtcnd the o::rtificme fuT:tp::rbdthn1cxpircsonor-bcfore the <lily t~ 
the Authoriry is .smi!<ficd is t~ l tbt d3y in the. txil:incc of the period during which thtit 
<.'Ontm<.1 <)f in~tmHicc-or othc.rfiooncfal ~1y is to rcnurin in force. being ti pc.riod th:I! 
docs fX:it cxo::cd one ntoorh f rom tOOd:!ly contcmplnicd in ~rogniph (bJ. 
(2) An c-xtc mion o f ttn i 01;t1t Mee. ccrri ficmc in tenns of subsection {I ) ~ pirc.s upon the. I S 
s.hip's tinivtil· tits post in the Republi:. 
(:.l) The. Aur.horiry llJ.3Y cnoo::I an itsun1nce.ccrtificmc. is.stlCd uOOcr section 12 if it is 
smis-fic-dtbnt. bccuusc <lf tiny modificit i<m or varimionof. or•>. thcccmtract of ins.ur..ince 
or <)'!her fioooci:d So.'X'-Ur;ity for the ship. the o\\•nc:r of the.Ship "'ill nor he covered for !Ill 
t1moun1 trutis not less-than the l.imitsof lisbilily pr<Setibcd by ptiragraph I of Arti:' lc V 20 
of the 1992 Li3bitity Con•tention in ~lmion ., lhe ship. 
(4) If. "'l'tik .an iMurMCc ttrtificm< iSSll(X! un<krsection l2 for3 ship rei;istcrcd iil the. 
Rcpu blic 01 in :i s.wtc tb:u is nc:it ti C<m1rxting State i'i in force.. me ship ceas.:.s to be 
registered in~ Republic or in tflc.S\.'le in question. ss thc.csS(' nuiy be. ttic.cenHicntc 
so issued thereupon cc~s to be in f.)ftt: _25 
(5) (<t) I f an insmnnce ccrtificttte i~icd under section 12 i~ cancelled in tcrnis of 
subiccri<m (3) or o.:n.sct to be in fore< by virtue. of subs.::ction (4). the. ntaStcr of the s.hip 
nw.">t "'ithput dcloy rerurn thc.ec.n ific:irc to the. Aut~>Tity. 
(bJA Ol$\'C.f >AOO fn ilsto comply withp~9gruph(a) coot1nits11u otfc.1.x: Md is linblc. 
on conviction to s fine oot cxco:ding R20 000. 30 
S hips owned by (;ol·ernmeot of REpublic 
14. ( I) The ~·lini.stcr m:ay. "iththesppmvnl o f lhc "'linis.terof Fil\.•uiceandin res:pc<-'i 
of s-Ship th:lt iso"•ncd by the G>vcrnntcnt of the. Republic. iMue n cenific.'t1eccltifyin.g 
thm the ship is owned by rhc. C'.c>vanntc.n1 of rhc. Rcpublk and tbnt nny lisbili ty for 
pc>lllirion dsnmg:c up to the li"ntits of liubilify applic.able-in relation n the ship W\Ck:.r 3S 
Article V o f the 1992 Liability Cotyention ~~II be n1ct by~ Go.,emntcot of the. 
Rcpublk. 
(2)S11bj:cl tosu"bs,cction(J). tice.n:ficarc. issuo:t UJ\dc.r subsection (L) ron1:1ins in tbree 
thT the period st.med in ;he ccnificmc. . 
(:.l) If. \\'hib a cc:nifictrtc. Muod un.Jc.r ru,hso:rion ( I) is in force. the ship ~as:cs to he 40 
O'A'llod by 1hcC'.c>vcrnntc.m o f the Rqublic, the cc.niticstc so iss'UO:I thcrouponceitSCs to 
be. in force. 
(4) lnanypruttcdin~brought inacrurt in the l~cpublic x> enforcen c lailn iB respect 
of11 liabiti tyi.ocurredundcr the I 992 Li:abilityConvcnt)on.c ... eryCootrt1ctingStn~ nrust 
be. rogtst<kd n.s b.<i.,·ing subntinedto rho:: juri!'>dicti~ of t.hst coun :ind mtt5.t he rcg:irdcd ~IS 4S 
ha•dng "'!lh'Cd .:iny dcfence.bn<iCd on its swtus $ s sovereign S1:11c. but nothing in this 
subsection nlu.q be re.gsr,do:I tis nllowing the. b vy <lf cxc:cu.rion-sg&nst ibe.p~ny of 




l5. ( l) The ~·li"nistcr nmy nl!ll:c re.;ul :iiions-
(<1J rcglll'ding any manc.rwhi<.11. in tcrnlSof this Act.. nuiy or nmM tt ptC'ilCribOO: 
l:bJ giving ctro:1 to Atticb X <Jf rhc 1992 Liability Convention: 
(cJ fi xing f¢s to be prod i nr~c:x:1 o f sny nuino-ss rising fronl the npplicnrioo of SS 




(dJ rcgardi.n,g fh.:.c<mvc.rsion ()f the tullOUAtsof m<~y referred to iA p:im.wapb l 
of Ani<:lc . V of ti>: 1992 Liobility Convcotion il'lto an1011.0ts of mon.cy 
cxprcs.s.:d in South Africoo t'UJl'C.nc.y: 
(eJ rcgwdin.g: i'll3rnnto:s thm arc occcpu1blc for the ptapuso: <lf parogrtq.il .1 of 
Anic k: V o(thc 1992 Liability Con•,1cnrion: 5 
(f. rcgi11ding the extern to 1A·hich the. right of subrogtltion ·provid::d for in 
fVl'NICJf:Jlflh ~ ,..r Alfirl l" \ ' n f lltt' I QQJ I C.hiJiry f'nn-..Y'irtirm mtl)· hr r .ic('T('i<;ffl 
by n pc.rsicln 01bc.r rt.an n person rd·crrcd to in t.Mt p:asgmph; 
(~I rhc t6Ccru1inntcnt of the tonnage of a s:hip. including. the c.s.tinl::dioo of the 
tpnoogc o f a ship in cil'atnt.<;tt1no:.s \vhcrc it is nm pc>s.«ibl<:: or fC3SM.:tbly 10 
prnt'l'.i<:tible to nu::6urc its tooongc~ and 
(ltJ regarding wy S1";Cill.t11y or iBC.idcnUll .iiclo1iQ.iStnifu.·cor proco:furnl n1mtcr thm 
it is ll('o:.s.~uy t> pr('S('.ribc thr dle proper intplcnlCntntionor adntinis.Utl'!ion of 
this Act. 
(2) A11y regul&ion fi ring ftts nuts.1 be oua&. \\ith th:. tippruval o f the. ~1ini~ttt of l.S 
r:irt:ll~(' .. 
Jurisdx-tion 
16. D.:spitcan.y;hin.g 10 tbecont:rsl) .. <:oowincd i n :my othc.r law, a tvlttgistrntc:scoun 
bss jur.sdiccion to i1npose My pc.oolfy _prc....::ribcd by this Act. 
An1todn1eot of law 
11.100 l sw spxificd inthcso:ond Ot>hun.nof lhc Schedule is hereby ti.mcnd:dto tl..-: 
ex cnt ndicmcd in the thi.rd coluntn rhcroof. 
I~. Anything doDC. \\'hct:hc.r wxlcr a Im\' orothcl'\\•isc. prior to the cnnmtcoccntcnt o f 
this Att. and \\'hich can be done under !I pm.,·~ion of this Act. nm.st be regsr.Jcd :is 25 
00\·j·ngbccn dc)OO unckt this Af:.t. 
Sbort liUe and t'cmunencemeni 
19. 11\is Act isc:i llcd th.- Mc~kiMShippi.i:tg: (Ci•;i l L isbility Convc.ntion) ;\c.t, 201 ~l. 
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Act f\To. 6 of !\,brine. Pollution 1'tlc rqx::i l o f sea-ions 1.1. 14 !llid 15. 
1931 {Co:n1rol !Ind Ch:il 




MEMORANDUM ONTl!E OllJECTS OFTHE MERCHANT 
SHIPPING <CIVIL LIAIULITY CONVENTION) BILL, 2-013 
I. PURl~.>SE OF BILL 
'J'hc. Bill scc.k.~tocoot1 the Lntcrootionnl ~,I t11 i tinlCO J¥t1n.i1..'ltion Prottxx>I of I W! to 
anlCOO rhel.ntcm!irional Con\•'C.ntion on Civil L iabil i!)' for Oil Pollution O..~nwgc of 
29 Novc1nbct 1%9( thcCivil Litil>ili tyCon•lcMion) into l:iw.1hc Bill fomis pnrtof 
s pscks,gc of mc!IS1Jlt'.S designed t> gh~cffcct to the Republic's obligsrions under 
.tic Chil L ia.l)i l it}' Con\.'('J)rion bnd the lntcrns.tionnl "'l uritin1C Organizmion 
Protocol o f 1992 10 amend 1hcl rncrnstionsl Convention on the &tablisfunc!ltof an 
l.ntcmsriooul Fund fin CompcBS!ltion for Oi l f\> lhttion D anltlgc. 197 1 (the Fwd 
Q)n~'Cntio1\). Psrl is.ntcnt m> &lrcsdy ~pptovcd tllc t\\•o 'f)Jotocols uOOcr sc.ction 
23l{2)of thc Consritution o f t he Republic o f South Africa. 1996 {thcCoo.\tirution). 
The. full ])l•d:3J.'C inc· lud::s the Bill snd t.OC--
• t-.,l creOOmShippi it,g ( l otcrnational O i l PollutiooCont,pclWirion Fund) Bi ll. which 
gi~-csclfo:1 v thc.J~wxl Convc.nrioo: 
• tvlcrchzun Shipping: {lntcrooti~m:i l Oil Pollution Co1npdrts::ltion Fund) Contribu-
tion.<>: Bill. \\'hich is a n;oocy Bill oontcntplatcd in ~tion 77 of thc.Coo.<.tinition: 
and 
• tvlcrehant Shipplt\'.!!, {lntc:rootion:il O il Pollurion CompcnS3tion r1.1nd) Adminis· 
trotion Bill \\'hich dc:ils \\'itb the tdntinistralivc nuuttts of the-n;oocy Bill. 
l. Cf\111, l.IABU_.IT\f ANO FlJNO CON\1ENfl0NS 
2.1 The Civil Liabi Ii (}' tsnd Fuud C<m..,-cnTioos 1.\-c.re.adoptcdundct thc. .:iu.~piccsof 
the l ntem:irionsl :\ilaririnic.Osg;sni2t1rion. Thc.y 00!1 " ' irhqucstioos of l inbil i ty 
!Ind crnnpcnS;taion fc)I' l oss ord!ul1s,sc cau.~ by amrainin.:1rion 1csulrin$ f roin 
thees;;:~ or disch:irgc.of persistent oi l from tttM.::..--.rs(i.c. ships 001•svuctc:d <)I' 
i1cbptod t()I' mc:currisgc <lf oi l in hulk 4"' c:trgo) . 
2.2 UDClcr me. Civi.I Liability Con•t'cMion cbinuints tlle ccrtillo:I tl <.'<)mpcnsm-ion 
f rom the registered sbWO\\'flCr {or the. provilc:r o f fiooncial security tbr the. 
sh\po\\•ncr·s li3bility) for JXlllution dmnagc suft'cr<XI in the. 1c.rri v 1y (including 
tcnir>rial sc.!!) or exch1.$ivc. eoc~nontic rone uf a C'.untra.::-ti.ng Suite. TOC-
shj>o\~'na"s l i .obitity is stria (only l inli ted e-xc1nptions nnd d::fu.fl('CS. urc 
svoilablc). but -tt.i s:. l iabi l i ty i s:. subjc<.1: to ti nti c~tion in nccordaoo:. \Vi!:h th.-
proviSi<>ns o f tk Civil Litlbility Convention. \\Jhcre. l inti t!lf.ion .uppl i~ the 
shipo\\'ner's liM>il i ty is:.dctcmtined \virh re ference n the i)M!lgeof t.hc ship 
(.'()!)CC.med. 
2:J \Vbc;reasthe G .v il Litibi l i tyConvcnt);)nc-stabl i sh.."s and teb'Ul!l~S the l i® il i ty 
of the tc$istttcd shipt>\\'tK'.r, the Fund C'.unvcotioo c$'Wblishc.s M imcrootionnl 
rund, c:il lcd ·thc ltK<:rn.!!lionsl Oil Pollution ComJ?CUs::iriOO (IOPC) FWld, the 
purpose of \\'h.lch is topsy rompcns::ition to victints of poUution danuigc 
( \\ifhin fhc mcsning of the (.'ivil Liubilit)' Convention) where ir.cy·b:r.'C been 
Ull3bl:: tooburi.n con1pcnsstion, orcontpcns.!1tion in 11111. unde.r thcprovisic~ 
of th." Civil Li::ibili1y Coo\-c.ntiou. The fOPC F1llld rcroivcs its funds f ron1 
cn-rgo O\\' nct'S. spccifrnlly front pc1som \\'00 receive nnnU!llly. in the ptHtS or 
tcm1inal i~mll:atiollS of the Coot111cting SUl!cs. n10rc thoo I 50.<XX> tonne-s of 
coo1ributingoil. The nuixi1nun1sn1oum o f conipc.RS:ltion payable by the lO FC 
Fund i n rc.tpo:I of ' !l single incident ~ currc.nt.ly S.DR 203 <XX> <XX> 
(~ZAR J.Q4 billion)• . This antoUnt includes the rompcnS31ion p.<i id by the. 
shipo\\·ncr or the shiJ'()\\'nc.t's insurc.r wHb the C.'ivil Liubilit)' C(>nVClUion . 
.. I S l)R (Sp:.:W J)tro.i·ns R,igk) =ZAR 15.Cll.ulO ( \'a.l!JI:'..,,, 6 ~m 2013"'""'~'<'h«p:ll•;wwlmf.ors/ 




2..i Bccsusc. ihc Fu.nd Convcmion is supplc1ncnta1)' t\) the C i•;i l Li:ihility 
Con ~-cntion. nsrite.c.n.ooc)t bo:ontc,!l pany to th:: Fwd o,n-..·c.ntion without. m 
the: s.:imc tintc. ti lw hc<.~Hnint :i pmtf t\) t.f).".Ci.,i l Liability Convc1n ion. 
3. SUMMARY OF UILL'S PROVISl<)NS 
3.2 (.;/oust! 1 stt l...~ to cooct the Civi l Litlbil i ry Convention into Im\'. 
l.3 Clause .1 is u st.Mdurd p«>"·ision d<'!ll in.g wirh ihc.ennrtnicnt's appli<:!ltioo to 
the Swtc nod ifs o rgsn.s . 
.3.4 l Jaust> 4 seeks to C.'tl:"·nd tb:: trppl icmion of the Acr 1'> th:: Prince Ed\\'tltd 
ls:l.oo~. tts provided for i n SC.'tion 4 o f the Prince Ed>.\1srd L"SlaBtk Ac1. 194$ 
( Act No. 43 o f 1948). In tcrn~of scctit,n4 an Act of P$'l i~tcm dix:.s not appl)'· 
to tho! Prince E.:fu-srd b:l.:suckunlcss by such Aet it is c.xpre>scd so to apply. 
3.$ C:lause 5 ttllowstk fvl inistcr:>f 1'rsnspon !O g ivc.pll.blicity tOthe-Conmscting 
S1t1cs. to the Civil Liability Convention bf ripproprituc. l)()fificstk>n in the:' 
Ct1:.tfle. 
~l.6 Clauu 6 sccl:sto construe ti ~crtsiB provision o f tind cc1t1i.n oth:r refcre.nc~ 
in the Civil Liabil ity Cbn\'Cntioo. Thc-c lsusc provict:s for !hc-inrrprcwrion of 
p.<11t1grsph I o f Ankle VU (\\hi.::h requires thc.o\\1nc.rof S$hipregis.tcrod in a 
Co~:i rnacring Sime {O nuiint.'liti cc:rt.mn lin:incisl securi ty) in reltition to t..hips 
rcg~~tcd in the Republic . References int.he Con"'C·ntionto terri torial SCli tind 
exclusive eronomic zone s rc 10 be construo:I in a nl:3Uncs thtlt is oonsistc:nt 
\\' i i.h 11lC "'lsri tinte Zoflo."* At•t. 1994 (Act No. 15 elf 1994). 
3.7 t :lousc> 7 dc.'llS \\' itb d !lints f<lfcompCM!lrionunderthc. J>fO\.i sioM of the.CW il 
L i tlbiliry O>n..,-c.ntion. h eot1llrnts the High Courfs sd1nimhy j u risdi<.•tk>n in 
rclario1~ to S1~h pr<xx:edin~. 
3.8 c:1aasc> 8 dcsls with l imi t11ioo pr<X'ccdings uOOcr ihc provisi<ms of th<: Civil 
L iahility Convention thm arc.brought in the. High Cou.n. 
3.9 <.:taure 9 ~ dlC fi rst c b w;c of Ptln 3 of the. Bill. P!fl't3 deals \\1ith · •IJ)sumBCe 
Cc.nific:ite.s" . Mdthc.c lause.scck.~to define " Cii0\."'C.m1ncnt ship" sndcrnoouc. 
cc.rt.tiin references i.n the. CivJ Lisbiliry Convcotiontbst sre rclc.~nt to thm 
Psin . 
.3.1 OClaurc> JO ~-ks to ~cit}· to which ships. Psn 3 appl ies. Psn3 doc.s oo; spply 
to Govc.mn1cnt ships used f<r noo-oomnlCl'cial purpuses. 
3.l I c:tou~e II pmvid.::s for the. coforce.mcrn of insuroocc certi ficmc carriage 
rcquirentcntstsOO cst0blishc\ pcoolti~ for nOJH:onipliaflCe . 
3 .1 2 (..'/anser 12 and 1.1 <ksl v.ith nurttcrs n:.b ted t\l !he issue. vnlidify tind 
cnoccllotion of ccns in iosurarK'ett.rtificmes. and provide. for the functioos o f 
the Sooth Afric:in ?\la ritinlC Std'cty Authority (SA"'·ISA) i n tlW regard. 
3.1 3 C:tou~e 14 dctils \\ilh Govcmntcnt ships. For ships O\\'ncd by the. Stntc .• i t 
ti ll \)\\'S the lvUnister of Tr.JAS)X>n. "A' irh 1hcconsc,nt of the. ~·linister of Fin:inoc .• 
t\l i~c.u ceni ficute.s:ttl!i ng ih:i! lisbi l iticsundc.r the Civi l Li abi l i ty Convention 
will be nict by the $rote, t1Jld provitc;; for th.-' period o f \.'& lilirf and for tOO 
lti~ing of ccnificatcs of this Vind .. T bc clausietilso cn1bodie.stho:.Con"'C·ntion's 
rul es: ( in ~~roph 2 of Artic le XI) on sovetcign iminunity in relation to 





J.l.;IGlaurt 15 sec.~ r> allO\\' the l\ilinMc~ of 1'ranspon to nud;c rogulatioos. 
Rc.gulntions. fi xing fees stc tc<p.tircd to be nl:dc ''\\i th the oonscn1 of the 
~I inim r o f Finn nee . . 
3.1 5 <.:taure 16 seeks to CJlt.:".fd 1hc j urisdic'rionof ~19gistrstcs' Coons in matte.ts o f 
punishntc.M. 
3.1 '6 Clautt' 17 nnd 1he- Schedule de:d iAith: COffiC<JUC.Jlrital tinlC,Admc..cns .t<> th.-
"'lari.oc Po lluOOn{Control 3ndCivil L.iobiti ty) Act.. 19SI {Act l\1o . 6of 1981) . 
3.17 (:tanse 18 cOMtlins trnnsdrionsl pro•lisions. 
3.1 :S Clau.l'e 19 is :. S'f.snd!ttd pmviiion de~l ing "'id) d)c. s;h(:n tid:. nOO 
<'00lOlC'OCClllC01 of the Cll\.i~,S:cd A<-·L 
4. CONSULTATION 
1be- Bill \\'$ published OU 15 Ap ri l 2009 in (;hl tel?llllt-'nl C.Ot/!flt' f\.lo. 3210.l for 
oomntc.'1.i. 'l'hc Oc.purrnlCut o f 1'rsnspcm did no1 rccC:i.,·c :iny comn\Cll~. 1'bc. 
l.Xpsruncnt c.x.tcn~·cly ooffiul tcd"\\·l tb the f\1ution:il ·r raisu:ry fmn1 July 2009 to 
Oc-tob:r2012. 
5. FINANCIAi, lt\ilPLICATlf)NS l'(>RSTATJ-: 
1'herc. -a re- no fi ooncinl ilnplicsrions for rhc Sw11::.: the Bill J:.Wrantccs finooci:d 
soc'Urity for lisbility, snd conipc-nssrion. for los.sor d:1nu.gc csuscd bf ooot~nlinn· 
l'ion resulting front rhc. csctipc. ordisc.b.:lrgc <lf pcrsis.tc.nt o il front o il tMkcrs. 
6. PA"Rl~IA,...IENTAR\' PR()Cl<:OtJRE 
6.1 1·f'.(<, St!ltt- L!M' Advi:iz~ t1nd me OcpmtnlM1 n{TrMipon are of th!. opiD.ion 
thnt ih$ Bill nmst be dc:s'.lt " ' ith in .'ltx:ordancc \\ith ithe pr~dlitc cs.ttiblisho:I 
by so::tion 75 o f the Con:stituti<m since it oonmi~ no pm~·ision t<> \\'hich the. 
proco:lure sa out in so::tion 74 or 76 o f the CoM-tirutinn :ippli:s . 
6.2 1·oc- Stmc. Lm\' Ad\:iscrsareof tic.opinion tNit it is .no; necessary r> refer tt.is. 
Bill tnthc f\;mion-al Hou.~. o f 1'mdirioool LctidcrS in ta-ms o f so.ztion liJ( l':(aJ 
o f the. ' J'mdifioool Lc.:adcrshiptind \..ovc.ronncc. f:mnte\\'Ot'k ~·t. 20ll(Act No. 
41 o f 2<X>3). since i t docs: nc>t com.sin provisions ~-rttliniog I> cus.tonuuy In\\' 
or c~onts oftNdi tionnl comnlUllitics.. 
rtatld to)· (Web Coml1l.l!:IKC.~ 
ISBN 978'-1·77597·0.S 1-4 
163 
 
APPENDIX 2: MERCHANT SHIPPING (INTERNATIONAL OIL POLLUTION 




To eooct the-Int ernat ional ~britkne ()YJtanlzat ion Protocol f)of J91n to a nwnd the 
ln'te m at ioual ('..on,•entioeul on tht .. E .. :uablishn•ent of a n International f.'und for-
Conipensat ion for ()if l 'ollution Dan.age-of 18 Dece1ul>er l!n I into law; and to 
provide for- n.atters ron.ned.ed therewith. 
BE lT ENACl'ED by the Psrliamcn! of the Rc-pubtic o0f South Africts, !lS follows:-
Ot>finitions 
I. In th?£ A~. unless thecontexf iRd:icmcs othc:r"'i.sc. any 1nc.nni ngsscrih:':d to a \\'Ord 
orexprosion in the 199? Fund Con'll:ntion mu.~t be.flt Lhc. ntcaning sio aM:ribcd . .:ind- 5 
"Author-Hy'" nlCMS dleSoulh A frican ?vlaritimc Snfcty AU'thority cswblim.-:d by 
S«li on l{I) or ill< S<>uth Arri<>n M oritim< Safcy Amh<>ri'Y A«. 1993 {A<l No.S 
of 1998): 
.. ~linister .. means !!he rvUnistct o f Tmns:piITT: 
" the 1971 f<uod Crun-ention" mc.nn.s the. lmcmationeal. Convcmion on W 10 
E~ttlb tishmau of :in lntcmatioool Fund for O il Pollliri<m D.:ilM!-"C. 1971 done m 
Brussels on 18 Doccmbc-r 197 1: 
.. the 19112 fund Co1n ·e otion .. me:ins Artid es I to 36 q11inq.ul~l'Of thc 1971 Fund 
Cbn\'<!-Btioo m amended by t~ 1992 Piotoool and rofcno:I to i n p.'ll'agtsph 2 of 
Anicle27of thc. 1992 Prot<:1col: IS 
" the 19112 P rotocol!• me-Ms the lnt~tioilial t>.·tsri timc Orgttniz.arion Prou:icol of 
1992 to nntc-td the lntem:itionsl Coo•..-cn1ion oo the. Est.sbl"ishntc-nt of an 
lntc.roo.tion:il F\tnd t:Or Oil Pollution Drunsgc of I & Oc«:ntbcr 1911-
(a) nppro,,.cd on 2..'l 0:-tobcr 1997 by dr, Nation.'11 Asscnlbly MCI on IS Mt1rch 
1999 by the. Ns:rioool Council of Provi.oo:.sns is rcquiro;i by SOCfion 211(2) of 20 
the Cons.tirution of dr. Rcpublk of SouthAfrk.s. 1996; nnd 
(bJ published for gencnil infonnmion u.nck.r Notice ~). i .5"J4 of 1(()9 in G<1: . .e11e 
N<~. 3272.1 o f 20 No..,x-mbcr 2009: 
" the. l<'und .. mcnn-; the l crtc.mation31 Oil R>Uution Comp•cn.-.:ition Atnd. 1992. 
oonblis:ho:t by Arti<.•lc2 o f t.he. 1992 Fund Con,,.entioo; and .25 
" tbisAct'" inclu<h anf r~ulati9n m{t;k. ill tcrn\S of SCX'tiQO 11. 
F..mctnwnt of J91n P rotocol into law aod i.ote r pretat loo 
.2. ( I ) Subjca to this A.ct the 1992 Protocol hns: thc. fbK'C·<lf l~w in the Re.public. 
(2) For rhc. purposes of psmgr.spb (cl)(i) and (ii) of Article 3 of the 1992 Fund 
.Convention nnd.i.n so fttr .ss it relsrs to the Republic. the re tCn-ncc to the t~-rritoria l s..:.s .lO 
nmst be con~d ss n reference. to the tc.n·i tori!l l waters of the Republic r<fctred to in 
s.xtion4of thclvlurit imcZonc<i Act. 1994 ( Ac.t No. IS<>f l~). 
(3) For thepwposcs <if par.aguipb(a)(ii) of Artide3of t.hc 1992 FundConvc.ntioonnd 
in so fur as it rch1tcs tor.he Republic. the rc.fctcncc to thc.exclusi"cc-.·onon\ic .zollC nru.st 
Qc.construcd as 11 re fcrcnoCc r> the.exclusive ccooontic m1~ofthc Rcpubli~ within the JS 
ntcaning o f sc<.'t"ion 7 of "thc t>.'ls.ritimc Zones Act. 1994 (Act No . 15 o f 1994). 
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(4) r"<>rflepurpnscsof thisAct. the E·ngl i s.h i::.xt <)f the 1992 Ptut>ool pte".:ails fort~ 
pu:rp1l'>Cs: of imc.rpretition. 
(5) '1'0C- ~linister m:iy by noi-iec. in: the COZ1!1t~ publ ish for gcn:.-.rnl infbmuirion any 
clHll't.!;:<$ l»tlde v the 1992 Fund Con.,'CJlti»n under Ankle 3 .l o f the 1992 Protocol if 
thcxsc.chnngcs are binding on !he Republ ic in tcrnttof ~ction131 of thc.Coo.c;.tinl!ioo o f 5 
the Republ ic o f Soq'ih A fries, 19%, 
Act binds S tate 
J. This Act binds thc.ScateMdc .... cry<irsoo of stmc comempkJtedins-cction 239 o f the. 
,COOSJi rution of the Republ ic of Sou lb Af rica. 1996. 
Applirotlon of Act 
4. This Ac.t nlso sppl ics t> the Prince EdwtirJ lslsnck refencd t\> in section I of the 
Prince Ed\\':lr.d ls land>Aa. 1948 (Aa f\'o. 43 o f 1948). 
1~1 ca.pa.city o f fluod 
S. The Pund is hereby ra-ogoiscd llS a j uristic person. 
6. 1'hc Oit<X.'tor of the Fuod Is hereby rocogniscd as the lcg:d reprcsc.M!lfi"'C of the 
l'Uod. 
Authority maf request 'li wid thr assistance. 
7. Forthcpu1posc.sof _p.<s.mgroph7 of Article: 4of the 1992 Fund Convention. a request 
10 
15 
:i>y the Authority to the Fuod for s~ist.'lntt- ()(llltcmplatOO i n 1.1\:it psrsgrn,pb. nmst tx: 20 
re.s,snkd 11s n to:pcs.t by !the Republk . 
Jurisdiction of Hi~b (;0o1.1rt 
8. The. High Coon o f ,South Africs c.xerc·i s:ing its «hnirnl ty j urisdiction under 100 
AdmiNihy J urisid:ktioo R.cgulmi on Act. 1983 (Act f\'lo. IOS of 1983). hssj urisdiction. 
iocludingj lll'Miction for a ll i ocidcnrol purixJSC.s..10 hearaOO d:tcmtinc cln ims agttit\Sl '2S 
the-Fund fhr ()(>mpenssrioo unclcr Arri<: le 4 o f the 1992 Fund Convention. 
f'und n1ay iot~n'ene Im pmceediols u.oder T\tle.~h.ant $b4>pin~ (Ch·U Li3bilitf 
Con\'entloo) Act . 2013 
9. The Fund n\Sy intc:r-..'CJlC. in procccdinp; for <.'Ontpcn~io11 under Psn 2 or' the. 
lvlctchMtShipping (CivU Li.ability Com:<!.Btion) Act. 201.l. 30 
10. lo tiny lcg.!!I prot~cdi~ involving the Funcl. thc.·ntc.• .. rc production ()f a ccnifi~ 
true copy of - . 
{a) nrty dorumcm i ssued by llrt or.g~ o f t bc. Fund: or 
{bJ nny <!-ntl)' in or extrnct ftom ooy'documcnt in rhe custody of the r1!nd. J5 
nn1S1bc rcpd::dn.ss.1tffic iCJK cvidm:oc of the. foci thatthc.dot.unlCM w3sso issued o r is 
under the custody of the Fund. unlcs.~ evidence. to d)c. comr.uy is .'.ld:tuccd. 
Regulations 
I I. ( 1) The. r. .. 1 inistcr n1ay mtlkc regulatioos--
(ttJ gi.,.·ing: eft'o:I toAtticlc Rof 'thc 1992 FundC01n·cnt~>n; 40 
(bJ fixing foes 10 be psid in rcspcc1 o f any m .• "(ftCt nri s.in.g: fmnl the: :ippl ;.::atioo or 
Attic le 8 of the I W2 Fund Con~'Cntion: .:ind 
(eJ rcgmdi.ng nny wci l lt•y or ioci<k:.ntttl &:lminiMrncivc <)t pmccrluml n1~cr th!d 
it i~ nccc:ss:uy '° pr.::scribe for rhe ptopc.r iniplcmc,nrn1ic>.nor adn1i.nism1<ioo or 




(2)Anf r~"Ubri91l fi xi ng fo:s nm.st be. msdc w i1h thc.coocurrc<iK'C of t.he 1\1inister of 
r:irl:'ll\CC·. 
~hort title and cOJumto.t'enumt 
12. This Act is cnllcd d\c. t-•lerch:imShippins;{lntcmmional O il Po llution Con1p:-ns:i 4 
rio.n 1'100) Ac·L 2013. snd t:ikcs d ro:t on .11 d:ltc fixed b:r· .the Prcsi ck.l'tf by pmclrunmion .S 




MEMORANDIJM ON THE OBJECTS OFTllE ~mRCHANT 
Sill PPll"G (IN'TERNATIONA L OD. POLLlfflON COMPENSATION 
FUND) BILL, 2013 
I. PURPOS~; (W BILL 
The Bill sccksto<!-n:tcr the l ntcrootioool f\'l ttriti.nlC0Jt.'lni7iltion Protocol <lf I 992to 
11mend rhc lntc.mmion:il Con•..-cntioo on the: Es.!!!blishmc1uclf tin lntcmt11ioool Fund 
tbr Co1npcns:ation for O il Pollution Dmntigc. of 197 1 (the F!Ulld Con•lcnrion) into 
b w. 1bc Bill fortn.~ JX!n of ti ·pai:kagc. o( lltc:iSUT\°$ <k.signcd to give dfo::t to the. 
Rcpub lic"s oblig.tiOO ns under the FundO>nvc.mion Mdtbc lnrm:rtionsl ?vlaririmc 
Org~.nlz:11ion Protocol of 1992 10 nmc.ncl lhc. lntcrn:irioool Con•.-cn1ion on a"·il 
Li® il i ty for Oil Pollution O!lnuagc. 1969 (the Civi l Linbil ily Convc.nrion). 
~rliamcn1 hat nlre.edy .rq>pmvcd the. rwo prot>ools u nclc1 :scction 231(2) of the. 
O>nsrinnion o f t.he. J:~cpubl ic o f South Africa, 1996. The fu ll p&.'.'kal,'C ioclud:s th.-: 
Bill a cxl the-
• f\·lerchtlnt Shipping (Civil Lisbiliry Convrotion) Bill, which give.~ clf~1 to the 
Civil Litbili ty Can.,-cntion: 
• f..,lcrekim Shippi~ (lntc-rootiooul Oil Pollution Con1pcnsatiQn Fund) Conrribu~ 
rim!$ Bill. which is n nmnc.y Bill oontcntpl.oto:I in ~iion 77 of thcC()(l:S.'titutioo.: 
Md 
• f..,lcrekim Shippi~ {lntcrootio11:tl Oil Pollution Con1pcns.uion l~nd) Adntini s.· 
mirion Bill which dci1ls wiih the. alntiois:untivc nisncrs o f the nmnc.y Bill. 
2. (~IVll .. LIAJULIT\' ANO FUND C()NVl':NTl(>N$ 
2.1 'The Civil LfobiJi~y snd Fund Conventions '"'Cre.nck)j)lc<lund:::tt~ .nMpiccs of 
thc. lmem!ltional ~·foritimc 01.gsninition. They cbl withquCSfjons of lisbility 
nnd contpcn~ion tht loss ordiim:lJ>cc.nusOO by ront:t1niootionrc.sulriog front 
thc.c-sc.:IJX! or dis.-h:lrgc of p::isistem oi l fro in tsnkcrs(i~ .. shi'J.'$ ocmsnictOO or 
ndtlptcd tbr the car'li"l.'C of oil in bulk ~cargo). 
2.2 Under the. Civi I Li.ability Conv<!.m:ion c laim:ints .nrecutitkd 1> oontpcn!Wion 
f rom the tcgisurcd shipowoor (or the. provi::lct Qf finooci s l security for the. 
shipo\\'nct's lis.bility) for 1x>lhnion ililmagc sutfcro:I intbc. 1c.rri1uy {including 
tcnic riol sea) Ot exch~vc c(ooontic zone of .n COMJreting State, The 
s.hipowna"s l id>i li ty is strict {only l imited excntptioos nnd &:fences ttrc 
avtiib ble). but this l fobi l i ty is subject to 611tiro1ion in aocord:!ncc with the 
provisions o r th.- Civil Lisbili1y Convention. \Vhcrc lintittsrion applies. th.' 
shipowner ·s l it.bil iry is dctemtitx:d with tc.fc.tc-ncc t> the l>ll:fl3gc. o f the ship 
CC)l'ICC.ffiCd. 
2.3 \Vhetc.:ist:he Ovil Liabilii:yCoovcn0011C$tsblishcs :aOO rc,gul3k\~ the lisbility 
or the registered s.hi·1x>wncr. the Fund Convention csttlbl ishc.s sn i o1c:roo.rioool 
rund. c.nllcd the;. 11\t<rn:ttioMI O il Pollution Compcn~on (IOPC) Fund. the. 
purpose of \\'hith is to p:iy oompensnrion to "ictims of poUuficm dsnwge 
( \\it.bin the mcsning o ( t.hc.Civil Lisbili!y Convc.nfion) ·where fhcy bsvc beat 
unWlc tooburin con1pcns.."1tion. or con1pcns.i1ritm in full.. un<kr the provisiont 
of !he Civi l Li;(t)>ility Convention, The IOFC Fund re«:ivcs its furxk froin 
Ctlfl>'() owncn. spcci6::nUy fn)m p::rsonswho receive MnU::ill f . in the pons or 
tenniBSI i.nstrill.tirions of the C<:i!ltrocting Swtcs. ntorc: nun 150.CXX> toooc.sof 
cootriburi i:tg oi I.. TOC. tow I amount of com p:n~iOJ\ ptl)'8.blc. by roc I OPC Fu1KI 
in tcs."pec·iof tin iocicbttN ('Utrontl)• S OR 20JOOO @(:%.ZAR J.04 bil lioo)~. 
1' his :1moun! includes lhc cont~ns.:irion p.'l id by the shipowner or the 
shipowner's i nsurer uncl:r the C ivil Liobitity Convcnric>n. 
• 1 SDR (Sp:ci;d !Nro.•ins R's~): Z.AR 15.0l.S200 ( '"Ale an 6 Jt;1n.: 2013·~, 1111(':/llo·n~•:imf<>(Jj 




2..i Bccsusc. ihc Fund Convcmion is supplcmcntazy to the Ci•;i l Li:ihiliiy 
Con ~-cntion. ns:1'tte.c:iooot bc:conic, n p:in}' to th:: Fund O>nvcBtioo without. ut 
the sti.mc time. :ilso tx:ooming n p arty to the.C ivil Lisbi lity Convcntioo. 
3. SU1'4 "'°1ARY 01-· Bii.L'S PR()VISI()~ 
3.1 (.,'louse I i$ a s1t1ndiird provision mm <kli oo.~ tertnin '.\a<k ti.rd cxprc,c.sions. 
l '" Clt1Use 1 $X.b to enact the I~ nd.Coo\.-cntion iDto lnw. It nlso pro,•idcs for the 
i.ntcrprewtion o f references in the l:Und Convention to t>rritorisl scti :ind 
cxclush:c ccon.:>mic ronc. in a nmnncr t.OOt is cons.i$1c nt "ith the ~·lteritimc 
Zones Act. l<»-1 {Acl f\'o, IS o f 1994). 
3.3 l'laute 3 i$ .!l S'Ullldtird provision dctil ing '.\' itb me·coocamcnt's t1pplict1rion to 
the St.t1tc and ils o rgsns . 
.3.4 l Jaure 4 seeks to <:.'tr.Id the npplicmion o f the Act 1'!> d~ Prince l?.d\\-std 
lsltin~. a:;; provi\kd for in S«'fion 4 o f the Prince Edwsrd L"SlnOO:i Ac1. 1948 
{Act l\'o. 4:l of 1948). ln terms of SC(.'tion 4 :in A'-"t of P!1rl iamcnt <k>cs not 
.npply to the Prince Ed1o1iogrd lsloldi. unk ss by Slli'h Ac;i it is ex.pr~cd so to 
apply. 
35 Clauses 5 and 6 so.-:.1; to ~vc clt·o::.t to p:irugmph 2 of Anic lc 2 of the Pund 
Convention. T!his psr.1grnph requires Convacting Ststcs to recognise the 
IOPC Fund.nsil lcgal person under their ln\\s-and toreoog:nise the Diro::torof 
the Fund :as the Fund's legal rcprcscowtivc. 
3.6 (.,'louse i seek.~ to cnipowcr the Sooth Afrie:in Mn ri ti1nc &ik -ty Authori ty to 
t<xJUC:S.1 :issis.ttlflo: on bch!ilf of th.' Gi>vcrnmc.nt ftom the IOPC Fund f<:ir th.' 
purposes of tc~ing:to ·nny pollution iocidcnt intapoctof whkh the Pund 
nwy be C!i llod upon to pay coni_pens41rion. 
3.7 Ctaure S sppl.ics to c lnims fc» con1pensarion ngtii flS! the IOPC Fund. It 
confi rms W High Coon's ad1niml ty jll.TMiction in: rol :ition to such 
procccdin~. 
l.8 Clause 9 g ives eftCct to p:irogrtipb4 o f A.Jttlc 7 of the FuOO Corwcl)tion. This 
p.<itngr~h allovl's the IOPC Fund to imc,rvMC'. in proce<rlinp; brought under 
Attic le IX of lhe Civi l Li:ibility Con\''Cntion. 
3,9 Cla11re JO de31s with the Wtl)' i nwhic'bce.rurin documcrM!try cv'1coce ntt1y be 
produced in lc.,i;ul yroco::din~ invol.viJtg the IO PC Fund. 
l .! OC/aus" JI seek~ u wthorisc rhc ~·linistcr o f Tr.insp:>n to make ccntiin 
regul3tioos:. inrer alit1 to give c.lfcct 10 Artkb 8 of tlhc. Pund Con"'Clltion. 
(Artid c: & dc.sl$\\'i th1h.'. nununl recognition Md enforccmc.mof judgntcntsin 
Contrncring SUltes.) Rcgulntions fixing fo::.s nrc to be nt:lde \\ith the 
concunc.noc. of d'le ~lj ni:i.te.rof Fironcc. 
3.l I Cltru~e 11 is :i st.sndntd provision dc~l ing ~~d) d)c s;h(:irt tirb nOO 
<.'ommcncentcl'IT of thc.cnvis:ag:edA<...'l. 
4. (:ON~ULTATl(>N 
The Bill wnS publisbcdin Ga:e11e No 32094 d:ird 9 April 2X>09. Comments were 
re<.'Ch'Cd fro1n Tm~DCt. Shell .:ind the South Arricw .Pc.u-olcum lndum-i~ 
Auocimioo (SAPIA). Ttx: !Xp!ll'tmc1u cxr.nsivc.ly consulr:cd IA'idl the. Nari>Ral 
'lie:.rury front Ju.ly 2009 to October 2012. 
5. l"INA!\1<;1AL 11'-IPl,ICATl<)NS FOR STA1'E 






APPENDIX 3: SYDNEY DRAFT AND COMMENTARY  
BILL 
To eooct the. lnfem:ukula I ~latitilne (h~anizntlon Protocol of 19'n to auwnd fhe 
lnte11lat-ional Co1n't'.ntioil on Ch·iJ Liability for ()JI Pollution Oanl .. of 
lCJ No,'t'mbe.r 1969 into J a.w~ and to pro,·ide for •:natters con1:iec·ted tbere-.vlth. 
BE 11' ENACTED by the P:ir tiantc.nt o( the Republic of South Af rica rs follows:-
ARRAN<.:F~U:NT ()f SECTIONS 
I. Dcfini ti~ 
PART I 
INrRODIJCTORY PROVISIONS 
2. l:.n:rtmcnt or 1~92 Protocol iBto b w 
3. Act binds Smte 
Appl ictirion of Act 4. 
5. PublicMion o f list of it:iio; to \\'hich 1992 Lfobility Convcotioo tipplics 
PA!tt 2 
(;()~IPE~ATIPN 
6. Coostructb nof ttl'Uiin provis~Hlttnd rcl'crcnccs in 1992 L i.abilily Convention 
5 
10 
7. Cls ims lht 001npoo:Hl'!ion 15 





11. I nsum.ncccc.rtific.:i tCi to be curried on cc.n:iin shi~ 
12 . lssucofi n.wrancx: ocniticstcs 
13 . Extension. ct1nccll'!ltion nnd lnps.in.g of itm11oocc ttnifict1tcs 





REC0CNl7.JNG 11 IAT CoaS1•.I Srn1cs sh•ll "'" 
unrcasonabJ)' expose ncighbourin1t St:ucs or the 
ro1nmon ltigl1 l>C~s arei to tl1c risk of damage LO 
1..1.ielr envfrofunent -as the resulL of action or 
in.nction with re>J>CC'I to Offshore Units, Artificial 
Islands nnd !~elated Appuncn~1nces. 
HAVE AGREED AS ~"OLLOWS: 
AKIIC:LE I 
.Oe fin iti o.ns 
I. I For 1 he purposes of 1his Con .. 'Clltion: 
(iJJ "ArLificht.1 lslanJ" shall m~an a pe1roanen1 
instullluion or s1n.1c1ut(! rigid!)' affixed to 1ht: tiCl.l 
bed and used or inrendcd (or use for E.c:onomic 
t\('t.ivi1io, including wcUhe.t.d.s and a.ssociau~d 
equiptnent, but shalJ n<>I inc.~ude fpipe.li1u:s] or 
iost"Jl:Ltions fo1·n,e<l frotn n<lll1r11I dredged 
mi:11crial$ or fill of na111r.al o rigin. 
(b) .. CoasuJ State" diaU me:an 1he S1:uc Part}' 
\vhich <;xcrciS<.-s rights und~r the U11ited 1\ 'a1h111 
(.011ve11uo11 on the Luo of the Seo, 19$2 
("UNCLOS") ror t ile purpose of c:xplori~ ror 
u.od exploiting cl1e resoutces of lhe seabed aod its 
subsoil in 1he 11re.1 in or above \\'hich the Offshore 
Uni1 i.11 siauucd. 
(c} .. Continental Shelf'" 11:.ts the meaninp, 
pnwi<led io UNCLOS. 
(d) 11Economic t\cti\'ilics" s.haU mean the 
expl<>rution. exploiuuku\, pl'O<.'~"i:ing or storage or 
h)'dtocatbons 1&n<l nliner:o.1 resources of 1hc seabed 
or it!'i subsoil. 
(c} 11Ex<'luslve T::cononllc Zooe"' has the rne.anlng 
1)ro\1ided in lJNCLOS. 
(f) "Licence- shall mean :i liccnre., concession, 
pl!l'tllit or other oulhoriiation issut-d b)' u Couslal 
S11ne ror Economic- 1\crivities. 
{g) "Llre!l.$(-'t"" shall i1)C(udc ll holder d a liccn<.'t' 
or 3ny pC1'$-0n or rol'poratklll wi1h ~ righr to :a 
licence. 
(bJ "Offshore Unit'" shall mean :tny Struc:1urc of 
wl1att'\1cr n:uu1-e \\• l1ci1 nol pcananentJy fixc..xl into 
the""' bed whid> 
(i) is c11p:.lblc of moving or being moved \\rhilc 
f1Q:1ting in or on \\ra1er, \\•hc:ther or 00 1 
attac:hc..-d to the scu bed during open1tions, 
:tnd 
(ii) is used or intended for use in Eooflomic 
Aclivitie:J; and 
( j jj ) incJudcs units used or intrndcd ror USC in 
LlH'.: 11cco1umododon of person.lld and 
equipment rd:u.cd lo 1.hc activitiei described 
in this paragraph. 
<i) "Offshore Unit \X'orker"' shaU n1'-"<1n any 
1>ci:-.son co1ployt:d or engaged in rontnl t lltitl 
ac1ividcs in wh:nt<:'\"Cr cnp:lci1y in the: opcr:nkm of 
<'In Offshore Unit or Anificial Island. 
(j> "Offshore Uni1 Occupon1" sh11U inc Jude any 
n:uural person onboard :tn Offshore Uni1 or 
Artificial bf and ror auy lawr ul pu1Jl0St'. iodudin~ 
an offshore unil \vorlter. 
(k) "Q\\incr" shall in"ludc 1hc O\vncr. lessee ilnd 
opcrnror of an (>ffshorc Uni1 or Artificial Island~ 
(1) "Poll1u:1n1,. sh~1U mc11n rhc escape of "ny 
subst:tncc or the application of any energy or 
proc('Ss \Vhic:h is delcrcriuus 10 tbc marinf 
t'il\•i1'0JlOie11L 
(m) "Petroki..1m .. diall mean a hydrocarbon of 
narunJ origin. 
(n) "R.clntcd A1>1>ur1cnanccs" shall ind1Jdc 
sirucrurc<i o r insr:ill:uions a&soc:i:ttcd ,,.;1b r\rcifici~LI 
lslancls o r OfTsho~ Unil!i llnd which are used or 
iulenck<l for ~ \vith n:Spt"Ct to a<.1ivitlts andJlitry 
to Eoooo1nic 1\cr.ivicics or in rekucd Ofrshore 
Occi1panr t1«0mmodi:ition, 




2.1 Thi.., C<.)nvcn1ion ap1>lics to :tU Offshore Unit..,, 
Anifidal lslan<ls and Rdated i\ppurtcn1ulCl'~'i used 
or intc:ndcd. for use ln the Exclusive Econontic 
Zone and adjac:e111 ~a"'·ard Continental Sbdr to 
tbc exti:ut ~· St!!h! J>11rl)' ma)' execdsc fl1nctio.-uJ 
jurisdiction over such Conlinenu1I Shelf 
c;onsis1cndy \\tith UNCLOS. 
2.2 State Parties to this C.onvcnti<.'n may cxtCfld 
that applitatiun C>f Ll1i~ Conv~ution or parts 
thel'eof to cbeit Tetritot·illl Sea ot• lnteenu.1 \Va1ers. 
2.J This ConVtutiC>n exu.~n<ls to Artifkiul llil1111d.s 
Ol' cornponenss thel'oof \\'bile ln ltMSit frocn A 
p!occ cf OOO$tfllCTion 10 i.tn intended place of 
inS1allation, in tr.tnsi1 bct\\'ttn intended places of 
in5'allation, and whi.lc iu lhe process of brinA 
sillvagt'd ur tt111u\-al, un1il sud1 ci111c as tl1cir 
clcmcrns lll'C brought into land tcrritOJ}' or are 
orhcrwi.se lawFnll)• dis1)oscd of. 
2.4 [Possiblcc\!l('OSion of gpplktttioo <:f Co.nvencion 
ro new ta:hoologics e.g, se:ihcd i1qu11cub.urc, offshore 
rommcrci:tl sateUi1.c Jauncb facitty.) 
AKnet.H ru 
0~1nerllh i1> 
J. I Offsbon: Units.. r\ rLific:.iu.I b;J,u1ds aod Rel11led 
AppllrtC.'O~lllctS sh11ll hitve owner.;hi1> ci1.ht"r in 
accord~ncc '''ith the: l~nv ot' the S1:1rc P~flY in 
\\illosc ter.ritorial \\':H.crs 1he)' :lrc loc.ucd, or in 
accordance w ith this Convention. 
3.2 E\'<."I)' Offshore Unit, Anific: i~LI l!iland and 
Relnl<-xl Appurtenancl-'S sh~ll he owned: by u 
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Jt1nsuc cn1ny or cnu11C$. being o ne or it 
t."()mbintciClf'I or. a l'hllUhll Or legal person Or by it 
S11tta Party 10 ,hiii (()nVt;n1ion. 
3.3 E\ier}' Stott" P11rty'' lit"' sh'll provide for ruld 
recognii<' owncr11h1p in1crcs1:s in Offshore Unhs, 
Artificial lsl•n<h or Rel•1"'1 Appunenan<es 
located in us r:,<'Ju,i\·C" Economi< Zone <'Ir 
...... ..ro odjac<n1 Cocm,,..nal Shelf. 
)A E•-.ry Si"• Pmy·, 1.-. shall p!O\·ick f<>< •nd 
rerogruze rij:h1> o( 1nirufttof °"'nership 0< use of 
Offshore Uni1.s. Anaficilll l'll.-nds or R('l11rcd 
Appurtenancd 
3.5 All Of(.,ho~ Unnt to \l.•hich this Canvcn1ion 
u.pp]ie:i shalJ h.1vi: 11 natioouUt)'. 
AM flCLE I\' 
Regi1tr•Llon 
..JJ lbis Arlidc appllc; to t.ll Offshore- Uni1~ 
cxccpr 1.hose V.'hdc: in 1C1ual use in Sia:e P211ics' 
tc:n:irori:tl sea or 1n1cmal ..,·at.as. 
-42 Staie P;ama shall by 1hcir nations.I 1 ..... 
pnJl\ridc for the- rq:isantion J O'll'DC'f'Sh.ip and 
mortgage interac1 an (>tfshore Units -and 1hctr 
Rd:ucd Apput1en;1nco. 
..JJ S1.:11e ParUtli sh:1U not pcnnit the U!iC in 1hcir 
Exclusive Ecooomk Zonc11 or seuwar<l udj.lren1 
rondncn111I sh<'lvcs: of unrcg.li;1crcd (Ir 'Suudcsii' 
Offshore Uni1s, 
4.4 Propncc.ary rights In (.>ffshorc Units fand 
Rebued Appurtm.rnce>) •h;JJ be p........00 by 1h1> 
Con\•cnuon and by 1hc fw· of 1hc Suue Pariy 
"b""' Ibey.,.. rq;dacml. 
-45 Each St;atc Pitn) dw.11 1..tt nccesul') 
rot'CiU n.>:i. to etbure that Of'f.WO«' U Us it c-oten in 
hs rcgjsitt h.;11\c ~'n('l"t or opcr.nnrs w·ho '"' 
~ffectivdy i<l1..'l'ltifi~blt' ror dx.· putp0$e o{ ensuring 
their full 11a:ounr11lnli1y. 
4.6 &:cog.l'lilion (u1J e11rorc~inen1 of rights or 
ownership 1lntl sccurhy intcl't'SlS!'lhall be governed 
by iJ,.. J;w of 1hc rl>J: S1•1e Pony. 
-L7 An ln1cmalion11J R~istcr rcrordinJt :aU 
Of&hort" Uni1t tu which Lllit Com·mtioo 1pplk"t 
may be csublishcd in 1ttoniancc .... ith Anicle 12. 
On iis .....bllihmc•n. lhc Rc,imtt ih.n r=nl an 
Offsbort Uni1s .Jenu1). ll"I "°d °"'"er. The 
Rqtis1cr sh11U •ho record mo«,;::11t.cs and 
h)1>0th<n Ori Ofr.Jio"' u ..... ·ni.: Rqj"or "''" 
require, and be enlidcd tu record • .suf6cien1 
lnfomlation conc1;rnu1.i lhC' ickntit)' of owncn 
und holden; or n1nr1wi~C§ und hypothecs w en:ible 
tJu.•jr iclcnlity and don1icilc 10 be known. 
-t8 Upon cxcrc.i!lin~ thdr responsibaitics w1der 
par.t,graph -4.2, llu.: Rt~llrit'!\ of St:.t1e J>~ sh<tn 
traosmil a.II ffqtiut")' inf(lonn~tion on (){[...bore Uni1s 
under their fl"lr? 101hc ln1cmalJOOal ~S1cc. 
' 
4,9 •rhc rn1cm:llional Ht:glo;;rcr sh.di be loc~tcd in 
r Aberdeen, United Kingdom). 
AJITIGLI.!\! 
Alortgagcs. Llms and Croo:itQt'•' Rantdics 
Ator1.gq" 
'-1 An Offshore Uru1 land llda1.d 
Appuncn~] n1.ayfonn 1he~ubJe<tt.i •~uy 
ant.,'tat by • ·Jlo oC .morr~ or h~lJOlht-..: . 
'.2 Sliltc P.ut.its .Jaa.I i.n1pkt1k41'!l and 111iJrnintS1~r 
R.'tlblnes for mongoges 0< h)poih<a of Offshore 
Units riancl Rdi:ited Appuncn.anttal. 
Ucn.!I 
,,) 'l'hc following cbims: upon ()f1'11horc Uni1.s 
(1u1J Hcl.u1cd AppurLenancc:s 1 ~hull be Sc:C\Jrcd bv 
1n11rhu11e Liens: 
(11> loss uf Jifc or pcnutu.l injury to Offi-horc Unit 
0.."t:upant.ll or ar1&ing from Opt'nlhetn of OOahore 
Unh• (and Rela1ed Appuntnlllltti); 
lbl <Wms of Offshocc Unii \X'ori:cr> lor wap:s 
and .oo.t bcncfj.,, 
(c, Ql\~c; 
fc:ll 1oniou:s or Jdictu:&.l ph)'siaJ ICllS&. in Jim:t 
0011UCCliOll with tbt opio:natiuu ur 111.1vi1tlltlUl1 o( 'he 
Ofl•ho"' Unh. 
Cl'4.!di1~ra:' Rem.edits 
''°' Liens under par~raph }.) $hitll hA\'c 1>riori1y 
oi.·1.-.,. i>t-gi&u:tt.-d rocu:tgages or h>·pcid1i,.'{~, 
' ·' Among 1hcrnscl•·«. iqiilrml monP!l<' °' 
hypoclxn :ill.JI h"'"' pnnri1y occordin~ 10 choir 
rittkol~~ 
' ·' ~ chcrnsch..-s, 6cn< rttOllllL.al br ibis 
("',on\"Cftti-On sh:..11 b:l\'t' priorit·y 11tt0rdinM; to thci.r 
1i,.1n~ m p.m1gr.ph 5J . 
(cx<:cp' 1 lu.t cl.uims secured by liens undc:r 
porll.JJNl)ll! '.3 (11) anJ (b), which A •'<~c l.kfore an 
<.'lrC\lrt\!flCC gh•ing rise lO II elai1n (or 1mlvt\~C ithall 
mnk bc:Jo"'' the clain1 S<-"C'1red hy i uch lic:n f<1r 
J11lv11~e) 
,.7 \\'.'here a n'IOftgai,-ee, ltcn hokkr. or othtr 
tf'l-ditor «-xttcises posse~I'). s•li: Of other 
~ .,;ainst an Offsho~ Uni., i1 sh.JI .wmc 
lh< obl11l"l""'5 o( die 0.·rltf of ouc:h unn. as 
ptmldccJ 1n ch.is Con,·cnuoo. fmm 1hc time N 
t11kl"-~ion or: c:on1n)) cJ 1hc Ot'fsho~ Unh 
,,8 P'olt~n.ph '·7 shall not be in1crprctcd .ts to 
hn1~e J1QbiJit)' UJ)Oll Such cn:dilOr (or l4CU or 
(lfl1 i:1sion- of rhe 0\\1netS, or or p,·1wns fur whQSt 
QCI! nr •>n1issions 1hc O\\'ncr i<\ IC)l,:llly rct1,1>011slhlc, 
\\'hich occurred be(ore che crcdi1or txe-ici.sed lhe 
ft'mc'<lict rt:ft"rrcd to in 1 heo J'>l'C«<IJn>t p"r•~r11ph. 
, ,9 A pc:n;on a.c;scninA a rmled)' llrish~ (rom the 
ri1t1111 pruo.idal for in this Anick Ul•)' 1MCrt that 
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right by mcull j: or Ul' f't~I ('If :an Offs.horc Unn only 
if. gr lhe tin1c or arrcllr, the Offs.IK>l'C Unii is nt1t on 
loouion (or 1ht' purl)c.'16c or cnp.aging in &onon1ic 
Acthities. 
5.JO\X1hc-n an Off,horc Unl1 ls on bc-arion for 1hr 
l>'W'J"OSe of eil1;taJ!1n,, in Ecoooollc Acri,-,tid, a 
J>erson may tiS<'f'I • remedy •nung from 1M righ1s 
p?O\i<kd fnr in po_.,phs ,. I or ,.l by• .,..hod 
ocher 1'""1 """' I" Al1<n*< Rem<dy"I. 
, .llSuch J\lt<m•I< Rem<ely N) b<oneof 
f11) a ckm:anJ that dw: OA11cr ~bail or Sl!Cltrit) 
up to the lesM:r (I( th~ value of the cJainianr's 
rea~n~bly 11rg11.1blt IX'\'.l '~~ or 1he v;1lue Cl( 1he 
Of&hore Unit; or 
(b ) the rt""gi.s1n11io11 or It /is pcr1Jc11s or cau1inn or 
strnil.tr rt.i;b1mblc ch11.~~ in lhe Flag Stutc Party 
reg.is.er <'f the Off~ht'rt Unh 
All"KJ..£ \ '1 
a.;1 Juri.d;ruon 
6.1 Each Smc: P•ny h.s a gcnmJ rigln of 
.-.guls.""' of Of&"°"' Uniu. lutillcial bland. 
1Wd Rd...trtl Appurte'fWnccs wutun tts krriton11I 
v.--:itcrs, E.xch.tsi\•c Economic Zone- and se-.tward 
udjaa."nt Conti11e:i1t111I :,hdJ 111c:sc ngb1:1 mu:st be 
exercised with rcttnl'J 10 t.hc ri,ghLS of othc..'1' S1.t11e 
Partic.'ll nnd the 1,.'01nn1011 111~. 
62 Staie Pur1b shi•U 01t:1hli.i;h u compeccnl and 
adcquale Mllnini:ur<11ion fur t1le pu~ of <:an)•in,.: 
ou1 their OOhj:prinns under ibis Corn'Clltinn. 
6.} Each Staie P•n)· th.t1J ensure that ils Coun.s 
possess Jr nc<'CSJaty rwuchcuon to dottm.inc 
riglus and claimf ari<int: from oub;cas ro.....d h)' 
this \..om-cn1ion, in(ludin@: ntth1S and daims 
Wing from u.as or omi!sions in the Tcrritori:1I 
Sc. the Exdulli\'e ~c:onomic: Zone :mJ se-.aw.ard 
:ldjacrn1 Conrinen1.d Shdf. 
6A ExctJ"M 11S pmvitlcd in p1&mgraphs6.5 and 6.6, 
Panies 3.tld le~-1 1 pcrlloni; cn~_ged in the 
0\l"Oen.hip o r npcr111ion or Of&hllrC Unit!I, 
Anificia.I l$fand1 itnd Appuncnance$ n1ay 
conlnlcl or sti1>ulJt1C' 1h11 ri~ht.s and claims arisi~ 
from subj('l("ft. ('C)\l("f'C'd by 1his \Am\"e1uion, 
including. JiAh1s and (laams ~ from aa:s or 
omisSOt> in ·remtorial Sa, the Ex.clus.i\C' 
Economic Zone -.nd snward 3dj:3cou 
Continm1•I Shdf In.I) be dct=ioc:d by any 
Coun nt:tblishcd by ;;&.ny Party, or by an ubirr-.d 
tribun'lll subjecc lO the l11w of' any Part~ 
bj A daiman1 may 11»cn ~• ri~t or d:tim in ton 
or cldici iari:1in~ fron~ 11uhiecl$ covered by thi!I 
\.Qn\•cn1inn, includinA ritthts llnd claims arising 
from acls or 01ni~ion11 iu 1crrilori:J \\•aterS, the 
ExdU$i\'t Eco1u:>1nic Zon~ and seaward a<ljattnl 
Coru.inml21 Shelf before a Coun al compe~i 
jumdictinn in •ny of 
I) thC' pince of die acdclcru; 
ii) 1hc don1kile of the d3.in13n1 or or gny per.ton 
.iJlcgt'd t<l be n::spon.sihlC'; i11HI 
id) •ny place \\'here rights under l),1r11+1,ru1>h 6.4 
1nav be :l$$Ct1cd. 
(1.6 uni ... an Offshore Oca.1••n1 ()t hu or h<r 
ck,>c:nd.nts arc enridcd 10 btnC"fits under • 
od>an< oi ·~· rompe11saoon ur><kr 1h.: law 
<i1h< Off•hon:O<xupuncs clomici<,S. ... 1~ 
oh.II permil Off.bore Ocaip.1ni> th< chol« ol 
pl~ in which lO .wen cli1ims iu prmidcd in 
pg~Nph 6.5. uoMthsr.anJing 1u1y C.'-OlllJ\K'I or 
RIJlul.ilion by the O(ishol'e Occupi1n1 10 lhe 
c.1:1ntr11C')'. 
6.7 b1•ch Stare Pan)' .shall confer on il11 Cou11s lhc 
ju1 i11diction to con.solidtt1c ur c.-oordin1ut- the 
dcu:nninacion of c.bims commenced in the: r.ouns 
of diffm-nl Staie P•rtics, 1ri5i~ fmm lhc untie 
11Cci<kn1 or ocx:urrcncr in f"C5P«1 of a matter 
ro.....d by ibis Com'mcion 
6.8 Aoy juclgmem ~= by a C.o.rn of a Siaic: 
Part> 1n n:spttt of or flrisin ~ from 11 ma ncr 
('O\uaf h)· this Canxenrion. whida iJ m(orc-ethfc 
Jn the Suuc Pi.Ln.y of origm u.·~re il is no lon,er 
1.ubjca to ordiniary forms o( rC'ltC'W. ~:alJ he 
1\'(Qg_ni».:J by any Sw1e P11.ny t.·~ccp1 when.: 1he 
jud~1ntn1 was obtained by fraud Cir where the 
c.l~f~ndant was 001 giv<"fl re8Ml11ablc 1lolkt.! of lhe 
d!'im Or I' (air oppom1nhy I() l)~Cl'll it~ (OS(, ;\ 
judgmi._111 r«<>gniZt!d undtt 1.hi1 i;ubpa~raph 
:J.1111 ~ cnforce;1;ble '1'1dlou1 dlt." OM.'f1t• o( 1 he caS4!' 
being~ 
6. 9 ~&ale Panics sh:dl extend ohlipiicm1 of rescue 
of olupwntlc:d pmons IO Omhon: Uni1 
O<cupanlS and other slul"'=kc:d pmons 1h.i an 
Of(ahort: Unit or Arti(iciaJ IJl.uiJ may 
:1ccommod;1tc in 5:1fery. 
6, 10 S1:11c Panics shall n."Cogniic obll,t:i.11ion11 of 
lllfe 1rcatn1cnt nnd tr~lns i1 to 1>hnrc or 11n:1111l1or:izcd 
inc:lividuabri found on Off$hoft' Uuiti, t\11Jfidnl 
l~liuuLi :ind Rd~ucd Appuncnnncc& 11s arc 
accorded 10 stO\Vawa)'S on board ~hipti. 
AtTI<1£Vll 
Penal Juriidic-1ioti 
7.1 llus Arud< appli<s onli 10 acl> or """'"°"' 
on or auocui<'d with Ofhhott UnilJ aod Rcla1<tl 
Appun~:uxn.. or a lllltWn.ility othc:r th..tn dw of 
d><: C...si.J Suic P•ny. 
7.2 In thl< Arud.:: 
fi) " l~ul;itory Offense" mcun$ u oon1rlo1\'c11tion, 
undC.1' It IU\\' or a Coit:ual S1ut~ 01' the 
don1idJiaJ)' la\\• of the O\vner. or opc:rati~ or 
Mfcsy 11t1ln<lard$ applying to 1u1 0((~horc Und. 
1\ nificial lsland and Appuncnancct. 
CiH •pC'l'$0!l.a] Offence" means .a C'Onlf11\'-"'0tion 
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under a k1w of an Offshore Occupant's 
domicile, a Ja\\• of a C.OUsct.I St:ite or the 
domiciliar)' 113\\' or 1hc °"'ner, of the bodily 
intcgrit-y or pc:NiOn:tl pr<;tpcrty of an Offshore 
Oc:cupant. 
(ijj) "J)ubH( OrJcl' Off~n~e· means ta 
contra\-cncion under u la\v of w1 Offsho~ 
Oc('upaut 'ii <lon.1jciJ~. a law of o Coastu.l State 
or the dorniciUa.N la\I.' o f the Ownt:r, 
invoh.;ng loi;s or lire: ix><lily in jury or propc11)' 
danlagt caused by per:s-011s other thao 
Offshore Occuptlnts. 
7 J The Co&st~l State has jurisdiction over 
Regultuory Offences. 
7 .~ \'<!hert> their <l<>mestic !aw so pro\iidet for 
rclC\•an' offences, 1-he Coas1al S1:)1c, the Owner's 
domicili11.r)' S 1:u c :ind the St:u.c of the (>ffi;horc 
Occupant's domicile t2ch hl;1$ jurisdiction over 
Person:tl Offences :and Public Order O«encc;s. 
7.5 \'(ll1erc u Rcgulntor)' O ffence, Personal 
()(fence or Public ()rder Offence ts bcliC\-cd 1<1 
ll:l\'C been committed by an Offshore Occupnnt. 
the Cott!tal Srute shall :afford ll1e do1njciliaiy Stu.tit 
o f 11M: ad\'ersely affected Offshon: C><.-cupa1u 1h(' 
firs t opportunjl)' of in\•csti~uli.n i; the ullcp.ed 
offerttt and prosecu1ing 1he Ofl'shore 0('<.'\11)3.Lll 
11Jleged 10 hnve (.'()mmine:d such Qffence. 
7 .6 \'(!here ~n Offshore OccutyJJ'tl Js convicted 
for P PcrsClntd Offeru."C C'lr .- Public Order O(fcnce 
under the O\\'ncr0$ domicilhuy Ja\\-' or the tl\v of 
1he Co.-sta.I Sn11e. rhe pto5'..-:ocutiog St~li~ may 001 
impost: fl more SC-\'C!fC pen11hy 1h:11n 1hnt pl'(~vidc!(I 
by the fa\v of the Offlih<Jrc Ot·cupmn'$ domicili:ll)' 
S11uc, 
7.7 \'(.'hccc !Ul O..vner. licensee or Oflshare 
Occup;1_01 is ch;irgeJ \Vhh u Rq{ul:11ory Offence b)' 
1hc C.0.JSlal State or the 0 \\'fler's domicilial)' State', 
it sh:.tll be a dc:fcn<.-c 1h1u compJUtntt with the hnv of 
Lhi: prosec:-u1i1lg State wuuJd lll.-'Ct.'SSllrily resuh iu 11 
contravciuion of the lll\v of ihc other $rate. 
7 .8 \'(flu:re ru1 Owitt'r, Licensee ur Offshore 
O ccupant is con,·ictcd oi a Regulatory ()ffencc, 
Pcrsonttl Offence o r Public Order Offetn:e, the 
1>eooo eonvicfe<l shall not be p1·oset:uted by a 
S11uc other thitn 1he 1>rosccutiog S(ate for an 
orfeoce fili:1 i1tg fronl tlll.: Sit)lh.! lltU or omissions 
upon \vhich the first tonvicrion \llilS OOsod. 
All'rtCLE VllJ 
Snfery 
8. l \'<Tht"re 1tn 1\1•tificial lshu1d or Related 
;\l>PlU'h!nllillCel! is. opcra1i::d 1n physic.11 tlssocbtioo 
\\~th an Offshore Uni:r. the C'.oost~ State shill! 
rcquin" the Owner o( the Artifici:.J ls}and or Rd:ued 
J\ppuncnitncc 1.0 Cl>Wbli{'lh 11nd m~inr~n fl qualir)• 
!1$Sllf:.UlC;c: managcn1enJ and oper.ttions &'Siem for 
the ArtificiuJ l!!lancl o r related nppu11t':nancC!I 
; 
oon11xitible '-lriih JS~t Code rcquircmcn1s "Pl)lic::tb!c 
to the associn1ed Offshore Uni1. 
8.2 Coa:;i_.al S1:11e P11nic:s shall ensure that the 
owners or oper.nors of Anifieial lslianck itnd 
rcl:tucd nppurrcnQnccs e;s1nblish. ,,n<l maint~in 
opcnirionitl ttUJlit)' assunaoce systerns app1-opriate 
to the type of stni<'turc (Ind 01>et'i1.doos ond 
con11>:ujblc with generally 11cccp1.cd qu:iliry 
assurance su1ndards. 
8.3 1'he Offshore Uflh flag state shall require tbtu 
1hc oper<'tor of <-.ttch Of(shore Unit dcsignme 11 
single penon (0 be in f.X.111n 111J1d or dM: Offshore 
U11i1. with authority for n<lvigatloo and safecy 
pnq)~ ewer 1111 Offshore Unic Woricc:n iand 
Offshote Uni1 Oocupants, to discontinue 
Economic t\crivirie.11;, io direci safer)' opcnuions 
aoJ to ord<'r Offsbor1: Unil u)O\>i:tncnt or 
e"\lt.'CU$liion ''11hout prior reference t<> the Offshore 
Uni1 Ow'ller or Lk-enSCC- or olhcr n1an11gcmcnt Qr 
gov<•rnment~I ~uthor:ity. 
8.4 No diiiclpilin1uy uctiou ~h11ll be:' tllkl·H by Lite 
employer of a pet'SOO in eommaod iagaiost thtu 
pciwu whu excrc.·ises iu good fititl1 a ny :n1tbority 
under )ub-anide 83. 
8.5 C<,»i~nl Stute Part k"S. by law or by tcnu:s of 
licences for the opcnuion of Offshore Unirs 
Artificial l"lands nnd Related Appurlcnances, lhall 
provide for stan<lar<l.-> of O<.."<:upational I.ea.Ith aod 
53fet}' for Ofhhore Unit \'(1orkcrs. Such sundards 
sliull be ('Onsistent \Vilh C>ttupation11J bcalth and 
safety practices gtoerially QCCCJHed by the 
international teclinicuJ co111n1uni1v o r as 
estttblishi:<l by lh..: Lnernatiooa.i L11bout 
Or,;aniz::1Lion ttnd shaU include provision for: 
fi ) a co1uprchensib)c common lnn.g11.age of 
command; 
Iii) 1>cnnlss11ble hours of work un<l o vcrLi111e; 
lii.i) vicrualling and accommodation; 
(i\'} 1>rotcc;1ivc clothing iand cq11ip111cnl; 
tv) !raining and supervision: 
(\•i} onh<>ard n1cdic-.U resourocs,; 
(vii} cvacwnion, mcdic.'ll treatment and 
repatrialion of Offsl1ore Uni1 \X'orkcrs lO 
injuf\...J Offshore Unit \'(forkers' domicilet 
(viii} joinr manag.emcnt/ l11l>our sa(ccy consuh:nion; 
und 
(ixt ri~hts to Offshore Unil \'(!orkers. of 
ooofidcotlitl cotnmunklltion \vid1 regulatory 
autboriUes. 
11u! stnodanJs providl..J by :;ubcJuusts (ii), fjji}, 
liv), (xi) and (:.:ii) shaU exte:nd 10 Offshore Unit 
Ckc-upiuus. 
8.6 Coasfal Stale l':uties shall p rovide for 
appropriate stw1<lards of operation of off$)1ore 
support crnft \I.then operated io assoc:i:uion with 
Offsl1~ Unil..i and 1\rcificial Lslan<ls engaged in 
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Economi(' Activiiics. These standard$ shnll 
include pro\•ision fo r. 
(i) standby disuanc<.'$: 
(ij) coUic;ion avoidance; 
(iii) USC of Cfl\01'.:$'; 
(iv) pollution pn..'\'Cnlion wid ronu·ol; 
(v) fil'f'rig.hting: 01nd 
(vi) $earc:h 11.od rescue. 
8.7 CoastaJ State t>arlic!i sh11IJ provide for 
appropriate st:1.11daL·<ls of opefiuion of offshore 
suppori aircroft and helicopters when 01>crined in 
association \\rith Offshore U11i1.S nnd Arlific:ial 
lsl1tnds eng<lged io Economic Accivicics. These 
st~Lndnrds sh:1ll indudc prO\rision (or: 
(a} pilot anJ aircre\v tfllining; 
(bl rlight J'l.annin,g; 
(cl visibiJi1y S(aodards: 
(d) (ircfiJ;.luing and e\•acuuliou: and 
(c) search :i.nd rescue. 
8.8 CoaStol Star<i Partie$ shall provid<i for 
upptoJ)rinte:.'. ~uu1<.·h1r<ls of c-01ls1ructio11 uod 
opc.rittion or d iving cr.1fi and cquipmcn' op<."f'Jtcd 
in as.'\Oei!trion \\tltlt ( )f£<>hon:: Units and Artifict1l 
island.<; ell.J.l;aged in Economic Anivitics. 11n:sc 
swndards $~111 include pr()l\•ision for: 
ht} nHuerial fil)d operations qualny t•SSUNIJl~ 
<bJ periodic inspe<.1io 11 unJ mili1 tcnnnt-c: 
(c) openuor truining and qualifications; :ind 
(d) Search ·u.nd rt."lleue. 
8 .9 Each Si ate 1"11ny shalJ require Lhat (A,·ners of 
OIT11horc Unil$, Artificial Isl.ands and Rdatcd 
Appurl('llances establish and nl:ni1n11.in a.o 
c1nergency rcspon."e and search and rc,<;cuc pl:l,lo, 
8. JO 11\e emerg~ncy response and search ti.od 
rescue 1>1-.an 5h111l <:on1ain 1>rovi5ion for reporting, 
distress t.'On1n1unicarions. fir1.ofighting, Slability 
oon1rol, muS(cring. tvacw.don and \'!Seo( S\lrviv11J 
crafi and cqui1:>nlCn1. 
8. l 1 CORSI•~ Sro1c: P<1~ies sho.11 establish and 
n1nin1ain sc:-.irch und rescue systems adcqurue 10 
the ex1eo1 lln<l cype of Ecooornic Acrivicies beifig 
citrricd on in their Territorial Sea, ExcJu~ivc 
Ecooon1ic Z.One or adjacent continental shelf. 
8.12 Each S1au: Par!)' !ihall require rh:u 1hc 1\las1.cr 
o r other person in charge of an Offshore lJni1 or 
Arrificial ls1~nd report 10 a des.ign:.ttcd i1u1hori1y: 
a} llfL)l death <>r * t ious iJljury of 1111 Offshore 
Unit OccupAAl~ 
b) the sinking. or dcs1.rucrion of an Offshore U1til 
or Artificial Island; 
cl any 11ncQntrollcd los!i of st:tbili1y of :1n 
Offshore Unit: 
<.0 an'' C>utbrcitk of Gre on an Offi>hure Unil, 
Artificial Lslon<l or refated 11µpurto;:n1An<."t; 
c} any coUision or 8roundin~ in\'olving nn 
()(fshorc Unh, ArciAcia.I Ldand or rel111cd 
n1>pl1ttenanct: • 
0 IUl)' structural fo.ilurc or 11n Offshore Unit, 
Anificial lsland or rd!ttcd appuncnantt; and 
g) lUlY t>iru;1rio.n or f.'O.ndition, \Vhich, if left 
unuttcnde<l. oould induce nn ueddenr t1r 
incident of the type described. 
8.IJ Coas1<J Srnte Parties shall establish uod 
maintain 11cddcn1 in\it:stijµ'ltion services to rcvici.\• 
rt.')>t1r1s made pu~uunt 10 sub·Qrticli: 8. 12. and 
\\'here appropriate to invcsti~tc reported 
occurrt:11ces, \'(/here a reported ocrurrcuce 
invol\'t.'5 an Off.<>bQrc Unit of a Oag other th:tn that 
of thi: Coastal $l.(1tc. <.>r OII.~hore Unit Oc<.·upants 
01her than residents of the ( :oa$utl Sutte, du: 
Offshore Unit fli.Jt State and the StaLC'S of the 
Offshore Unit Occupanls tionlicile $htill be 
crui1 led le> desigrutte observers 1.0 p:trticipatc in Lhc 
invcs1ip.lion and hnvc lilet:C..'iS 10 informndon 
gained from the investig;uion. l 'he rcpon of Lhc 
Co.'1Sti.1l State sh:1ll be 1>ubl!ci1.cd. 
8.14 Coastal State P.-rtles shaU ensure, through 
oondi1ions cif license. 1>roviliion of insurance ar 
cvideJlte of fmandftl respoosibilily, ot as'5umption 
of •\"Sponsibilitics by Jomesdc non·govcrnmc1ltii.I 
organl:tatio!ls or govcnHncntal entities, t.httt 
Owners have a<lniin.istr<ltive 3nd financial 
resourcell appropriutc tu the.- effective 
implement1tdon of staodatds tkod taCt..i\'lties fo1· 
\\'hicb t.ht:y are rcsponsiblt' under his 1\rtid c. 
8.15 An Offshore Unit £1:1g scite or u Coastal State 
may dcleg;ite ud1uini.strotion of any ()p<:<r:ilioo or 
M:Lndard provided for in this Anide 10 Liccn\.CCS1 
Offshore Unit Owners or non·governmental 
cntilics.. Such dclcgati<>n docs not relieve $HUC 
por1ics 10 this Con,:m1ion of their rc.5J>0nsibilitics 
of rompli;1ncc wi1h 1his Anicle. 
8.16St'11C Parties .shall cn"ure th~1 dele.ga1ed 
ttl.l l hori1ics under this 1\ rdclc have sufficient 
technlcaJ expertise "od fioanci~J resources to 
tidCiql •<'h~I)' disch~rge such 1tdminisfrlnion. 
Atrna.ti.x 
Salvag~ 
9.1 ]'his Article: applies io Offshore Uni1s, 
Artificial L.slands :tnd Rd11lcd 1\ppur1manc1;..,;, and 
con1ponents 1hcrc:of, while afloat or being ci1rricd 
h)• \Vatcr durin,g uny ~riod of tn1nliil or \\'bile on 
location o ther than \vhilc cnsngcd in Economk 
Activit.it.-:>. 
9.2 In this Article, 
Ii) 'hazaT<l to n•vigation' mt••ns any ob,..ruction 
abo\~ tlie SC<tbed to ships e.xert isioy rlghc.s of 
innoce.111 p!1.S$agc in tcrcitorial w:11crs and any 
ships Oll\.ig-uting or opi:rating in the E.xcJu~ve 




(ii) 'di:;ch:ugc or poll111~1ni· me:1ns 1hc dischnrgc 
or emission cif pcrs.is1c nt oil or- any subi;.tancc 
o r t:ner~)( which hns o r is li.kdy Lo ha\'e a 
delel~riow. dTccl upoo thC' u.1..fuucic or short 
biota of the 1'crri1ortal Sea, Exclusive 
Econornic Zone or adjnet:iu Contl11'-~1 tt1) Shelf 
of ~u1y party, or of rhe comnlon 11re:1. 
9.) E:1ch Stu1c Party shall n..oquirc th3t ()\\•ncrs or 
Operator.; of Offshore Units., Artificial lslands 
;1nd Related Appunen:inCC$ have !In cn1erg<.:ncy 
sal\'llE-C plan. 
9.4 'The enlagcrn:y :S::ll\>agt' pli:.n shall coot:tiu 
pro,iisiou for response to uncontrolled<lisdlarges 
or cmissionso( 1>0llu1an{S fron1 n;uurol or i1nifld11 l 
reservoirs \Vi1h \vltich the opcrndon o( 1.he 
Offshore Unit, 1\ niili:inl 1.sJand or Rcl~ucd 
Appuncnanc~s is :issoci:ucd. 
9.5 EachSt.:ate Party shall require Lhat the 1\olaster 
or other per:so1\ in ch.urge of ~ Off:shore U1\i:J, 
l\c·cifici;tl JsJunJ or Rel~1ed Appunenancl." und('r 
iLS jurisdic:tion repOrt \\' iLhout Jd11~· MO)' eveJU 
invol\'ing a h..z.. .. u·d t<> nnvigatfoo or a discha.rge or 
1.nobablc d'i$chiargc of a _J)()ll l11an1 10: 
ll) 11.ny Coastlll State lo whose lerrhoriW \\'Rters-. 
Ex<"lusive Economic Z<lne or 1,dj<lcen1 
sc..-a,vard (:onfincnu1l Shdf rhe event occu~: 
b) :tn)' Party grantor of t\ny ap1>liclll>fe License-: 
:ind 
cf any Pany in which me Offshore Uni1 is 
registered. 
9.6 Each St:.11c Party shall cst-nhtish a national 
systcrn for re51>0n<li11Jt prun1ptly und effr:cli\'d y 10 
such fcports of ha.zarJs to navigation or 
discharJ.tes or probable discharge$ of pollutanls 
l"01tsistt1UJ)· 'viLh the t'l!'quimut:nts of Artide60 of 
UNCLOS. 
9.7 ·rhc S:llv:age Con\'c.nt:ion is ex1ended 10 
Off1ihorc Uni1s, Anificia! Islands and Rdated 
Appurtenauc:~s while on loc:a1io11 and not cu.ga1-1ed 
in Economic Activities. 
AKTICl.EX 
Rtn1ov1tl 
lO.J ·n1is ArLicle upplies ro O(f:shore Unitli, 
J\nificial lilaods ttnd Relctt(-d AppunenWll"eS 
IOCltcd in Oll\•igabJc warcn1 thr«>ugh which righ1s 
o( innoccn1 p:tsso1s.c ma)• be exercised, in the 
Exd usi\'e Ec:onon1ic Zone or on th e aclj~ccn1 
seaward C011tiuent.al Shclf, 
10.2 ln lhis A11icle, "hazard to navigation~ means 
any obstntction ab<i''t.' cbe k.abed to shi1>s 
exercising righls of in1HX\'nt p1r&"'agc in lerrilorilll 
wnr< .. "f'S and <lny ships navigating or opcr:uing in 
Lite Exclusive EconQnlic Zone or ad js ccn1 
sca\\·ard Continernal Shdf. 
LOJ E.1ch S1:ue P:lny shall require th:u Owners or 
Operators of Offshore Units. Artific:ial lsb1n<ls 
9 
and Relined Appurrcnnnccs h:l\"'C a plan for: 
11) ensuring I.he condnued siAfecy of n1lVjg1uion 
m1d pt'olt't.1iun of 1he marine ~nvirunmtnl in 
the surrouo.<liog \\'Qters once- use or- operations 
~~:or 
b) 1hcir remov:1I or partial n-mov~J to permit 
s::ifety or navigation and protection of the 
1narinc cnvirorunenL 
I 0.-1 Eud1 St.:nc P:iny shall esroblish a nat.ion:tl 
systen1 for rt.":Spon<llng, to r1ny O fbhon! Un.it, 
Ani!iciaJ L~.:ind or Rclutcc:I Appwtcn.anccs under its 
jurisd~1io11. '1iihicb becom1:s abandoned or derdic:t 
'lfl<l whlch lllay io,•oh-e a hazard to oa,1igation Cir a 
disc:b11rge or probable disc:har~e ti poUuuuus. 
10., \'('here an Offshore Unit, Anificial lsls.nd o r 
Rdat1.--d t\ppurtcnancc:s is abandoned or derelict 
at1d ti haz:.irJ LO UU\'igucion or du.' marine 
t:n\'ironmcnt, ench Sttttc Pa11y shall take 
reusooable llK'USur<'5 to 111ark, ahc::r or rC..'ShOv ... any 
Offshor~ Uni1, Artificial Island or Rel1ucd 
Appurttnru1ces \Vitltin that Party's jurisdic:tion so 
thal it reuses to be a hrtzard 10 na,;g1uiou Ot' to che 




I I. I h r t lijs Artid~. -Pollution Dilfllllb"t .. 1~1t-.lnS 
loss or claJn~ge caused out~i<.le 1Ul Offshore Unit, 
Anificial Lslnnd und Ri:Jatc,_.J Appurten~mccs or 
oulSi<le a n01ural rest.~l'\'Oir or other geologic 
(or1n.ition. by 1hc discharge or II poJIUlQn' and 
lnclud<.'S the cost~ of p1-evencivc meaSt..11'<.':S and 
further loss or danln.ge CfuJsc<I by preventive 
lllCllS 11 f'CS, 
A1>plicarion 
11.2 ·nus Article '11>pljes 10 Pollution D.uuage 
c.iusc:d by or i1rising from the emission or di!".thovge 
of poUutuom from Offshore Units. Artificial lsl•nds 
and Relu1cd Appun:cn..1.nccs itt any ii.me 11nd 10 
onissionli or clischargcs from nnrural rcscrrnirs o r 
other goologk~ forolado.ns on.1)1 duri11g the ('OlU'Se 
or Eoonomi(' Aaiviric:;: and \l•hich 11.t<C CDuscd by or 
arise from such Economic Ac1ivitic:s. 
11 J This Aniclc: applies 10 pollution d11moi~c 
c:iuscd h)' or arisinF- from the c mi1'Sion or 
dischnrgc of pollu{'ln1s. from :;hips, cxcc1>r svrvcy, 
~:tndby and supply vcssds, \\thile eng:Lgcd in 
Economic Activities. 
Liability 
11.-1 Liability for potlution damage C':IU.$C<I by or 
:irising from Lhc emission or discharge of 
pollutitnrs from Offshore Unhs. Arrificb.I J:;l:1nds 




I l,, "fhc: Lic:cnsec sh~1u be li:iblc ror 1>0llunon 
damuge ~used by or it rising from Lhe emission or 
disch:.tr~c of pollu1;1.n1:1 from n;uur.al reservoirs or 
01hcr !tcologic forlll:lltions. 
11.6 \'<'here l;ln ()(fshore Uni1, Anifichd Island or 
Related Apponenances has Olore than one 
0\1.•ncr. they i;hilll be jointly ~nd St::\.'c1·11lly lfohlc. 
l 1.7 No fuiblliiy for pollution damoi;e sholl •tmh 
l('.I 11n Clwncr or Lif'Cfl$CC i( i1 1>t0\'CS thut 1hc 
da1n11J.,~ resulted fro1u an ttcr o( \\1lr, hostilities. ch•il 
1,1,rar, insurrecrion. Qt 1• m1n11':!l phenomenon c:if an 
e.Xttptio1'L.'l1, iftevitable and irresistible dlaratlec 
11.8 Rig.bu; of con1pens..'l1ion under lhis Article 
shall be extifigujsh"'d unless J~u.I 1>roet>ediug:s: ttre 
brought \\1rhin rwo ye;1rs from 1ht> dace when 1hc 
1>ollulion d1un11ge OCC"urrt-d. In nt:l t.ll:-.e shall lt.'%:tl 
l>roct'<-dings bt."' broughl after si:x years from the 
dine of 1hc incident \)»hich caused 1he <lan1:1gc. 
\'(i'bcrc. die incidi:nt consists of t'I serit'$ of 
(l('.(\lrrcoccs., lhe six years' period shall run from 
the <lute of the lir:st sud1 occurrt!l.1cl!. 
l 1.9 tr the Ch.vner o r Lict'n.o;c:e proves thul the 
pollution diunagt: resuh1:d wholly or parLly eithl.'r 
from t\ll ftct OL' oro.issioo Jone wilh intent 10 cause 
damap.e by the person who suffered t11e da1nage or 
fron1 the Jlq'.;ligenre of lhnt P'-'t'SOJl, thl.' Owner or 
Licensee: n1uy becxoneriucd \\'holly or 1>anJy from 
his: liability to such perSoo. 
I l.10 No daim fur con1pcnsation for pollution 
Jarnag_e shall be OlaJ.: llgO.i.ltSl the 0\\1fh.'f' Or 
Liccn.sc:e otherwise than in accordauce \\'1th a.his 
Co11veiuioo. 
1 l.l t No claim for cotnpc:nmtiou ror 1>0Uu1ion 
di"t1nage u11dC't this Conventiol'I or otherwise ma)' 
be mlldc ag11inS1 t.hc sc-rvnnts or ap;cnt$ of the 
O\\'LlCr or Licensee. 
l J .12 A Licensee li:1ble for pollution d1tnwgc under 
this Article .s.baU nol h11vc any ri1;ht of 1«oune. 
AKTICLEXIJ 
Apponionment of Llahility 
12. J This Ardcle 11p1>lics to siny 0«1.1rreoC"C "''hich 
mny give rise 10 ch•iJ liability \.\'hich i$ cuusalt)' 
rc:l:ncd 10: 
ta) &ouoouc Ac:tivitlc:s.: 
Cb) the movcmm1 of Offshore Units, Artifici:tl 
1sl$n(I$ and Relined A1>pun<:nana::s l>y \\'a1cr 
or to or from a loc:1tion \\'here Economic 
1\ctiviJicll arc intended to titkc p.face or lta\'t" 
taken phtcc; 
(cl 1he 1)rescnce or ttn Offshore Uni1 \\7orker or 
Offshore Unit O<:<:up.a.nt on or in the 
proxjniil)' of an Offshote Unir, i\l'Cificial 
1slan<I or Rcliucd Apptu1cnanccs: an'I 
Cd) :1 railureor neglttt [o comply \\ritb or perfonn 
uny duty under 1hjs: Convention. 
10 
12.2 \'\There lo$$ is caoscd h)• the f1111h or n-cglcc1 of 
two or more persons. their li:ib iJit)' is 
1>r<>t:>0rtionatc to the degree to wluc;h they ~re 
m;pealvdy at fnuh or negligent., :lnd if it i$ not 
possible to JttCl'•n)ne diA'e:rent <lcgrecs of fuuJ1 or 
ncglcn, thcir li:1bility is c:qu:il. 
12J Vc:roons th;n itrc tH £8uh or n<..oglcct are joi.rnJy 
:tnd SC\'Ct:tlt)' Ji:tblc to the persons suffering the 
loss. btn. "s bes\vcen themselves. 1hey itrc li11ble to 
m;,1kc contrib1.u ion 10 c:lch <uhcr or 10 indcnlnify 
each other in lhe degree to which thC)' arc 
1t$peoivdy ~1 (;1uh or negligm1. 
12.4 A person who is. eodtled t<> dQirn 
contrlhution or indemnhy under thi!i Anicfc fron1 
another person I.hat is or m-uy be JiabJe in l'l'$pcct 
o( ;1 IOll11 n111>' do so 
(a) by proct-cdings undt<r 1\nic:le \I o( this 
Conveotion; 
(b) by ndding the 01hcr J>Cf1i(ltl a5 a pany 10 11 
proceeding pcndinJ: before a Coun or 
lribunuJ of competent juris<lict.iont 
(c> by oommencing 11 pr<x.'<.>ieding 10 a Coun or 
uibunul of con1pt'tcn1 juri11dicrion; 
(<l) if the otller person has senled \\'irb lhc person 
su(ferin}: the Joss. by conlnH~ocing or 
t.'Ontinuin.g ll J>t'O('ffilin~ beforc a Cwn or 
LribunaJ of competeo( juris<licrion. 
12.5 No cliUu1nia)'ht- 1na<lc un<lcr sub·nrticle. 12.1.1 
{cU later lh:tn one ye1r aftcr the dale of judJ;mcnt 
iu d1c proccOOing or the dat~ <if the ~ufct1tt<11 t 
.igreemen1. 
12.6 Tlie Courl or cribunoJ be.furl.' \vl1ich a 
pr<K't'ccliug is commenced or ct,ncioucd under 
:sub.artide l2.'I (<l} 1nay adjust or den)' t11c atnount 
awiu<le<l ifh ls no t sutislicd t.bttt lhe seulemer11 ~·t\s 
rt'allonahle. 
12.7 The right.s o;inferrrd by lhis Artide on :i 
person that is found liable or scuJc:s o claim arc 
subject 10 ru1)' clcissing oonu\lct. ('()1lSi.Slen1 wid1 
I.he duties nnd oblig;'ltions under this Convention, 
bc.l\\'1..-cn the per.100 dni.ining 'u1d n perso11 fr-0111 
\vhc>m contribution or indemnity i.s drumed. 
App)jcation 
AXrJCLt:. XIII 
Limit:uion of LiabiUty 
I} .J ' lhi."i Aniclc does not nppl)' 10: 
11) claims ~"Ubjtt"l lO ttny lnlen1a1ion11l convention 
or narional lcg:isfot ion respecting nuclear 
d.tMt-agt:; au<l 
b) daims b)' Offshore Occupant"i C)r their heirs 
or dependanls. where the law of domiciJe of 
Lhc Offshore Occupant or their heir.; or 
dependants <lo not pennil employers or 
Q\\fOe1$ or Ott"upiers to li1nJ1 their liabilily; 
1}211te Ov.rneror Licens{'t' of au Offshore:" Unit, 
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ArLificbl W:ind or Rd~ned Appuncn-nnc~. 11nd 
1>erson$ fol' xi.·hose ' 'm or omissions dh~)' are 
rcsponi;ibJe, mny Jimir their li.,.biliry :1s set Olll in 
thJsA1·Lide. 
13.11lie foDuwin~ dahns are tubje<.'1 to li1nit:uion 
of Jj3biJity: 
i} cl:iim!> in rcspcci of los!> of ll (c or 1>ersooal 
injury or Joss of or <l1truug<." lO 1>ropeny 
occurring in direct connccd<>n 'vii.h the 
operntion of the Off;hol\.'. UuiL. ArtiCici1l 
Jsland or Relalc:d Appuncnancc~ 
ii) cL11ms In rcs.J>CCI of other loss rcsulring from 
infrin,gen,en1 of rights otht!r than connl'tctu1tl 
rights, OC('lJrring in \lirro oonnoct.ion \\•ith 
the openuie>n of rhe Offshore Unit. Artificittl 
Island or Relined App1u1en1.1nces; and 
iii) cl:tims. "her th:m under cQntr:ta, in rcspca 
of the mising, ren10\•al, des1 ruction or 
rendering h~1nnle$$ of 1hc Offl'horc Unil, 
1\1·cificiuJ Island or kltued t\pp1Jt(eoa.nces. 
l3.4 A perso1l !<hall not be \'.'lltitfi:d to llntit .its 
Uubiliiy if it is prov«! th•t the l06s resultc<l [rom 
p!.!rson11I ad or 0tnissioo, co1nn1iue<l \vit.11 iut~n l 
10 cause $Uch loss, or rec.kJcs... . ly :ind with I.he 
lu10\\•lc:J.gc: that sud1 lnu \\·ould p robubl)• result. 
l)J 1"he rimitS of liability for d:.tims ;trising on an)' 
di.sdnc1 location, sh11'l l>c cal("IJLucd as follows: 
(Units of Account per mass ton ordeadwci~ht ton) 
r A. for Pollu{ion damage J 
( B. for non·Pollution danmfte J 
1.3.6 \'(fhcre 1hc cJaim in rcspoo ol: which lin1i1tuion 
i.s :l:ssenOO 1trises froc11 rh<" operation of t\\'O oc more 
Offslw1~ Units or Artifici1J lsl~nd$, t.lie Uinit of 
lhLb.iliLy is ~kuhited on 1.bc b.u.ti o[ dieir C'OlnbiocJ 
mllSS tonn~c or de:1dwciJ?,h1 tonn~oe. 
lJ.7 1·be limit of liability sh:1IJ ~ppl)' to the 
uggrq;ittc of dnin1s \\'hich arise on any <listinc.i 
<>Catsion. 
Tue LIMITATION FUND 
Consriru1ion of 1he fund 
13.8 Any pel'son alleged to be linble ff• ll>' 
constitute ~1 fund \\fith the Coun or oi.bcr 
compc1en1 1.nuhorit)' of ~11)' Sratc Party in \vhich 
leg3J proceedings urc instituted in rcspccl of 
cl"jm$ suhjoo 10 limiunion. The fund i;h.UI be 
constituted in the sum of such of Lhc amounts sci 
out in pari\g:Nph l}.5 "8 nee applicable to cJ~ims 
for which lhal pt'tSOn n\a)' be liable. IOgethcr \\tilh 
intc!\:Sl thereon f'roo1 the dare of the occurrence 
giving ri~<" lo the liabili1y until tl1~ date of the 
con:sdru1iolt of the fund. ;\o)' fuod thus 
0011.sUtuled sh~JJ be nvailablc onl)' ft1 r the p11yn1en1 
of cl:1.in1i; in n:spec1 of \\·hich limit:ttion of Jj~1bili t)' 
can be: invoked. 
II 
1).9 ,\ fi1nd m1ty be con:itinncd, ci1hcr by 
depositing Lhc: sum, or by producing :1 guarantee 
acceptable under !he lq;:i:slalion o( Lhe S1a1c Party 
\\ihcre the fund i:; constituted :ind considered 10 be 
adequate by the C.ourt or oth c:r compc:tc:nt 
ourl1oriry. 
11.1 0 A fund constiLuted by one of 1}1c: persons 
iucnliooeJ lo paIX1graph U .2 or lhclr lusurer :shttl.I 
be deem<.>d C'OOStilu1ed by 1Lll 1>CrSOns stipu.l1uc<l in 
th:u p~r11gniph. 
Disrrihutic>n or the fun(I 
t>.1 t SubjCC110 1hc provisions of pllrng.r.iphs,.3 
Md 5.6 of Article V .-nd of 1>~n1gn•1>h l}. 1-1, lhc 
fund sh:tll be distributed :m1ong the claim.:tots in 
proportion to their cst.:1blished claims ~ainst Lhc 
fw\d. 
L1.12 lf, bcfort' the Fund is J isuibuted. the 
ptrson liable, or hil insure.i; hgi seuled o dlt.in1 
ag;Unsr lhe fund such J>e(1:00 shn.11, ur1 lO Lhe 
amounr he hit$ l'aid, a«r1ire by !lubrog,nion rhc 
riglns. which the person so compensated \VOuld 
h~ve cnjo}•cd un<lcr thi<> Convcn1ion, 
l} .I ) Such sub rogation rights in respect of 
dain1o; providtd for in por.tgro•J>h 13.12 m:1y aloo 
be exercised b)' persons 01hcr than those therein 
mentioned. in respect or any nmoun1 of 
oou1pcnsution which they niay have paid. but ouly 
lO d1e tXl<."llt thni soch subrogarion is p~ined 
und~r I.be upp)ic:tbl~ n:uion:tl law. 
IJ . 14 \'(/hew 1hc JX!J'S-On lillble 01· nriy other 
J>Cf$0fl cs1~blLo;hcs 1h1u he may be com1">C:DC!<I t<t pay, 
at a. later da1c1 in wbole or in pare any such <L•»Oltnt 
or oompcnS<1don with n::jµrd h'l whjd1 such person 
\\'Quid ha\•c enjoyed a right~ s1tbrog:11ion punusnt 
10 paca~raphli: 13.12 and l3.13 hud t.he 
'-'tin1pen:1.otioo been paid be.fort the fund \\'S:l 
djslributed, the C..oun or mher competent authority 
of 1bt: Stale \\'bc:rc tbe fun<l has lxu. t'Qo111itured 
may order thitt U, sufficient su1n slHJJ lx-
1>ro\iisi-0n11.lly set &side 10 enable such 1x:rson ~1 su<'h 
l:ucr d:.ue to enforce his cl:ain1 ti.g:t.iru-i t.hc fund~ 
Bar to other 11c1ion!\ 
11.1 5 Wl1ere ! t limitation fund hll5 been 
consdanccl in :t('C(lrd::incc \\•ith 1hi$ Anide, ~1ny 
person l:ta\~np, made a dajm against Lhe fund slut.II 
be b~rrred {rom exercising any ri1tht io n:.-spect of 
su<h l'lili.nl iwlil)SLM!i other :tsstt.s of ll pt•l·son by 
or on bchnlf of whon\ the funJ h;)s been 
<.'Onstiruted. 
JJ. 16 After u llmitndon fund has been 
consrinncd in aCCQrdancc \Vith 1his Anidc, any 
Offsh~)rc Uni1 or Rclsntd ApJ'ori:en:tn<:e, 
belonging to :l person on bch:'llI of wh<1m th~fund 
h:.t$ been conStituted, which has bc:cn an'C$ted 
\\•idUu llic jurisdiction of 11 Srolt' Pi.rrty for a clai.Jn 
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'1.•h1ch m:iy Ix- r11lscd i~l.lln$.1 the- fund, or itn)' 
secul'ity given, lllll)' be n:leaseJ or 11hern1u e 
rcmcd)• disch!lr~cd hy Order of ' he Couri or other 
rompc1en1 i11nh('lri1)' of tiucb Sca1c. ( lm1:e1;cr, $Uch 
rclefl-llc l'r cbschar):c sh.1U 11IW11ys he ordrrcd if 1hr 
Hmi1:1rion fund h•t !>cm ron5.ti1utcd in 1he St.a1c 
'1.·b~ the AITCS1 i.s rJWlc. 
0.17 The rulcsol p>..,.,..phs IJ.1' md 1J.l65IWI 
•pply ool)' u 1ht cbim;wc ,...> btir\i! •dam .pi"" 
1hc !imiu1rinn fund bd'on-1hc Coon ild:minisrennt 
m.. fund """ ,.., (und .. ..-wallv .. ~.bk md 
(reel)~ 1rans-rcrablc 1n rtsp<.'C.1cl1ha; cl:.im 
CO\'ef"ning lf!w 
1).18 Suhjec1 10 the 1n<>vi.4iotto; of 1hi$ Anide, 1hr 
rult:'S ref1.ring co lhe c<u1s11tudon l\nd dislribuiioos 
or u limi1111ion fund, lind ull rules of procedure in 
conneaion 1hcrcwd h, , Jui.JJ be EtO\'t'rncd b)' 1hc 




1-t.I To C'OO."'Cf' It~ h11b.l11l \inckr 1his Com"'tncion, 
~.a.ch C>.i.'"fler of 11n Ot'f~hore Unu shall be ~quire<l 
to ha\'C 11n<l n1,1intain 1nsur11nc:c or 01hcr fio;1ncial 
sccun1y of such l)'f>C: 11nd an 1uch letm$ as the flag 
smte P•ny of 1he OIT<horo Unii 5111111 sp«ify, 
1>t0\•idod 1ht11 1hc no1ou111 shall nor be less 1h1,n 
the gre:ner of 1hc limi111l100 funds caJcuJ31.cd in 
;1ccordancc 1,1,~1h Ankle I)., in rcspca of 1hc 
Of'Uhore Uni1 ... 
l~.2 To 00\et llJ ltab11a1)· under 1h2~ Cotl\'CllUOn 
each (lwntt of on AnjficiaJ lsbmd o.- rdscd 
•ppuncnonr< <hall h< "-'IUI~ to h"'~ and 
m:ain14ln insunancc Ot 01hcr- 6.nanc:i:al SttUn1y of 
such r)'pe and Qn a;uch 1ttn\S ll5 di.e gr.vtlor o( rhe 
License in rcsp«1 d che AruCicW 4bnd or 
Rcfarcd Appuncn:.incn ~ the gruntor 0£ 1hc 
Lic:cnsc Jhodl 11rX'dfy. provided 1 h.ir the .-i.moun1 
shall not be les.s 1hun the gra 11.c-r of the limit:uion 
funds calculnitt:I in 11c.·cord11ncc "°''ith Article 1 lJ 
in rcspt"C1 of 1hc Anifici:J lc;land or Rd1ued 
Appunen:anccs. 
14.) To mist in the d1!ifhargc of its ohl~ationfr: 
undtt ibis eo.,,...,,;.,,,, C'Kh Lic:<nstt sball h< 
required JO h•\~ •nd ma1n1am m....._.Wl(C or or.her 
Sn.ncisl sccuril)' of M>ch l}J>C and on such <crms 
llS UK- gn1n1or of the Licm.sc shall specif)·. 
pto\>lcled 1h:.t 1hc 1unounc sh.ill not be- lcs.s than 
i.he cwnuJ;1tivc 11moun1 bl the lim.iution fund• 
o.tablbhfd by thij Con\'dluon ul respect cl each 
Offshore Unit, r\riill<iul l.sJand or Rdu1ed 
1\1:>purtcn11nc:c1i c.-ovt•'\-<l by lhc Liccosc. 
14.4 An insuNn~ or other financial security shall 
ll 01 s:.tisf y lhe rcc.iu i l\"IUC: n 111 or th.i~ Artid~ if i I c:.n 
cease, for rcaaliQnl other 1.h:m the expiry of thc-
period of \'a!Klin• of' lhc i'™1lanCC' or SC'Cllrily, 
hcrorc 1wo monrhs have: clttp!icd ("un 1hc <l:uc on 
which not ice of its tern1inalion i-i l{i\'cn to Lhc 
c:o1npcic11t public nulhori1y of the Fl3JJ, Stille J>arly 
or Party g,rantor of rhc:: Liceni;c, 1'hc forcg.oinit 
1Jf<WisH:>11 shaU !iimi.brly apply to •ny 1uodillc11tiun 
"-'Inch n."Sults m the insurancr or )l(.'CUnt)' 1:io 
lao1~cr .,liijjing IM ""!Uir<roen1< <)( 1h11 Article 
IUAD)' cLwo fo.- c<>mpens;11100 for polluuoo 
d•m• mll)' be brough1 tlu«tlj 4ain<t IM 
lnWiTr or other person pl'O\id'n~ financial 
3C.'alnty for the Owner or Liccnxc'1: li.abiLty for 
pol1uuon d .. 101• fn such (1tjt the h•b1l11y ol the 
defendant sh:all be limi1ed 10 1hc: 11n1ount 1pcc1ficd 
in u«'tlrdancc with par:r.grnph I),, irn:spcctivc of 
th4.! £Let that i.Ju~ pollution dtun.1,,;c occu1·1W ~:1 u 
l'CSUll Q( llll 9Cl OI' OnliSSiOn hy lh(' 0 \VO(.'t' or 
U<.'l.'DK't.' ltin1sdf.. done <ldibt•r1ucly wjd1 11tlual 
kno'1"~bie LhaL pollucioo dam11~ would n::suh. 
Th< dr£cnJan1 moy furiher ., •• ii hlm,..lr of 1hc 
cH"°""' oth..- thsn the bankrupicy or ••U>clinJ!-
up oC ihc 0......- or Littn,.., ,.n;d, 1hc o,...,.,. or 
l.icaucc hunsclf \l.'Oldd lui\~ bttn mtidaf to 
in.d<<. Funbcnnorc. rhc clrlendooi< m,y avail 
lum:ld( of !hr Jcfcn"" 1ha1 1hc polltmoo Jorn.If« 
l'\'iulted from the wilful mi)coo<luc:t of 1hc C>vmer 
<w l,.acctlk~ hjmself. but the tlct'cnd111nc may flCK 
11v"il JU,nlelf of an>• other JJcncc ""'h1c.:h he n1ight 
huvl.! been e111ided to invoke in pro~t·chngs 
hrt111~ht by 1hc.· Owner or l .. icto~cc 11~i11111 hin1. 
'lhc <lcfcndant .shall in anv c\'cn1 hi1vc the riWu to 
require the <h'llcr or Licensee 10 be iointcl an Ll-ie 
proo.wull!•· 
l.f .6 Any sums pfO\·idcd. by insuranc~ or by other 
CinancW i«'UrilY nuinttint'd in •('('f)rdantt _.nh 
poDP'lfPh IU ~ 1~2 sholl be .,..;Jabk in 1bc 
r.,,. pi.c., (o.- ""' .. 1i3!1K1.ion or d ..... under ibis 
Con\·\.'f'ltion. 
l4,7 \'('hctt the Owner o r UcmSl't.' ~ u St1L4U: Pian.); 
1hc OwllCr or Lioo:isee shall not be ri..""'qu1rcd 10 
nuuntain 1n5uruncc ('Ir other f'ini1n<:1~l !K'('unty co 
CO\ft'r i1.11 liability. 
ARTIQ.CXV 
Adminisuation •nd Rrvl11ion 
J). I A Committee romi)()fiCd of 1 rc:prct1en1at1\·c 
cl co<h S.atc Pany is h=by .,.•hli•hod. 
1'.2 \\.uhtn ihitt momhs ol 11>< ckpos.1 ol 1hc 
fin.al instrumcn1 of ralifiatkwt or llCCnMon by 
.....tuch &.his Coo\ution sha.8 c:ocnc into clrc<t, d.t 
Cornnuntt shall rnttt to c.·on)iJ.:r lht' 
t:it11bl1Shn1':n1 !ilnJ procedures (<>r r~ f1n.inong 
11,nd adnunu1trulion of the lntn-1u1uonal Rt1;istcr 
lor Off short' Uniu 1tuth«;1ed u1Hk r Ar1lcle IV 
I}.} 1''hc Con1mincc ma)', by «u1sc.11~us or I>)' vote 
C'o( .11 1001 l\.\'O 1hirds or Stale p"' ry fC."l)t'C\\.'OUHivt'S 
J>f'QCl'll, recommend a J>rnc:eduf'(" or pl'N"t-durcs 
for the 6n.aocing 1Uld 11dminit1ra1ion of ,uch 
I111c-m1tional llq;ister, and 10 makt" 
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rccommc.ndudons \Y!th l'C::S J'k..'CI 10 such other 
matters rda1ed to thi.'i U>n\icntio n a~ the Panics 
111ay rc:quisili-On in attordance \\1id1 t11is 1\rtidi:. 
15.-4 I f Ute: recom1n endation respecting the 
financing ond tu.l1u i1 '1isLmtion of Lb~ J.ntem11lional 
Regish:r Is nccepted under t.his Article, the 
Con1minttsh1dl n1cc1 'i'lf lc.i.st 11.nnually 10 consider 
1 he continued iadminisrnuion, fin;Lnc.ing Qr 
dissolution o f th e lnrcmational RCAislc:r. 
l'..:S Ai the request of the ln1crn:11 ional /llh1ri1.imc 
011taniz;uion, o r of the 1n1em:uional l..1bour 
Ort;anW1tion, or a1 1.be request of at fe:U1 on.e 
1hird of ihe t>unies 10 this Cc>n\'dlrjon re<--eived h)· 
[lf!.10 or Jcpos1t<.H)' gov~rnmtnt] u.ri1hin any six 
n1on1h period , the Con1111juee shall meet 10 
ronsidcr the adoption of sW11dards or guidelines 
with respett LO Artide VJll. 
15.6 A' 1hc n;;ques1 <if ui lc1tH one 1hird of 1hc 
P:inics co this Con,•entlon rcccivcd h)' r 1/\1() or 
Depositol)' Government ] within any six munlh 
p:riocl. 1he (.ommiu(;c shall me<:1 to consider 
maucrs respecting 1.hc amendment o f this 
Conventiou sulxniuc.d fur consideratioo by Parties. 
15.7 The fC'commcndations of the (...01umiuec 
sh11U be noti!icd by [ IMO or Dep05itory 
Gover:n1nc:.ft1] to all Stitt~ Parties. A S1a1e Pllrty, 
\\<hich, widii_n six month s o( such norificution, has 
noi nQ1.ified l CMO or Ocposi1ory Govcrnn1cn1 1 
th:tt it is unable to accept such rc<:ommcndation, 
shaU be de.crm-.J to have acccptc.-d it. 
1, .8 A recommendation of the Co111mittlX' shall 
becotnc binding on State Parties if the 
recom1nendndon has b<.et-1 ~c:hie,"ef..I by tonscnsos 
or is ;1<lop1cd unaf1 imoosly. or has been llcceprcd 
by :u lc~St t\\'O third$ Qf the State Pnrries. 
AK1·1CLE XVI t,·sw 
[provisions on sig.1,11n1n.::, ratification, accept.inre, 
::ipprov~1l, accc!lsion, con1ing in10 c(fect 
denunciation and depository :1nthority] 
COMMENTARY ON MAY 2001 DRAFT OUC CONVENTION 
Preamble 
1'h(' prf'tln1bJe js inreod~d 10 :set ouL basic 
~,rinciples from \vhich the convention is 
dC\•clopcd. 
oc.rmitions 
M11.rdricioJ L-.fand" inst<llhuions formed from 
nnlur:LI <lrt'<f~c...J nmleciaJs or fill or natural origin 
are ex<"luded from operation of the convention :tS! 
- 1hcsc ""' n1orc likcl)• to be found in 1hc intcmtll 
or terrltotial wacetS of SllU<'S; o.od 
- 1,vhiJc UNCLOS <loes not pcr111j1 cre:ation of 
anificia1 island.ti for the pUT(~ of manipulating 
mari1imc boundariC$. lhe ('rc:arion of an :'niticial 
islanJ from oaturul aulleri.Ws is iJJOt\' likely IO 
a1tr:ia the a1>plicut.ion of domestic Lt\\' rdating 
10 real property or immO\•nbles 
Pipc:Uno arc c.sduded &uni operation ol: the OUC 
convention, ll$ it is considered 1h:i1 cxiscinit 
1>ro\•isions of UNCLOS sufficiently cover$ 
pipdine openujun. \\1dJJ1cad~ aJ\.' CO\'en:d, :b they, 
ra1hcr than pipdines. arc a critical link for 
01'>Cr~ni on11I risk n11.ln$gcmcn1 nnd the lk1bility 
regiine. 
"Economic: ;)c;uvirics" - th~~ ;.tre r.;suictcd 10 
ncti.,..ilie!! 11ssociare<l with hyJro<"u.rb<tns and 
1nin~ral resourl'cs in \•icw of th.: exprc:ss 
pn::fcrcnc<".s of national mrltititne h1w :is$oclation.s. 
"coastt•I state'" "continental 11hdr "cxtlusjvc 
ll 
economic :wne- "'territorial se:i~ - the UNCLOS 
definitions '9rc :ldoprcd 10 ensure oonsis1cncy of 
nppliC""d.lion. 
''License .. "licensee" - this clctlnirion is c:tsl bro:uily 
IO l'efloo- the wide mngt of tights of e:cµloit,1tlo11 
grwucd b)• c:oitStal sttttc.'S, and to ensure the OUC 
convcnt.lon is applied 10 the !ittbmncc of offshore 
oconomic ueti,•itics n.-.g11rdless of 1hc: form th:lt 
couedSions of use tnay wke. 
"Offshore Unh"' - this definition i:; intended to be 
Cunc:tiont'I so as to include emerging fucure 
1cchnolo~ics as they an: developed 
'·offshore uni1 \\'Orker· "offshore- uni1 ()ccuparu" 
th<.":!ic persons ~re dcfiucd distinc-tj\'Cly as the OUC 
oonvcntio n :lpplics in d.is1inc-t \VU)'$ 1.0 their 
4.lis tin,·ti"~ in•1n1s 
"Owner:· - this broud dd-i11illon is inlendeod to 
ensure th:u the obligations and lx:ne6rs of t.he 
OUC conve11tiOJ1 tlpplies to !host" in eff'-·ct.ivc 
functional control, £Cjl,U.r<lJc:ss or the form or USC or 
opcrnrion. 
'"Poliurao1" - chis definition is inreoded 10 cover 
the broad r1tnge of subnunca du.~micals au<l 
proccs.scs which may be undertaken on offshore 
wlitS: and ru1-ificial islands. 
A1,plication 
2.1 \'(Tith the e."'ceptioo of artificial islo.o.ds Ol' 
con1poncnl11 in Lmns.it, clu: OUC i~ intended to 
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h:t\'C ihc same geographic soopc or 11pplic111i()n :•s 
UNCLOS. 
2.2 A \'CJluntary nght extension or application of 
1he OUC 10 1errhoria1 se•• or io1emal "-'a1ers ls 
iul(j~dt.x! lO fut.1litute general uJ:opti<>u of lhe 
ouc. 
2 J lt i~ t'Unsidi:rt.-d that Ll1e cxi:stini,; intenutliooial 
lqtal rcjtimc co\•erini; $hips would appl)• 10 
offshore t1ni1s while in u·11nsil.. 1-lo\\rcver, is ntuf;h 
less likely th11t lU\ ~nificiu.l lslan<l 0 1· 11 conlJ>00e111 
( :;ucb as the cuisS()n foundation of a 1tr.avity based 
srn1erure) \\'Ould be-~arde<l Mu ship. 11lerefon: 
tbc OUC is intt'nded to apply to artificial islands 
1hronghou1 ihc rin1c of their funcdon:ll exi$tcnce. 
10 ensure t.he objoctives « sat'e ope-ration and 
removal art meL 
2.4 Pro\•ision shooJd be nt{lde for che extension 
of the QUC LO nc.'\\' fo rm.i. or l:eOUOlniC' at't..i\lili~ 
such as seabed aquaC'uhurc. tourist acromn1od;l· 
nons 1Jn<11hcr f11n1rc 1q:hnolog_1cs 
O""ncrship 
3.J 111is elaus~ is ln1en<led to fneiJinire 
nppJic.·atiun tL the OUC lo tt'Tritorial \lt'alcrS by 
tho,o;c :;1:11cs 1):1.rtics. which re q uire marilin1c 
;icdviiie:; in •erritori:il w111ers 10 be undcn"kcn h)• 
Jotuestic il~ ,iesseJs only, Outside of terrhoiiaJ 
and intcn l:ll w-:nc:n;, the- {)UC docs nol require 
offs~tbrt units or QniririaJ iil1and.s to lly the Oag cf 
COO.'ital st:itc, us long as they ha\'e some nn1ion.ali1y. 
) .2, .lJ In vi<:\v of the significant legal incidents of 
offsho1·e uni1 1,nd 1u·cificial island opel~11 ion, ir i-s 
critie1dly necc.-ssary 10 8~'()idcd 1hc opcrt1tion or 
"stiucless" offs bore unlts. As u «n'Oll1u:y, slates 
parties :ire r-equircd 10 recognize O\\'nerdlip 
intc~IS and rightS 10 t:r.tnsfcr and USC: or offshore 
units arrificloJ islands 
Rcgistt'lttion 
-I. I - -I.,-; 11.rc ll coroJfldt)' to tutkle 3 11nd intt."lldOO 10 
rnrry it into effect. 
4.5 lbis parugraph is derived Cronl the 1986 
Unitt.J Nations n:gisll'.llion of :;h ips convcn1ion 
nnd is in1cn<lcd l(l ensure ob!igittion!' under rhc 
OUC may Le enforced effooivcly 
-l.6 This 1>rovisi()!l is analogous to the rqistr:uion 
and montaging of ships 
4.7 Considcn1bli: i1uer'l'Sl \O-:ts expressed by some 
n1uional mori1inle 1i,w ~ssoci1uions for an 
i1utt-muLional rt'g.iitcr of off~hort units. ·r11ib b 
f unctionnlly :1.n o ptional clause, fo r the 
cst.J,li$hmcnr, flnnncing :ind rondnu!lnon of 1hc 
i.ruemariooal regjSter li ~t1bjeC'I to tl1e J:H'Ovisiou of 
1ht c:ommiuec ofstu1c:s partjc:s un<ler t'lrlidc 15. 
14 
T\ior1gages, Ljel\$ and Credlcors' Rc.n1edies 
,-.1. 52 :.trc in1end1..--d to facilitate the financing o f 
offi;horc uniis and 10 m1nin1i:t.ie <:Qnllicts of fo\\'S 
iSSU'I."$ 
' ·> Th.ii; drafL aniclc wus 1hc subjcc;L of 
oonsiderabh: Jiscussion. As 1>crsoos hil\'ing nn 
Optrotional or business relatiollship 'vith off..di0re 
units are- gencrall)' cc)mmercially sophii;tic:1ted, 
and therefore. may n1anaJ;e risk by \'oluntary 
contracruill mc:.1ns, it was not 1hough1 appropri:nc 
tO &1'301 t«0gni1ion of QO}' f'Jl Ul'i timc liCOS CX 
0001 rgctu. E.xt.-ep Lioo~ llre Lhe u1uriti1nt liC'l'IS 
~ranted to of(shnn:- units occup:uus for loss of Jife 
or ptr$0llal inju r)' u.nJ for w!lgt'S 1tnd 5<.'lt'ia.I 
bencllt$, 'vhc:rc cqu:tl bargaining power cu.nnot be 
<l~umcd. c;h1ims a.rii-ing from cntploymcnt of 
o!fsho.re uni1 occupanr.s have \'! given rise lO 
s.ignifiotnt conflict of b \\'S issues. ' f hesc arc also 
a<ldL·cssed iJ~ 11r1kle6. 
Credi1ors remedies 
5.4·5.6 reflect ~encrnUy n:girn<"S common to Jic:ns 
and mong:igC$ of ship:;. There '"a."' fess consensus 
whether u f'C\'eNnl of priorilil."S in Lime whh l\.'Spctl 
to sal\'ag..: c)aims is nt."C.'"CSSal')' or tb-irabte to 
oocour~ge sal\•<)ge openuions of offshore u.nits. 
5.7. 5.8 1\s the o peraLioo of wl offshore w1it hils a 
fllr gre-Jter risk po.tcntin1 th11n , for exan1ple. an 
in:;olvent owners· bul.k currier s1:cun:d in a harbor, 
it is desirable 10 conunl the scope of rmicdics 
exercised b}' sc:curod creditors. 
5. 9· 5. I l 1'bcsc sub:u-Liclcs a re s imilarl)' in tended to 
«:fleer 11 b.1 l~nce bet\\'<:Cn c;rcdioors rights and 1-he 
neeesslry of tbe safe opcl'adoo of acth't' offshore 
units. 
C'.ivil jui:i.sdjc,tfon 
6.1 is intended to reflect 4'tt:ncra'I UNC:L()S 
J>Qficics 
6.2, 6.~ J\ consistent 1ho11c: cf the OUC con-
vention ii; tl1c: necc:ssit)' fur :states partio to 
properly administer it 
6.4 1\1>1lrr fron1 offshore u1Ji1 occupants 11nd ton 
victims. the offshore industrr should be c:ruidcd to 
oontr1tt'ft1;1J frccdonl in c;hoice of fo\\' and choice of 
fOl'UUI, 
6,j-6.8 Sin1ilarly 10 in1cm.irional con\lcnrion!' on 
c-.trriuge of J,1-0<>ds by st"u ao<l for o civil liabiUty for 
a poUution, a dt..-ar SC'I o r rulo for jurio;d.ictioos in 
\\ihich d aims m.:1y be comn1cnccd i$ dcsif':1hlc. If 
the domicili:1.ry st:u.c of M offshore unit OCCUP'.tnt 
h~s o system of \Vorkcr$ ~mpens:uion, the 
offshot\! unit opet-.ttor should n« have 10 <le:J 
·with forum shoppiOJ; I,,)' an injurt'd worker. 
182 
 
6.9·6.I 2 There hnvc been examples of pcr$ons 
fleeing coost~l tircilS bc<\1,.'t l>)• suife actempling ro 
seek. reJui;e 1tbo.11~l t1ffihorc units. 'flu.·sc persons 
and stO\v:a\\'11.)'1' havt rig}U$ of physical protection 
under in1crnation11I hurnu11i1arian law, 
Penal Jumdi~Jion 
7.1 \Th.-tt th< .. tio<wu) of offshor< oon or 
rda1cd appuncnana:s ti t1x same :as thar of thr 
rossuJ smtc, 1htrc iJ Ltdc pmcns:ial (or con£licu of 
Liw in pen•! ]ut1ldiC1i<>n. • P"tticularly .. 1h< 
OUC requi~ at11tQ ~U<ll 10 h<a\~ :tn d'fectivt: 
regulatory ttclmini$1r;uj<tt1, 
7 l PeO•tl offen~cs ar.: t•la1"iflcd into thn.'t 
c:ncg(lrit$ ai; 1 hc:y 111 lriact diffcn:nl pcioritie$ and 
i11terCS1$ of rhe r o1•M al '>toi1c. rhc l:i\\' Qf the 
offshore uni1's Ha~ ~1od 1hc do1nidlllll'y country of 
the offshore unn occu1>an1 
7 5 \'Chile ~tales pjrtan RM) ba\"e differing a 
domestic poltq: int~ll in ,urisc.lictioo O\'tr penal 
offmscs, rhi" paNtftNph 1s irucnded ro gi\1C rhc 
domiciliary ililtt- firia opport\INt)' ro in,atigo.U<" 
and pr<lol<'<Ui< "''"'""' or pubit< order olfen .... 
whik pcrmitrinJL thc CU.l.!lc..J state.- to act if the" 
domicili:iry .St.-'llC declines to do llO. 
7.7. 7.s·rhcli~ J"""JtNphll 11re in1cndcd 10 ilvoid 
double jeopard)' 1tnd c,.pl!chly recognize 1hr 
defense.- o( ronlpulQ(ny ron11>flane<'. 
Safery 
8.J 8.."0lUllC offihon: UIUIJ arc f:X.pliatly suhjm 
to th. ISM Code:. th= arc ..frty roottmS if.,.. 
ofT.shon! unit iJ optr9tnl m ronsuncuon with ind 
artificial tJ.nd or n:lou:d 1ppun"""'ces """ch 
lhcmsd\u arc not •ubjtt1 to SOLAS. Thi$ 
p~l°'.aph if noc: ln1cndcd w compd applicuion 
of the entire ISf\·1 code to a runttJonoi_lly QSSO(i1ucd 
uttifidal iJand or n • .,1uc:d l~ l>1:>urtcl't1Ult'I:, its Ion~ a11 
1herc h; co1np;uihil11y between the qv:.lit)' 
1lll$Url.lncc 5)'~ 1cn1 In ufc on the asg.ocl~utd 
scrunun:s 1tnJ tht..- offlihorc unh. 
8.2 lhis p.11r~1u"lph tt p l oncn1cd and tn~cndcd 
10 p.:nnil ow~nr. flf:' ib1hty co adop1 nNI 
technolq:y md op.:nulOdll methods. 
8.;. 8.4 These P<l'"Jflphs rdle<t fmdings .ind 
rttummcndations oi th< OCEAr. RAl'GER ond 
PlPER Al.Pf/A in<iu111n and u.rc intended to 
ensure thoit the- AnJlll• IK:""on 1n romm:ind can 
htke proper •.:nter~t'nt-y n1l.'!1&lllifes " 'ltb<>ut J.._~Q)'S 
~sliociated in obt11inin,; ek"arnnc:ts or fear of 
cn1ploy1ncn1 1'('1nh11tiC\n, 
85 'This pliU",.;;rai-,h i11 in11!ndcd 10 ensure the 
003StUJ s:ca1e h::1' # b1u;lc rcpilatory or monirormp, 
it•ginlit" in J>iace far 1 oil'~ uoit ~rkm and 
0«u1>an111. flcxibi'li:ry in 1hc mc:1hod o( u.dliC\oing 
1 1!~11 ilK.'51..• li;'(h:Js i~ µern1incd . Portl(untpl\•, a CO-tl!fa.l 
t41&1c 1nay u<lupl ind'usU}' stitudards, t't'OOt-:n lz:c odi~1· 
11..K ~lalc standards, or <b-e-Jop its O\\•n. 
8.6., RJ, Et8 11H":sc par-.grn1>hs 1H\~ 1n1n1t1cd co 
cnsut't' that coasul States address thc::sc safc1y 
wuc."I. I 1cxibilily in dlC mnhod of implancnun,. 
t1- swtdar<b is pmnitt..d 
a 9.S.11 Thcx p;mq<rapbs rdlca find- -1 
~of ihc OCEA\ RAN(,EJ< inquiry: 
8. I) Tht.'ie m,iuiremcn15 a~ aJ1aJo~ to lltc' 
protocol111 established by ICAO far in\'cM4i:.1tJOO of 
avi111ton ~cd~nls invol\ling ourcl'llh or pcn!ons of 
on..: coun1r)' io,,..olving ao ottu1·ren<:e In another. 
8.16 \X'hilc 11dminL..-tN1ivc ft ll·d npcr.itionill 
llt'(ibUn)' is desirabJ~~ it shoold no1 be abweJ co 
C\'ltdr cl'fccth"C" ac.lministration 
S.lvor 
9.1·9.6 The inw.J ct.us.. ..., in1cnd..d to opply 
OPRC pnllC',pks to olfshort" un111 ind :1nifK1.al 
1:tl.uuJs. 
9,7 ·n"" e:xelusion of thc optrildnn <1r lhc ~:J,~e 
CCHl\\•nlion lO olTsbore Ulll~. llfi>:\.,: In pttn rron1 
ind~l I)' concerns O\'er the <l.un1tcttl ofin1crvcntio11 
b)' 11011\'ors inexperienced in f1f(11hon-: unic 
ch~r~C1cr1slics. These ronsidena1io1l! do n0t 1tP1>ly 
whttt lh<" offshore uni1 ii; not tn~~N iu 
CCOMmic activities. 
R ...... .i 
IO. I The opplkation ol 1h< OUC: is ot<ndcd to 
lhc n:.1~ .. bk: W111crs in r~ tcmtori.d tc:a, bcca1.JK 
the UNCLOS rigms, of inno..:tn1 p..as50llC 
J>f\.~UPJ>O:M!. ure na\·iga1u11; envlr(>rlllliCflL Lf tht 
co.-s1.,I $l11lc obtains economic bend.ill! f ron1 
pcriniuing .all offshore uni15 or 1a11ific·i11l l3 IJ111tl" to 
(IJ>Cl\1lc in 01\\•igable \Yt11ers, iu oblij;1uion to 
t!fl'1 111~ 1he sa(c1y of i!Uch \\l'il!Clli fmn1 :111 ifld:1I 
>1runures should be ncknowloo~<-<l. 
PoUution 
Thtt •nidc 11 an .dtp1aiuon of 1hc \...LEE 
00<>\-cnuon "1th the op<ianid cLtU>< <kk<<d 
Apportionment of Ll:abilhy 
\~'liilC' h1.s1ori"".al admil"llh)' l•w n tle., 11nd 1hc 
(Olli$ion \'()l\vc:ntion ret'Ogiti.l.~ UJ>1-)(lf'lio41nll.'nt of 
fi111b, in eollisions bct\\'ccn .ships, no1 iall rountries 
dorrtC!llic l:1ws pto\~de !'or d nliliar 1i1JllX'u1io11111rnl of 
llul>Jhyooncmi1og "'·rongs oot rela1cd to$hipboard 
1e1h•itioi or in\'olving 11LnJctu~ which 11.1~ not 
ship<. 11>i< article ~ dcrn'C<I {"'"' p1n 2 of the 








APPENDIX 4: PETROSA MAP OF OFFSHORE PETROLEUM ACTIVITIES 
Available at http://www.petroleumagencysa.com/images/pdfs/Hubmap10a13.pdf, accessed 12 November 2013 
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